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Abstract
This thesis investigates the interaction of monetary policy and banking regulation and
supervision and what it may imply for the design of their institutional setup. Reforms
implemented all over the world in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis aimed not only
at revising the institutional arrangements of banking supervision that were in place, but
also at introducing a macroprudential oversight of the ﬁnancial system, as a complement
to the microprudential approach, mainly empowering central banks with new ﬁnancial
stability objectives and instruments.
Despite the research eﬀort undertaken, it is still unclear whether central banks, which
main role is to ensure the price stability, should engage in banking supervisory respon-
sibilities and extend their mandates to embrace ﬁnancial stability goals. This thesis
contributes to this literature by:
 Surveying the empirical and theoretical literature concerning the implications of the
interactions between these policies for the design of their institutional framework.
 Assessing the conﬂicting goals of price and banking stability. Acknowledging that
central banks in charge of banking regulation may be less aggressive in their in-
ﬂation mandate, in cases in which tight monetary policy conditions could have
a negative eﬀect on the stability of the banking system, it has been argued that
banking supervisory powers should be assigned to an independent authority to
avoid inﬂation bias.
 Revisiting the role of monetary policy in 'leaning against the ﬁnancial imbalances'
and its interaction with macroprudential regulation.
 Investigating the transmission mechanisms of diﬀerent macroprudential policy in-
struments and their interactions with monetary policy-controlled interest rates,
under a New Keynesian (NK) model with two types of ﬁnancial frictions. For this
topic, preliminary ﬁndings are shown.
We start by showing the lack of both analytical and empirical studies focused on the
trade-oﬀs between expected beneﬁts (`sharing of information' and `expertise') and ex-
pected costs (`conﬂict of interests', `reputation risks', `organizational costs' and `balance
of powers') of central bank involvement in banking supervision. The main conclusions
from the remaining research work conducted in this thesis are:
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 Empirically, there is no evidence of an inﬂationary bias arising from institutional
frameworks in which central banks have banking supervisory mandates.
 Theoretically, based on a NK framework with a banking system and ﬁnancial fric-
tions, we ﬁnd that 'leaning against the ﬁnancial imbalances' monetary policy rules
maximise welfare compared to a standard, conventional Taylor rule. Moreover,
the deployment of macroprudential regulation together with standard monetary
policy also improves welfare, regardless of the ﬁnancial target used and the type
of policy mandate under assessment (separate or uniﬁed). The welfare maximiza-
tion is achieved under a partially uniﬁed mandate featuring a macroprudential
rule reacting simultaneously to credit and credit spreads. Inﬂation stabilization
is better accomplished in a separate mandate, with a standard Taylor rule and a
macroprudential rule responding to credit and spreads.
 When considering loan-to-value (LTV) ratios as a macroprudential tool, prelim-
inary results show that less stricter regulatory requirements for the LTV ratio
amplify the propagation mechanism of monetary policy shocks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The consensus towards the separation of monetary policy and banking regulation and
supervision was unsettled by the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, which revealed the need for imple-
menting major reforms into the institutional mandates of monetary policy and banking
regulation and supervision. These reforms aimed not only at revising the institutional
arrangements of banking supervision that were in place, but also at introducing a macro-
prudential oversight of the ﬁnancial system, as a complement to the microprudential
approach, mainly empowering central banks with new ﬁnancial stability objectives and
instruments.1Although these changes to the institutional designs of monetary policy and
prudential regulation have occurred all over the world, there is still a lack of deep investi-
gation on the interactions between these policies and, consequently, on their implications
to the stability of prices, the ﬁnancial system, the macroeconomy and, ultimately, to the
social welfare.
The introduction of macroprudential policies can improve the trade-oﬀs for monetary
policy and be helpful in particular situations. For example, by ensuring that the ﬁnan-
cial system works smoothly, thereby contributing to an eﬀective transmission process
of monetary policy. Furthermore, by managing the ﬁnancial cycle and increasing the
resilience of the ﬁnancial sector, macroprudential policies may reduce the probability of
systemic crisis and therefore the probability of monetary policy becoming constrained by
the zero lower bound. However, as explained by Smets (2014), there are side-eﬀects that
one policy has on the objectives of the other, originated by the sharing of transmission
channels.
1As an example of reforms in Europe, the United Kingdom is a an example of a country in which
reforms were made in the institutional setup of banking regulation and supervision after the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis, by bringing the Financial Services Authority to the Bank of England.
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For instance, changes in policy rates or non-conventional monetary policies may aﬀect
risk-taking behavior ex ante and the tightness of credit constraints ex post. In a crisis,
liquidity policies by the central bank may avoid a collapse of the banking sector, but also
reduce incentives for banks to recapitalize and restructure, while promoting the growth
of non-performing loans and regulatory forbearance by supervisors. Changes in macro-
prudential policy may pose challenges to monetary policy as well, by altering ﬁnancing
conditions and aﬀecting the real economy and price stability. In the current juncture,
macroprudential policies tend to reinforce the banking sector resilience to shocks, by
imposing stricter bank capital ratios, such as capital buﬀers for systemically important
institutions. These measures' expected impact is to reduce credit availability, conﬂicting
with the purpose of the actual monetary policy stance of very low interest rates and
quantitative easing.
The need for coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies brings ad-
ditional challenges for the design of institutional setups which aims at maximising the
complementary aspects of these policies and minimising the potential conﬂicts that may
arise in the short run. In the academic literature, despite the proliferation of research
work on these ﬁelds, there is not a clear-cut answer to whether central banks shall engage
in banking supervisory responsibilities and extend their mandates to comprise ﬁnancial
stability goals.
This thesis contributes to this literature in several ways. Chapter 2 surveys the literature
concerning the implications of the interactions between these policies for the design of
the institutional framework. To this extent, we compile both theoretical and empirical
literature and identify the topics that need to be further explored. This review indicates
that there is a trade-oﬀ between expected beneﬁts (sharing of information and expertise)
and expected costs (`conﬂict of interests', `reputation risks', `organizational costs' and
`balance of powers') of central bank involvement in banking regulation and supervision.
On the one hand, there is a lack of analytical frameworks studying the interplay between
monetary policy and banking regulation. On the other hand, the empirical evidence is
scarce and not fully conclusive. Empirical studies focus essentially in analysing the argu-
ments related with the `information gains', `staﬀ and funding' and `conﬂict of interests'.
These studies tend to support the `conﬂict of interests argument', pointing out for a
separate institutional setup of monetary policy and banking regulation. In contrast, the
informational gains argument does not gather the same consensus in the empirical lit-
erature. Nevertheless, only a few papers investigate these eﬀects, as it will be discussed
in Chapter 1.
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Regarding the theoretical literature, microeconomic approaches on this topic shows that
the analysis of the banking regulators / supervisors incentives should be carefully con-
sidered in the design of optimal supervisory institutional setups. This literature, mainly
centered in the supervisory and regulatory functions of policymakers, would beneﬁt from
an extension to assess the implications for the institutional setups of incorporating its in-
terplay with monetary policy. Macroeconomic models in which the interplay of monetary
policy and banking regulation is investigated are also scant and focused on Basel I and
Basel II capital regulation frameworks. These studies show that capital regulation has
an impact on the level of output and increases business cycle ﬂuctuations, highlighting
the procyclical eﬀects of Basel II capital requirements. Also, they suggest that capital
regulation requires, in some cases, adjustments of monetary policy.
Chapter 3 focuses on the conﬂicting goals of price and ﬁnancial stability. In this chapter,
we examine the macroeconomic outcomes of economies characterised by diﬀerent monet-
ary and ﬁnancial supervisory architectures. Acknowledging that central banks in charge
of banking regulation may be less aggressive in their inﬂation mandate, it is argued that
banking supervisory powers should be assigned to an independent authority to avoid
inﬂation bias. The paper empirically assesses whether central banks' combined man-
dates lead to an inﬂation bias problem using panel data for 25 industrialised countries
from 1975 to 2012, adopting both static and dynamic panel data models. Findings sug-
gest that, once we control for relevant policy and institutional factors, the separation of
banking supervision and monetary policy does not have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
inﬂation outcomes, i.e., there is no evidence of an inﬂationary bias arising from institu-
tional frameworks in which central banks have banking supervisory mandates. Results
show that there are other institutional pillars of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory
architecture, such as deposit insurance schemes and inﬂation targeting mandates of cent-
ral banks, that contribute in a signiﬁcant manner to keeping inﬂation rates low. Deposit
insurance schemes, in particular, are seen as incentives to the banking industry to under-
take riskier activities, putting the stability of the banking system at stake. This study
suggests that, on the contrary, deposit insurance schemes are important institutional
cornerstones for the stability of prices, by promoting conﬁdence in the well function-
ing of the banking system. As such, they contribute in a non-negligible manner to the
stability of the overall economy.
Chapter 4 aims at investigating the role of monetary policy in promoting ﬁnancial sta-
bility and its interaction with macroprudential regulation. Before the ﬁnancial crisis,
there was a broad consensus in the literature stating that monetary policymakers should
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target price stability without taking pre-emptive measures to avoid the development of
asset prices bubbles. In the aftermath of the crisis, it is clear that policymakers should
do more than cleaning after the bubble burst. To this extent, some authors argue that
monetary policy should also react to ﬁnancial variables, such as credit and indebtedness,
and help countervailing the development of ﬁnancial imbalances. On the other hand,
policymakers and researchers in general advocate the need for a macroprudential over-
sight of the ﬁnancial system, to monitor and mitigate the building up of systemic risks
across ﬁnancial institutions and throughout time.
We address both sides of the debate by developing a model with price stickiness, ﬁnancial
imperfections and a macroprudential oversight of the banking system. Our focus is on
standard monetary policy measures and we suggest as a macroprudential tool a non-
neutral tax / subsidy scheme. Optimal policy exercises are conducted to assess the gains
(or losses) in terms of social welfare of these alternative policy regimes.
First, we evaluate whether monetary policy should respond to ﬁnancial variables, such as
credit, credit spreads or asset prices, under the assumption of the existence of disruptions
in the banking system. Second, we introduce a macroprudential instrument to examine
the impact of having a macroprudential regulator reacting countercyclically to ﬁnancial
imbalances. This exercise is performed under two policy mandates. We assume that each
policy targets its own policy goal, meaning that monetary policy pursues price stability
and macroprudential policy focus on ﬁnancial stability. Then, we extend the analysis by
assuming that monetary policy also reacts to ﬁnancial imbalances, in order to replicate
a uniﬁed institutional mandate, in which both monetary and macroprudential policies
target ﬁnancial stability objectives.
We show that, in a model featuring ﬁnancial frictions, a `leaning against the ﬁnancial
imbalances´ monetary policy rule would perform better in terms of maximizing welfare
than a standard, conventional monetary policy rule. However, rules responding to credit
spreads and asset prices would be related to higher inﬂation volatility, as claimed in the
literature. As a matter of compromise between welfare maximization and macroeconomic
stability, our results suggest that a monetary policy rule that could accomplish this
balance would be one feeding back on credit only, given that it provides a smaller welfare
loss compared to a standard Taylor rule, at the same time it delivers lower inﬂation,
output and interest rate volatility.
In the case of scenarios encompassing a macroprudential policy approach, our ﬁndings
from optimization exercises are interesting from a policy perspective. First, they con-
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ﬁrm the countercyclical nature of macroprudential tools. More important, we show the
deployment of macroprudential regulation together with standard monetary policy im-
proves welfare, regardless of the target selected in the analysis and, to some extent, of the
type of policy mandate under assessment (separate or uniﬁed). The welfare maximiza-
tion is achieved, though, under a partially uniﬁed mandate featuring a macroprudential
rule that reacts simultaneously to credit and credit spreads. The welfare gains from
introducing macroprudential regulation are, in the best case scenario, around 0.07% in
consumption equivalent terms. This improvement is small, but aligned with previous
ﬁndings in the literature (see, for instance, De Paoli and Paustian (2012); Angelini et al.
(2011)). Inﬂation stabilization, on the other hand, is better accomplished in a separate
mandate, in which we have a standard Taylor rule feeding back on inﬂation and output
gaps, and a macroprudential rule responding to credit and spreads.
Despite showing macroprudential regulation improves welfare in every policy mandate
considered in the analysis, our ﬁndings do not provide a deﬁnite answer in terms of
the institutional mandates of monetary and macroprudential policies. A separate policy
regime seems to perform also well in what welfare improvement is concerned. This ﬁnding
is not fully aligned with the consensus among policy makers and academics towards the
joining of macroprudential regulation and monetary policy under a same authority.
Chapter 5 examines the transmission mechanisms of diﬀerent macroprudential policy
instruments and their interactions with monetary policy-controlled interest rates. For
this purpose, we develop a New Keynesian model with two types of ﬁnancial frictions.
Based on a New Keynesian model with a banking sector based on Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011), which incorporates an incentive constraint between
households and banks, we include a second friction along the lines of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). This friction arises from a collateral constraint on
the entrepreneurs' optimization problem. In this extended framework, the provision of
funds from banks to entrepreneurs is not only constrained by the amount of funds that
households are willing to deposit in the banking system, but also by the limits on the
borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs. The model features two macroprudential policy
instruments that diﬀer in their eﬀectiveness in addressing the diﬀerent frictions.
This setup provides a ﬁrst step to analyze how monetary policy would diﬀer depending on
whether it has access to the full or only parts of the macroprudential toolkit  a question
that is particularly relevant in the emerging institutional landscape of the euro area
where the central bank lacks some important macroprudential instruments. The follow
preliminary ﬁndings stand out. First, when merging two sources of credit frictions in an
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otherwise standard New Keynesian framework, the collateral constraint type of credit
friction is dominant over the incentive constraint proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Against this background, the net worth channel of the banking sector from the Gertler
and Karadi (2011) model is not so relevant and, as a consequence, the model's large eﬀect
on the economy also vanishes under a technology and monetary type of shocks. This
is a robust property of our framework, since it holds for diﬀerent calibration scenarios
and alternative monetary policy rules. Second, the inclusion of a collateral constraint,
that can be seen as a prudent bank behaviour, enhances banks' resilience to shocks. This
ability is improved when a more stringent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is considered. These
outcomes oﬀer some insight on the beneﬁts of introducing time-varying LTV ratios as a
macroprudential tool.
Finally, less stricter regulatory requirements for the loan-to-value ratio amplify the prop-
agation mechanism of monetary policy shocks. The incorporation in this two ﬁnancial
frictions model of macroprudential tools, such as countercyclical capital requirements and
time-varying loan-to-value ratios, will be work for future research. Once this extension is
completed, we will focus our analysis on the assessment of how eﬀective macroprudential
policy is in counteracting the eﬀects of shocks in the business cycle, assuming a perfect
control of both instruments and considering two alternative scenarios: one including a
monetary policy response and the other abstracting from monetary policy.
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Chapter 2
Institutional setups of monetary policy
and banking regulation and
supervision - a survey
2.1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis raised the debate regarding the institutional arrangements of
monetary policy and banking regulation and supervision.1
Historically, as pointed out by Haubrich (1996), the institutional arrangements of mone-
tary policy and banking regulation were mainly inﬂuenced by two distinct traditions: the
English tradition and the German inﬂuence. For example, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia and Hong Kong used to follow the English tradition, combining the
monetary policy and supervision under the central bank premises. On the other hand,
Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland used to follow the German tradition of
separation of functions. According to Haubrich (1996), the origin of these diﬀerent tra-
ditions is related to the evolution of the payment system. Countries that adopted the
English tradition experienced a rapid expansion of credit through the introduction of
alternative forms of money, where the central banks naturally became the guarantors of
the smooth functioning of the payment system and the regulators in these market-based
1The concepts of banking regulation and banking supervision are distinct. The former relates to the
deﬁnition of legal rules which the banks have to comply with; the latter respects to the surveillance of
the compliance of those rules by banks. These are two diﬀerent tasks, but usually they are conducted
by the same authority. In this survey, since these responsibilities are intertwined, they will be studied
en bloc.
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ﬁnancial systems. In contrast, countries that experienced a slow expansion of credit
developed a bank-based ﬁnancial system of well-capitalised banks that were regulated
by an independent authority following the German tradition.
In the late 90's there was a tendency for the separation of both functions (Docherty
(2008)), following the German approach. This has occurred in the European Monetary
Union, when the European Central Bank was assigned the responsibility for the conduct
of monetary policy and the national authorities became in charge of the banking regu-
lation and supervision (Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)). Likewise, United Kingdom
and Australia have opted for the separation of these functions. DiNoia and DiGiorgio
(1999) states that only a few industrialised countries have assigned to a single agency
(i.e. the central bank) both tasks. The degree of uniﬁcation between ﬁnancial regula-
tors seemed to be inversely related to the central bank role in the banking regulation
and supervision (also known as central bank fragmentation eﬀect) (Masciandaro (2004)).
Nonetheless, there are still diﬀerences among countries in what regards the institutional
arrangements of banking regulation and supervision.
Notwithstanding the institutional mandates trends around the world in the period pre-
ceding the ﬁnancial crisis, in academic literature it remained an open-ended question.
The arguments for and against separation are strong and therefore it is not an easy task
to ﬁnd a theoretical solution to the issue of what would be the most eﬃcient institutional
mandate from a social welfare point of view. From an empirical standpoint, it seems to
exist in the literature a relative consensus around the thesis of the `conﬂict of interests
eﬀect', but not in what concerns the 'information eﬀect', which are two of the inevitable
arguments of this discussion, as it will be explained in the next sections.
Recently, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis questioned this apparent consensus towards the sep-
aration of functions, and many countries, as the United Kingdom, Germany, United
States of America, Ireland and even the European Union, implemented major reforms
regarding the role of the central bank in banking supervision mandates. In particular,
these reforms encompassed the introduction of a macroprudential view of the ﬁnancial
system as a complement of the microprudential approach already in place. This was
due to costs triggered by the ﬁnancial crisis and the inability of banking supervisors
to prevent it strongly emphasized the need for more policies and instruments targeting
macro-ﬁnancial stability. As deﬁned by Borio (2003), the objective of a macropruden-
tial approach is to limit the risk of episodes of ﬁnancial distress with signiﬁcant losses in
terms of the real output for the economy as a whole, in which it diﬀers from the objec-
tive of the microprudential approach, that aims to limit the risk of episodes of ﬁnancial
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distress at individual institutions, regardless of their impact on the overall economy.
The discussion concerning the role of macroprudential policy in ﬁnancial stability regu-
latory frameworks introduced new questions into the governance debate. In fact, there is
now a clearer distinction between microprudential and macroprudential policies, which
may change the way governance issues regarding monetary policy and banking regulation
and supervision have been addressed in the past.2 For instance, macroprudential policies
might be more connected to monetary policy than microprudential policies, namely in
what regards informational synergies, since macroprudential and monetary policies are
more macro-oriented. As a consequence, the discussion at the current juncture has to
include a new variable into the institutional framework equation, that is macroprudential
policy.
This paper aims at surveying the arguments in favour and against the diﬀerent options
for institutional arrangements, taking also into account the new role of banking regu-
lation and supervision and how it should interact with monetary policy. We identify
key issues in the literature that need to be further explored. On the one hand, there is
a need for analytical frameworks in order to study the interactions between monetary
policy and banking regulation and supervision. In particular, the impacts of the imple-
mentation of macroprudential policy on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
in diﬀerent macroeconomic models, in the form of cooperative and non-cooperative in-
teractions. On the other hand, the empirical evidence is scarce and not fully conclusive
in what the advantages and disadvantages of speciﬁc institutional designs are concerned.
Empirical research should be expanded not only on the grounds of the work done so far,
by including a larger number of countries, time horizon, explanatory variables and the
use of diﬀerent estimation techniques, but also by identifying the economic situations
in which the interplay of monetary policy and prudential policies is likely to produce
conﬂicting outcomes.
The survey is organised as follows. Acknowledging that the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy decisions depends on the smooth operation of the banking system, but the sound-
ness and stability of the banking sector also rely on price and macroeconomic stability,
an overview of the interactions of monetary policy and banking regulation is thereby cru-
cial to understand the issues related to the design of the institutional mandates of these
policies. Section 2.2 of the survey explains how these interactions may occur. Section 2.3
analyses the most important arguments in favour and against the separation of policies,
2Nonetheless, as Galati and Moessner (2012) point out, there is no clear consensus on the relation-
ship and delineation between microprudential policy and macroprudential policy.
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by surveying the relevant empirical literature. Theoretical approaches are covered in
Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 provides a complementary perspective to the economic view
on this topic, by surveying the political-economy approach.
The second part of the survey is focused on the post-2008 crisis period, in which reforms
in banking regulatory mandates were implemented to introduce a macroprudential policy
oversight of the ﬁnancial systems. We discuss the implications of these reforms for the
monetary policy mandate and how it reconciles with the debate pre-crisis in Section 2.6.
Section 2.6.3 concludes.
2.2 The Interactions of Banking Regulation and Mon-
etary Policy
Banking regulation and monetary policy are completely distinct functions, not only in
terms of the objectives pursued, but also in terms of the nature and frequency of their
decisions and qualiﬁcation of staﬀ. Nonetheless, both are intertwined in several ways.
On the one hand, the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends on the smooth functioning
of the banking system, which is promoted by sound banking regulation and supervision
practices. On the other hand, the monetary policy stance may also pose risks to ﬁnancial
stability, justifying that monetary policy decisions should be under the watchful eye of
the banking supervisors.
Although there are several channels of monetary policy transmission,we focus our anal-
ysis on those that work through ﬁnancial imperfections, and are more likely to impact
on bank stability and ultimately on the stability of the ﬁnancial system.3 From this
perspective, there are three main channels of monetary policy propagation: i) the credit
channel, which comprises the bank lending and the borrowers' balance-sheet channels,
ii) the bank capital channel and iii) the risk-taking channel.4
Through the credit channel, monetary policy shocks have an impact not only on the
level of interest rates, but also on the size of the external ﬁnancial premium (i.e. the
diﬀerence between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal
funds) (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). The bank lending and the borrowers' balance-
sheet channels illustrate the link between monetary policy decisions and the external
3See European Central Bank, 2011 for more on the transmission channels of monetary policy.
4In this section we address only the transmission channels of conventional monetary policy.
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ﬁnance premium. The borrowers' balance-sheet channel is based on the assumption that
the external ﬁnance premium is directly related to the borrower's ﬁnancial condition,
which, in turn, is positively determined by the net worth the borrower owns (addressed
as the sum of the liquid assets and the market value of collaterals). A stronger ﬁnancial
condition (or a greater net worth) of a borrower is thereby associated to a lower exter-
nal ﬁnance premium. The lower external ﬁnance premium results from the borrower
capacity to internally ﬁnance a higher share of his or her investments and / or to oﬀer
more collateral to the lender. Given that the borrowers' ﬁnancial situation aﬀects the
external ﬁnance premium, thus determining the general credit conditions available to
them, variations in the quality of borrowers' balance-sheets should likewise impact on
credit terms they face and, consequently, on their investment and spending decisions.
The balance-sheet transmission mechanism of monetary policy arises from the impact of
changes in interest rates on the borrowers' net worth, at least in two ways. Directly, by
increasing the cost of liabilities (such as outstanding short-term or ﬂoating-rate debt), in
the case of rising interest rates, which reduces cash ﬂows and deteriorates the borrower's
ﬁnancial position. Or even by decreasing the price of assets that can be used as collateral,
deteriorating in this way the borrower's ﬁnancial position. Indirectly, a rise in interest
rates may also reduce demand for a certain product, also aﬀecting ﬁrms' net cash ﬂows
and collateral values. In both situations, a tightening in monetary policy interest rates
increases the external ﬁnance premium, negatively impacting the borrowers' ability to
take loans out (i.e. it reduces credit demand in general).
The bank lending channel of monetary policy, on the other hand, operates through
the banks' balance-sheet. In particular, monetary policy may aﬀect the external ﬁnance
premium by changing the ﬁnancial intermediaries' supply of funds, which, in turn, aﬀects
credit supply. A reduction in the supply of funds can, in principle, be achieved by an
increase in reserve requirements (directly reducing the share of liabilities used for granting
credit), a policy measure that is not so common nowadays, or by a rise in interest rates
(raising the relative cost of funds faced by banks). In the case of a decline in credit supply,
the most bank-dependent borrowers, although they may not be completely excluded from
credit, they may have to face costs associated with ﬁnding a new lender, for instance.
The higher costs are likely to increase, by this manner, their external ﬁnance premium
and reduce real activity (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)).
The bank capital channel thesis highlights the role of bank capital requirements, for
market or regulatory reasons, in inﬂuencing the banks' business choices. It is argued that
the bank capital requirements are likely to amplify the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks.
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According to Borio and Zhu (2012), changes in interest rates can aﬀect bank capital
in diverse ways. They may have a direct impact, by aﬀecting cash ﬂows, net interest
margins, proﬁts and the valuation of assets. Changes in interest rates may also indirectly
generate changes in bank capital, through its impact on non-bank balance-sheets and
the macroeconomy, which can have an eﬀect on asset quality and the adequacy of the
bank capital cushion in turn. Overall, when the banks' cost of funds increase, as a result
of the decrease of the value of the bank capital or the increase of its issuance cost, it
is likely to induce higher funding costs to ﬁrms when borrowing from banks. Higher
lending costs may lead to lower borrowing and, thereby, a decrease in ﬁrms investment
and output. This propagation eﬀect typically comes from imperfections in the markets
for bank capital, which dictate changes in the value of bank capital - see Drumond (2009)
for a review on the theoretical reasons.
The risk-taking channel, as ﬁrst argued by Borio and Zhu (2012), is also considered an
important way through which monetary policy could impact on banking stability. It is
argued that low interest rates boost assets and collateral prices and if the market believes
that this is a sustainable rise, it prompts banks and borrowers to accept higher risks.
Then, a softening of credit standards can follow, which may lead to an excessive increase
in loan supply. At the same time, low interest rates make riskier assets more attractive
given the demand for higher yields (`search for yield' eﬀect) as an alternative to less
proﬁtable investments. By the means of the risk-taking monetary policy channel, low
interest rates reduce risk perceptions and/or improve risk tolerance, thereby encouraging
risk taking behaviour.
The close link between monetary policy and the banking system implied by these trans-
mission channels makes the stability of the banking sector not only a concern but a
crucial matter for monetary policy eﬀectiveness. Otherwise, an unstable banking system
can pose signiﬁcant threats to the desired smooth functioning of these transmission mech-
anisms and to the expected and desirable eﬀects of monetary policy decisions. Against
this background, regulation and supervision of the banking system, as a necessary con-
dition to promote banking and ﬁnancial stability, is thereby a requirement to obtain
stability of prices.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to argue that banking regulators should also be
interested in the stability of prices (Tuya and Zamalloa (1994)). Price stability is a
source of macroeconomic stability and banks prefer to operate in an environment with
low degree of uncertainty. As explained by the authors, high and volatile inﬂation may
provide wrong market signals, causing miss-allocation of resources and thus endangering
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the credit decisions of bankers, increasing the probability of bank failures.
The eﬀects of banking regulation and supervision tools in monetary conditions should
thereby be object of concern for monetary policymakers. The instruments used by
banking regulators to minimize moral hazard problems and promote the safety, soundness
and competition of the banking system (for instance, capital adequacy requirements,
asset classiﬁcation and liquidity requirements) can have undesirable eﬀects in monetary
aggregates and interest rates. Banking regulations, such as Basel I and Basel II systems
of risk-based capital requirements, may change the monetary transmission mechanism,
by aﬀecting balance-sheet responses of the banking system and limiting credit and other
assets growth. As Hanson et al. (2010) describe, when a troubled bank is asked to increase
its capital to total assets ratio, for instance, the regulator does not care whether the
bank adjusts via the numerator or via the denominator - that is, by raising new capital or
by shrinking assets, because in both cases this ratio is strengthened to the level required
by the banking authority. However, if the bank chooses to decrease its assets instead of
raising capital, that might represent a reduction on lending and, as a result, it might
aﬀect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
In addition, it is argued that the introduction of capital requirements or its reinforcement
can have a procyclical eﬀect in the economy. In a crisis, a negative shock to the capital
positions of banks, which are highly leveraged and regulated institutions, requires them
to shrink assets to comply with the minimum regulatory capital requirements, amplifying
the negative impact of economic shocks.
The implications of banking regulation on the monetary policy eﬀectiveness are largely
studied. VanHoose (2008) and Drumond (2009) provide surveys on theoretical predic-
tions and empirical evidence, mainly focusing on the ampliﬁcation eﬀects of the Basel I
and Basel II accords through the bank capital channel. The survey by VanHoose (2008)
shows that the eﬀects of monetary policy through the banking system are asymmetric,
depending on the levels of capitalization of the banks. The survey shows that banks
which are well capitalized are less constrained in their reactions to contractionary mon-
etary policy shocks than banks with relatively lower levels of capitalization. When there
is a monetary policy easing the capital unconstrained banks tend to be less reactive.
Drumond (2009) concludes that the theoretical models focusing on the bank capital
channel under the Basel II accord generally support the procyclicality hypothesis and
that the magnitude of the procyclical eﬀects depends on, among other determinants, the
composition of banks' asset portfolios, the approach adopted by banks to compute their
minimum capital requirements, and the capital buﬀers over the regulatory minimum
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held by the banking institutions.
The introduction of a macroprudential oversight of the ﬁnancial system, as already es-
tablished by the Basel III regulatory framework, brings new challenges for the interaction
between monetary policy and banking regulation, which need to be thoroughly inves-
tigated. Among other aspects, the interactions may result from the fact that some of
the instruments used by monetary policy and macroprudential regulation are similar.
This is the case of changes in haircuts for central bank operations or changes in reserve
requirements, which can be considered substitutes of macroprudential instruments such
as liquidity requirements and regulation of margin requirements (Smets, 2014). The
sharing of transmission channels and the use of similar instruments calls for the design
of institutional arrangements in which strong coordination mechanisms are embedded.
Section 2.6 presents preliminary ﬁndings in this regard.
Having in mind the ways through which monetary policy and banking regulation may
be interlinked, the next section reviews the rationale behind the diﬀerent designs of the
institutional framework of monetary policy and banking regulation around the world,
covering, in particular, the main arguments for and against a certain type of institutional
arrangement.
2.3 Institutional arrangements of monetary policy and
banking regulation
Worldwide, according to the World Bank database, there is still a preference for assigning
banking supervision responsibilities to central banks, given that only 39 economies out
of 98 favoured an institutional mandate in which banking supervision is assigned to
an independent authority.5 Moreover, the allocation of banking supervision powers to
central banks has not changed signiﬁcantly after the beginning of the 2007 and 2008
ﬁnancial crisis, as shown in Table 2.1. In 2007, the prudential supervision of the banking
sector was conducted by the central bank in 60 countries, comparing to 59 economies in
2010.
Nonetheless, developed economies (40 countries in 2010) show a more balanced distri-
bution of banking supervision responsibilities, since, based on the 2010 ﬁgures, 50%
5The database covers the ﬁnancial sector supervision institutional structures for 98 countries from
1999 to 2010 and distinguishes between high, upper-middle and lower-middle income economies.
28
assigned this regulatory and supervisory role to the central bank. On the other hand,
upper-middle and lower-middle income countries still reveal a tendency to assign the
banking supervision power to the central bank.
Table 2.1: Mandates of Banking Supervision Around the World
Countries
Prudential Banking Supervision
Within the CB Outside the CB
2007 2010 2007 2010
High Income 21 20 19 20
Upper-Middle Income 22 22 12 12
Lower-Middle Income 17 17 7 7
Total 60 59 38 39
Source: The World Bank, Organization of Financial Sector Supervision Database.
Author's own calculations.
With the purpose of clarifying the diﬀerent political options for the design of the mon-
etary policy and banking regulation and supervision institutional arrangements, in the
next subsections we start by reviewing the arguments supporting the choice of a combined
institutional mandate, in which the central bank is the banking supervisory authority,
and then we survey the arguments for a separate institutional mandate, where banking
regulation and supervision are assigned to an independent authority (Figure 2.1 provides
a summary of the main arguments).
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Figure 2.1: Main arguments for diﬀerent institutional arrangements of monetary policy
and banking regulation and supervision
For this literature review, we limit the scope of our analysis to these two types of institu-
tional mandates of banking regulation and supervision (i.e. we only assess whether the
banking regulatory and supervisory powers are within the central bank or outside the
central bank), deliberately omitting other types of ﬁnancial supervisory architectures.
2.3.1 Arguments against a separate mandate between monetary
policy and banking regulation
There is a large number of arguments in the literature regarding the defense of a uniﬁed
mandate of monetary policy and banking regulation. As referred by Haubrich (1996),
the economics of combination is the economics of information and incentives. The
arguments are listed in two categories: `informational gains' and `staﬀ and funding'.
`Information Gains' arguments
There are informational advantages resulting from the participation of the monetary
policy authority in bank regulation and supervision. The `information gains' result from
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having direct access to conﬁdential information concerning banks' ﬁnancial conditions.
The literature points out three types of advantages from having access to conﬁdential
information regarding the safety and soundness of the banks: its usefulness to decide
whether to provide the lender of last resort (LOLR) support by central banks, as a source
of information about the state of the economy and it improves the accuracy of economic
forecasting.6
One important advantage is intimately closed to the LOLR role of central banks, that
makes them concerned about the systemic stability of the banking and ﬁnancial systems
((Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994) and (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995)). Given this role,
the central bank needs to be aware of the economic and ﬁnancial conditions of the bank
institutions to distinguish between illiquid banks that can be solvent or insolvent, in order
to provide the LOLR support (which should be put in action in situations where the
bank is illiquid, but solvent) and reduce moral hazard. If the central bank participates in
the supervisory process of the banking system, it will have direct access to the banking
supervision data and, under these circumstances, it would be more straightforward to
judge about the solvency of the troubled banks and decide whether to provide or not the
LOLR assistance.7 More speciﬁcally, Repullo (2000) states that in order for the LOLR
to provide liquidity to banks, it can require to lend on good collaterals, as banking
securities. To distinguish between good and bad collaterals, Repullo (2000) argues
that an obvious source of information is bank supervision, because it can have access
to private information on the ﬁnancial condition of the illiquid bank. Therefore, the
decision to implement the lending of last resort assistance should rely on this supervisory
information. Since the central bank can be seen as the ultimate guarantor of ﬁnancial
stability, as argued by Eichengreen and Dincer (2011), the type of information it needs
to be a competent guarantor can only be obtained when it has regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities.
The combination of policies becomes even more relevant during periods of ﬁnancial crises,
when only direct supervision can provide timely and relevant information about banking
conditions (Haubrich, 1996). DeGrauwe (2007) expands this argument further, stating
that if the balance sheets of central banks are aﬀected by a bubble crash, they should be
6As highlighted in Fahr et al. (2011), in the limit the central bank could replace the interbank market
entirely, working as a market maker of last resort, in contrast to a loan provider to a single bank. The
`information gains' argument is valid, regardless of the role of a central bank (as a lender or as a market
maker of last resort).
7Nevertheless, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993; 1995) argue that the preferences of the central
banks, regarding bank rescues, are focused on the risk of a contagion eﬀect, instead of being concentrated
in the banks' solvency.
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also concerned about movements in the assets markets, in order to prevent the bubbles
to form and eventually burst. Therefore, the author concludes that central banks should
expand their responsibilities to the supervision of all institutions that generate credit
and liquidity (and not only to banks).
Banking supervision data is important not only to guide decisions related with the role
of the LOLR, but also to improve the accuracy of economic forecasting so as to conduct
monetary policy in a more eﬀective way, as argued by Peek et al. (1999). Accordingly,
problems in the banking sector can be used as an early indicator of the deterioration of
the macroeconomic conditions. Another aspect worth mentioning is that banking super-
visory information is also relevant to understand how banks might respond to changes in
interest rates ((Peek et al., 1999) and (Goodhart, 2000)). As already referred, monetary
policy aﬀects inﬂation through a transmission mechanism in which the intermediation by
the banking system is essential.8 Therefore, in order to assure the eﬀectiveness of mon-
etary policy, it is necessary to understand how banks might react in their decisions on
lending and credit creation to changes in the monetary policy instruments, i.e. interest
rates.
There are also other arguments related to operational issues, but not as relevant as the
ones described before. For instance, Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) argue that the design of
monetary policy and bank supervision is heavily dependent on information collected from
banks. Therefore, the two policies should be conducted by the same agency to guarantee
the time availability of this type of information and avoid a unnecessary reporting bur-
den on banks. Another argument by Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) is that central bankers
have international contacts with their counterparts that are very useful for banking su-
pervision. In their regular meetings, they discuss policy coordination and timely analyse
economic developments that can aﬀect international banks. Being a separate agency,
banking supervision would not be able to have access to this information.
Discussion
Although this is a major argument to join both functions, there is not a general consen-
sus regarding the view that monetary policy authorities should have access to banking
information by undertaking supervisory responsibilities ((Peek et al., 1999) and (Good-
hart, 2000)). First, LOLR facility is not an exclusive mission of central banks, as argued
8See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a description of the transmission mechanisms of monetary
policy.
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by Goodhart (2000): (...) crisis management, at least in most countries, has already
gone beyond the capacity of the Central Bank to handle on its own. (...) So crisis man-
agement already involves joint co-operation, assessment and agreement between Central
Banks and Ministries of Finance, and the use of taxpayers' funds to resolve the banking
system crisis. Khan and Santos (2005) also point out that the LOLR may be unable to
distinguish between insolvent and illiquid banks, due to information asymmetry prob-
lems, even in the cases central banks have supervisory responsibilities.
In addition, in the absence of direct supervisory responsibilities, the central bank could
simply request the supervisory information from the bank regulator. Peek et al. (1999)
point out some hurdles that, in practice, could hamper these eﬀorts. For example, the
monetary authority should have ready access to all supervisory data in order to be able
to ascertain which data are important for the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, central
banks must have access to timely and reliable supervisory data. More important is that
the assessment of a bank's health and the information used to make that assessment
might depend on the objective function of the banking supervisor, which would limit
the ability of the central bank to interpret the supervisory information. For instance,
the diﬀerent objectives could originate the collection of and emphasis on diﬀerent bank
information or aﬀect the way CAMEL ratings are assigned.9 In addition, Goodhart
(2000) points out that, once the banking supervision has been removed from the central
bank, it can lose the ability to interpret supervisory information properly. Ferguson
(1999) agrees with this view, referring that in the last analysis, there simply is no
substitute for understanding the links among supervision, regulation, market behaviour,
risk taking, prudential standards, and [...] macro stability.
Finally, based on the adversarial legal system theory, Haubrich (1996) claims that the
separation of functions would produce the most information. In other words, each sepa-
rate authority with diﬀerent objectives will obtain evidence that conﬁrms their own view,
whereas combined authorities may not be interested to ﬁnd information that contradicts
their preferred policy.
With regard to the argument that underlines the importance of banking supervision
data to improve the accuracy of economic forecasting, the empirical evidence is weak.
In the literature, there are two papers about this issue, but they show contradictory
results. Peek et al. (1999) analyse whether the banking supervisory functions enhances
9CAMEL rating is a United States supervisory rating, that is based on the banks' overall conditions.
The ﬁnancial conditions of the banks are assessed by the following components: Capital Adequacy (C),
Asset Quality (A), Management (M), Earnings (E) and Liquidity (L).
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the conduct of monetary policy by the central banks, by investigating whether the su-
pervisory information is used by the Federal Reserve in the conduct of monetary policy
to improve macroeconomic forecasts. They conclude that supervisory conﬁdential infor-
mation about banks' health is not used by the Federal Reserve staﬀ to improve their
forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment rates in way that is diﬀerent from forecast-
ers that do not have access to this information. However, they show that conﬁdential
supervisory information is useful to predict inﬂation and unemployment.
Using a diﬀerent methodology, Feldman et al. (2003) contradicts this last result, by
comparing the performance of two forecasting models, one including supervisory infor-
mation and one without it, in order to understand whether adding these conﬁdential
data to the model improves forecasting accuracy for unemployment and inﬂation or not.
Results show that the forecast errors are virtually the same as in both models speciﬁca-
tions. Therefore, in out-of-sample exercises, this paper does not ﬁnd evidence from any
methodology applied that supervisory information would improve forecasts of inﬂation,
contradicting the empirical results by Peek et al. (1999).
`Qualiﬁed Staﬀ' argument
Another group of arguments is related with the expertise of human capital employed
by central banks and banking supervisors. It is argued that both banking supervision
and monetary policy could beneﬁt from being allocated to the central bank. There
are some advantages for banking regulators. First, the knowledge and skills originated
by the management of systemic risk, which has traditionally been associated with the
conduct of monetary policy, may improve the conduct of prudential supervision due
to the closed relationship between this task and monetary policy (Docherty, 2008). In
addition, the prestige and independence of central banks improve their ability to enforce
actions, as well to recruit and retain the most skilled professional staﬀ. Therefore, the
banking regulator would naturally beneﬁt from these abilities, being able to recruit
the most skilled staﬀ and take advantage of the credibility of the central bank when
enforcing their actions to bank institutions (Garicano and Lastra, 2010). This argument
is specially relevant in countries where the level of human capital with this expertise is
scarce (Abrams and Taylor, 2000).
By the same token, the development of expertise about the way the ﬁnancial system
operates is of critical importance to monetary policy making, as argued by Ferguson
(1999). In his view, there is no substitute [...] for the understanding of the institutions
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and the workings of the markets that comes with the hands-on experience derived from
actual supervisory responsibility. Ferguson (1999) claims central banks should have
supervisory roles, in order to develop the knowledge and experience that would be crucial
to manage a ﬁnancial crisis.
The only empirical evidence related to the staﬀ argument is given by Goodhart et al.
(2002). Based on a sample of 91 banks across 57 countries, they conclude that the main
determinant for the employment of experts with diﬀerent skills (economists or lawyers)
is whether the supervisory authority is the central bank or not.10 More precisely, central
banks hire economists and ﬁnance experts, but few lawyers in their supervisory and
ﬁnancial stability department. By contrast, non-central bank agencies employ more
lawyers than economists. Considering this empirical evidence together with economists
ability to analyse the impact of macroeconomic trends on the banking system, the authors
conclude that an institutional setting with involvement of the central bank is more likely
to produce such a macro-approach than a setting without central bank involvement.
Therefore, they propose an institutional arrangement where the central bank and the
banking regulator and supervisor are physically together, but with separate boards. This
empirical result sheds some light into the argument that the expertise of central banking
staﬀ would contribute to the eﬀectiveness of banking supervision. However, it would be
necessary to explore whether these diﬀerences of expertise enhance the eﬀectiveness of
banking regulation and supervision.
`Independence and Funding' argument
In what regards to funding, a uniﬁed mandate ensures independence of banking supervi-
sion from ﬁscal budget pressure ((Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994), (Abrams and Taylor, 2000),
among others). In the same way as monetary policy, banking regulation and supervision
policy requires independence from political pressure to adequately perform its function.
Central banks are generally self-funded and usually proﬁtable and these features would
provide banking regulation with independence from budget pressures and its supervisory
actions would not be inﬂuenced by political decisions.
Currently, this argument is overpast in the sense that banking regulators and supervisors
are now mainly funded by the central banks and by the supervised ﬁnancial institutions,
insulating them from political pressures. Based on information concerning funding of
10As stressed by the authors, the results should be interpreted carefully, because they are inﬂuenced
by the diﬀerent ways in which supervisory institutions answered the questionnaire.
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supervisory agencies for 143 countries provided by the World Bank (Banking Regulation
Survey, June 2008), we ascertain that in 28% of the countries, those agencies are funded
by the Central Bank, in 21% they are funded by supervised ﬁnancial institutions and in
only 3% supervisory agencies rely on government funding.11
Garicano and Lastra (2010) argue that the wider is the role of the central bank, the
more subject it could become to political pressures, thus threatening its independence. In
particular, that may happen when a large failure requires government intervention and
funding, letting the central bank politically subservient in a supervisory role (Goodhart,
1996).
2.3.2 Arguments for a Separate Mandate of Monetary Policy
and Banking Regulation
As Goodhart (1996) pointed out, there is a growing list of arguments for separation.
These arguments can be grouped in three categories, namely `conﬂict of interests', `rep-
utation risk', `organizational costs' and `balance of powers'. The empirical evidence is
also surveyed.
`Conﬂict of Interests' argument
An important argument for separation is that a conﬂict of objectives between the mone-
tary authority and the regulatory and supervisory authority may arise, due to the impact
of changes in interest rates (Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993; 1995) in banking stabil-
ity. The argument goes as follows. Under certain circumstances, the monetary authority
may be interested in raising interest rates to control inﬂation, but the banking regulator
may try to avoid the adverse eﬀect of high interest rates on the soundness and proﬁtabil-
ity of the banking sector. Therefore, when both functions are ruled by the same agency,
i.e. the central bank, monetary policy stance might become more ﬂexible if the central
bank fears that tight monetary conditions may cause bank distress and ultimately bank
failures. In cases like this, it is likely that the ﬂexibility in guiding monetary policy will
lead to an inﬂation bias, since, as Haubrich (1996) explains, the central bank might view
its primary function as protecting banks, not the public interest.
Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) explore the eﬀects of monetary policy in the banking sector.
They conclude that, under certain circumstances, monetary policy conﬂicts with the
11Note: This information was not available for 33% of the countries .
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objective of preserving the soundness of the banking system. The contraction of the
monetary policy instrument, i.e. a rise in interest rates, is likely to increase the risk of
loan default and, consequently, deteriorate the soundness of the banking system.
On the other hand, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993; 1995) discuss what would be the
negative impact of high short-term interest rates to the banking system. They argue
that the impact depends not only on the period of time in which high interest rates
are likely to last, but also on the structure of the banking system's balance sheets. For
instance, banking systems which are mainly ﬁnanced by a retail deposit base, whose
interest rates are unlikely to change following changes in money market wholesale rates,
would have better conditions to deal with contractionary monetary policies. Or, another
example, bank institutions that have bank loans and mortgages contracts deﬁned in
terms of a ﬁxed interest rate are also less prone to temporary periods of high interest
rates. Therefore, they conclude that the structure of the banking and ﬁnancial systems
inﬂuence the degree of the `conﬂict of interests eﬀect' and that these conﬂicts increase
proportionally to the ﬁnancial intermediation and competitiveness of the banking system.
So far, we have described the sources of the conﬂict of interest in the case of a tightening
of monetary policy. Nonetheless, as Blinder (2010) explains, this problem can also
arise when monetary policy is expansionary. Suppose the banks are in trouble and the
macroeconomic environment is weak. The banking supervisor should enforce banking
discipline and the monetary policymaker should decrease interest rates to stimulate the
economy. However, if the central bank has supervisory powers the policies will conﬂict,
because the increase of discipline in banks will have the eﬀect of reducing bank lending,
while the decrease of interest rates will have the opposite result. In a context of a
ﬁnancially distressed banking system, Blinder (2010) argues that the consequence may
be regulatory and supervisory forbearance.
In sum, the discussion about conﬂict of interest implies that, in a uniﬁed institutional
regime, when there are inﬂationary pressures and monetary policy should be tightened,
there is the risk that a lax monetary policy policy may be implemented, to safeguard
the banks, sacriﬁcing the inﬂation target; when there are deﬂationary pressures and
monetary policy should be expanded, there is the risk that a lax banking supervision
will be pursued, to avoid the adverse impact in bank lending. Underpinned on this
arguments, banking regulation policies should be assigned to separate and independent
authorities.
In a critical perspective, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993; 1995) defend that, in an
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environment characterized by open, competitive, and market-driven banking system,
the conﬂict of interest should be incorporated into a single agency in order to achieve a
more eﬃcient resolution of bank distress. In face of a potential bank failure, the monetary
policy authority, as it is also responsible for systemic stability, will prefer to rescue the
bank, whereas the banking regulator will tend to close it in order to avoid moral hazard.
In addition, Blinder (2010) considers that separation of policies may not maximise the
society outcome, because the banking supervisor would be unlikely to take into account
macroeconomic concerns when disciplining the banks. Thus, the supervisor might be
strict with banks and, consequently, reduce bank lending, even when it is necessary to
provide more credit to the economy.
The empirical evidence seems to support the argument that `conﬂicts of interests' may
arise, suggesting that the central banks should only focus on monetary policy. This con-
clusion is conﬁrmed by the empirical results of DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999), Copelovitch
and Singer (2008) and Ioannidou (2005). DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) focus on 25 de-
veloped countries and classify them in two groups, monopolistic and non-monopolistic
countries. Monopolistic countries includes the ones in which the central bank is in charge
of the monetary policy and acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. The estimation
results show that monopolist central banks are less eﬀective in controlling inﬂation.12
Nevertheless, as the authors pointed out, the sample dimension is small, so the diﬀer-
ences found in the average level of inﬂation could be due to other common features
shared by the group of countries that composes the sample.13
Based on the same set of countries, Copelovitch and Singer (2008) extend this study to
test the following hypothesis: institutional mandates of central bankers have an impor-
tant inﬂuence on inﬂation outcomes; the eﬀect of a central bank's mandate on inﬂation
is conditional on the government's choice of exchange rate regime, and the eﬀect of the
central bank's regulatory mandate is conditional upon the size of the domestic banking
sector. Though their econometric approach incorporates additional explanatory vari-
ables, their ﬁndings agree with those of DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999). However, they
12Using inﬂation rates data for the 1960-1996 period, they perform an econometric analysis where the
dependent variable in the regression, average inﬂation rate, is explained by the country's institutional
mandate (dummy variable, that takes 1 when the central bank is monopolistic and 0 otherwise) and by
the degree of independence of the central bank from the government, measured by the index of Grilli et
al. (1991).
13This study presents an additional empirical contribution to this literature, by analysing the bank's
pricing behaviour and performance in monopolistic and non-monopolistic countries. They suggest that
the diﬀerent institutional arrangements may inﬂuence the competition model of the banking system.
In particular, they argue that the banking sectors in 'monopolistic' countries are more protected and
somehow less developed and eﬃcient than those in 'non-monopolistic' countries.
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also show that the impact on inﬂation rates of having a separate banking regulator is
conditional on the choice of exchange regime and the size of the domestic banking sector.
In particular, the separation mandate has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on inﬂation under
ﬂoating rates, but this eﬀect is only observed at middle to high levels of banking sector
size.
An additional empirical contribution by Ioannidou (2005) about the `conﬂict of interests
eﬀect' uses data from one country only, the United States of America, avoiding the
criticism of cross-sectional studies. The study focuses on the particular banking system
regulatory architecture of United States, in which three authorities, the Federal Reserve
System (Fed), the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), share the supervisory powers, but the Fed is the
only authority with monetary policy responsibilities. In this study, the behaviour of the
Fed as a bank supervisor is compared with the supervisory behaviour of the other two
agencies. In particular, it is analysed the eﬀect of the monetary policy on the probability
of a bank getting a formal action (dependent variable). Data covers the period 1990-
1998. Results suggest monetary policy inﬂuences the supervisory actions of the Fed, but
does not aﬀect the actions of the other supervisory agencies. When the Fed rises the
funds rate, the probability of getting a formal action decreases, which means that the Fed
turns out to be more ﬂexible in its bank supervisory role when it tightens its monetary
policy stance. Overall, the empirical results support for the conﬂict of interest eﬀect.
`Reputation Risk' argument
An additional relevant argument is that the reputation of the central bank is more
likely to suﬀer, than to beneﬁt, from banking regulation and supervision, specially in
periods of banking distress ((Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995) and (Ferguson, 1999)). If
bank failures occur, public perception of central bank credibility in conducting monetary
policy can be negatively aﬀected by its role as banking regulator and supervisor. In this
situation, the reputation costs could be very high for the central banks in charge of both
monetary policy and banking regulation. Hence, the monetary policy authority may
not be interested in damaging its credibility by being responsible for both powers. As
Goodhart (1996) clearly explains, external regulation is only desirable to the point where
the marginal beneﬁts exceed the marginal costs. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that
an optimal regulator will be a regulator who fails from time to time in the exercise of her
duty, because the alternative is too expensive. However, a failure of the banking regulator
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is generally visible by the public and it weakens credibility of the banking regulator and
supervisor, because it is not interpreted as a possible outcome of an optimal policy.
Haubrich (1996) oﬀers a critical view about this argument. Allowing a bank failure
might mean not only that the central bank is incompetent and, consequently, ﬂexible
on inﬂation, but also that it is strict in both functions. According to the author, each
interpretation is valid, depending on the circumstances. Hawkseby (2001), in turn,
perceives the reputation risk as a consequence of the potential conﬂict of interest that
may occur once the central bank is in charge of both policies. He argues that the central
bank may have the motivation to be more lax in its monetary policy function to avoid
the failure of a bank or group of banks, which would hurt its credibility as a prudential
supervisor.
`Organizational Costs' argument
The existence of `organizational costs' as an argument against a uniﬁed institutional ar-
rangement is claimed by Vickers (2002) and Garicano and Lastra (2010) among others.
Vickers (2002) analyses the operational diﬀerences between monetary policy (the `hedge-
hog') and competition policy (the `foxes') in the United Kingdom.14 Banking regulation
is considered a competition policy, according to his deﬁnition. Vickers (2002) argues that
monetary policymakers and competition authorities are very distinctive institutions, in
what concerns four organizational aspects: simplicity of tasks, repetition of decisions,
conﬁdentiality and transparency, and interested parties.
Table 1 summarizes the main diﬀerences between the two kind of policymakers, based
on the organizational categories suggested by Vickers (2002):
14Competition policy comprises a variety of industries and markets, such as banks, beer, broadcasting
and buses and also diﬀerent issues, for instance mergers, collusion, vertical relationships, pricing
behaviour, and so on (Vickers, 2002).
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Table 2.2: Organizational Features of Monetary and Competition Policies
Monetary Policy Competition Policy
Simplicity of
Tasks
Yes -
Choose the oﬃcial
short-term interest rate
to determine the
inﬂation rate.
No - variety of
competition policy
questions. Some
competition questions
have not-so-simple
answers nor remedies.
Repetition of
decisions
The key monetary
policy question is
repeated every month.
Competition cases are
more one-oﬀ in nature -
there are no repeated
decisions.
Conﬁdentiality
/ Trans-
parency
Public information and
public models.
Conﬁdential
information.
Interested
Parties
Decisions aﬀect every
one to some degree.
Mostly producers and
their representatives.
Vickers (2002) argues that monetary policymakers tasks are simple, in the sense that they
typically deal with one goal only (price stability) and use one instrument (interest rates)
to achieve their objective. Therefore, the assessment of its success in controlling inﬂation
rates should be straightforward. The simplicity of tasks by the central bank contrasts
with the variety of competition policy issues, which sometimes are diﬃcult to solve.
Focusing on banking regulation and supervision, Garicano and Lastra (2010) defend
that, as a rule, this activity is multitasking, because it deals with multiple goals (ﬁnancial
stability, investor/consumer protection, conduct of business, among others), and deploys
a wide range of tools (licensing requirements, macro and micro prudential supervision,
ﬁnancial stability reviews, lender of last resort operations and crisis management and
resolution).
Another attribute distinguishing both functions is related to the frequency of decisions.
The decision monetary policy authorities have to make - to increase, maintain or de-
crease the interest rate, given economic conditions - is the same every month, whereas
competition regulators usually do not repeat decisions, due to the singular nature of
competition cases. Furthermore, competition cases deal with conﬁdential information
and, as a consequence, competition policymakers must be extremely cautious in what
regards the public release of information. Conversely, monetary policy handles with
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public information and public models. Transparency is also diﬃcult to deal with in
competition policy, even though it has become more transparent in recent years.
Lastly but rather important, generally the decisions about interest rates undertaken
by monetary policy aﬀects everyone to some degree, but the impact of decisions of
competition regulators aﬀects mostly producers and their representatives, making this
functions more vulnerable to lobbying by interested parties. As argued by Haubrich
(1996), the banking industry, which is better organised and aﬀected than the public,
could capture the central bank and gain undue inﬂuence.15
`The Balance of Power' argument
Ferguson (2000), Haubrich (1996) and Goodhart (1996; 2000) introduce another argu-
ment for the separation of functions, that is the concentration of powers in a single
institution. A central bank that is responsible for both monetary policy and banking
regulation and supervision is a very powerful institution and it should be monitored
closely by the citizens and their elected representatives. A related argument by Fergu-
son (1999) is that banking regulation and supervision, considering its importance for the
economy, should be allocated to elected authorities, so as to be collectively evaluated in
its performance.
The concerns about the concentration of powers in a single institution are raised when
the central bank is independent from the government. In a democracy, this means
that important powers are delegated to an authority that is not democratically elected.
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) and Goodhart (2000) state that the tendency towards
the independence of the central bank from the government occurred simultaneously with
the trend towards the removal of banking regulation and supervision from the central
bank. Some explanations for this occurrence are addressed by Goodhart (2000). One
explanation is that democratically elected governments are unlikely to delegate important
powers to an independent agency. Alternatively, the separation of functions could have
been the acceptance that there are `conﬂicts of interest' between the two functions.
Another argument related to the `balance of powers' is associated to the development of
the ﬁnancial system that calls for a uniﬁed regulator for the banks, insurance companies
and securities markets, as stated by Goodhart (2000) and Ferguson (1999). According to
15This argument is associated to the `organizational costs' argument, that states that competition
regulators are more vulnerable to lobbying by interest parties, as banking industry, than monetary
policymakers (Vickers, 2002).
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Ferguson (1999), [...] coupling it with the Central Bank would create too much power in
one entity and place the Central Bank beyond its expertise. However, a single supervisory
authority for all ﬁnancial institutions would pose some concerns, in the sense that it
would be focused on its broad mission and neglect the consequences of its actions in the
economy.
Conclusions on Section 2.3
The literature review referring to the advantages and disadvantages of a combined insti-
tutional mandate for monetary policy and banking supervision indicates that there is a
trade-oﬀ between expected beneﬁts (sharing of information and expertise) and expected
costs (`conﬂict of interests', `reputation risks', `organizational costs' and `balance of pow-
ers') of central bank involvement in banking regulation and supervision (Pellegrina et al.,
2010).
Hence, as Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) point out, the decision of placing banking regula-
tion and supervision in the central bank should be taken on a case-by-case basis. For
example, banking regulation and supervision powers should be assigned to the central
bank in economies in transition, characterised by institutions and legal systems under
a development process, scarcity of human capital and a lack of coordination between
institutions. Moreover, in countries where there is no statutory guarantee to ensure an
independent banking supervision agency the central bank should also be in charge of
banking supervision. On the other hand, countries with high developed ﬁnancial sys-
tems operating internationally, the argument that a central bank should have regulatory
and supervisory powers for all banking institutions loses strength, due to the complexity
of supervising all the ﬁnancial intermediaries that are aﬀected by its decisions.
Another critique comes from Beck and Gros (2012), which advocate that most of this
literature focuses on normal times rather than a crisis situation, although theory and
practice may show that the nature of the relationship between supervision and monetary
policy might diﬀer fundamentally between crisis and normal times.
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) also conclude that the question of the appropriate
design of regulatory system may need to be answered against the particular ﬁnancial /
banking structure of each country, rather than being capable of resolution as an abstract
generality. Furthermore, the reasoning concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
separate institutional arrangements is conditioned by the type of institution - the central
bank or the banking regulator - that is being under analysis. Haubrich (1996) argues
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that as technology, ﬁnance, and the global economy change, so too may the shape of the
world's central banks. [...] This should serve as a reminder that the regulatory structure
keeps evolving and needs continuous reappraisal . In sum, there is not a one size ﬁts
all solution, which means that the design of institutional mandates must undertake
a careful and balanced analysis of the arguments, taking into account the speciﬁcities
of each country, in terms of political system, ﬁnancial sector development and current
architecture of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision.
There are important conclusions from the empirical review. First of all, there is little
empirical analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of diﬀerent institutional man-
dates of monetary policy and banking regulation and supervision. The empirical studies
focus essentially in analysing the arguments related with the `information gains', `staﬀ
and funding' and `conﬂict of interests'. Furthermore, empirical evidence seems to sup-
port the option for an institutional framework where the central bank does not have
regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. In particular, the empirical evidence seems
to conﬁrm that the conﬂict of interests eﬀect may occur, suggesting that central banks
should only focus in monetary policy. However, the samples in which the authors based
their analysis are small in terms of time horizon considered (only 24 years). Moreover,
the econometric methods employed are not the most appropriate to analyse panel data.
In contrast, the `informational gains' advantage does not gather the same consensus in
the empirical literature. Nevertheless, only a few papers investigate this eﬀect. This
eﬀect is particularly relevant having in mind that, according to Garicano and Lastra
(2010), the apparent consensus towards a separate regime was aﬀected by the recent
ﬁnancial crisis and, more precisely, by the Northern Rock failure, which caught the
Bank of England completely unprepared .
Regarding the staﬀ expertise argument, it was empirically found that the central banks
with supervisory powers employ more economists than banking regulators and super-
visors, which hire comparatively more lawyers. Although it sheds some light into the
diﬀerences in expertise among supervisory institutions, it is not suﬃcient to conﬁrm the
argument that the unique expertise of central banking staﬀ would improve the eﬀective-
ness of banking regulation and supervision. Lastly, it is not easy to assess the pertinence
of `reputation and organizational costs' arguments, which may explain the dearth of
empirical papers approaching these issues.
In conclusion, it is necessary to undertake more empirical research, in order to understand
the real relevance of the arguments discussed above. Otherwise, as pointed out by
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Hawkseby (2001), political factors end up having a key role in the choice of supervisory
structure, given the high degree of uncertainty about the economic costs and beneﬁts of
supervisory structures.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis highlighted the importance of developing a macroprudential
approach to regulatory policy, which may introduce a diﬀerent perspective to the tradi-
tional debate about governance of banking regulation and supervision (microprudential
policy focus) and monetary policy. Garicano and Lastra (2010) suggest an intermediate
solution, that is that the function of macroprudential policy should be conducted by
the central bank, whilst the microprudential policy should be allocated to a separate
institution.
2.4 Banking Regulation and Monetary Policy - Theo-
retical Approach
The connections between monetary policy and banking regulation are poorly addressed
in the theoretical literature. However, there is an interesting and fruitful strand studying
the optimal institutional allocation of regulatory functions, such as lender of last resort
(LOLR), deposit insurance and banking supervision, with microeconomic frameworks
(Repullo (2000), Khan and Santos (2005) and Ponce (2010)). It is interesting in the
sense that it focus on one of the major arguments for allocating banking supervision
powers at the central bank: its role as LOLR. This argument, as explained above, claims
that the LOLR should have access to supervisory information in order to distinguish
between insolvent and illiquid banks. By addressing the issue of which institution should
play the lender of last resort role and of whether it should accumulate this function with
supervisory powers, this literature provides useful insights to this debate.
While the abovementioned studies are based on microeconomic models, there are others
approaching the interconnections between monetary policy and banking regulation and
supervision from a macroeconomic point of view ((Seater, 2000), (Cecchetti and Li, 2008),
(Walque et al., 2010), (Angeloni and Faia, 2013) and (Cecchetti and Kohler, 2014)). In
this section, we will ﬁrst survey the microeconomic approaches, and then we will cover
the macroeconomic models.
Repullo (2000) is one of the ﬁrst attempts to explore the interactions between central
banks and regulators, by studying the optimal allocation of the lending of last resort
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function. Based on an incomplete contract framework, Repullo (2000) develops a banking
model with liquidity shocks, in order to analyse which agency, the central bank or the
deposit insurer, should perform the lender of last resort function. The model assumes
that the agency to which is given the lender of last resort role shall also be the supervisory
authority, so as to have access to supervisory information. Supervisory information is
key for a LOLR entity to correctly evaluate the true value of the assets that will be used
as collateral in the liquidity loan. The central bank and the deposit insurer maximise
their own objective functions.16 The central bank is concerned about the impact of a
bank failure on the stability of the banking system, while the deposit insurer is worried
about the risk of having to reimburse depositors after a bank failure. Results show that
the central bank should provide the LOLR assistance for small liquidity shocks, whilst
the deposit insurer should have this role for large liquidity shocks. Therefore, assuming
that small liquidity shocks are more frequent than large ones, conclusions suggest that
the LOLR function should be allocated to central banks, and consequently, the banking
supervision too, in order to avoid duplication of monitoring costs. In face of large
liquidity shocks, the central bank shall delegate this role to the deposit insurer.
Khan and Santos (2005) extend the Repullo (2000) framework to investigate whether the
deposit insurer and the lender of last resort should be separate or uniﬁed agencies and
whether one of these regulators should be responsible for banking supervision. However,
they introduce new features. They explicitly model banking regulation and supervision17,
which corresponds to the power of closing a bank, and they also allow for a distinction
between insolvent and illiquid banks. In addition, by assuming that information is
asymmetric, they assess the impact of the institutional allocation of banking regulation
and supervision on regulator's incentive to obtain and share conﬁdential information on
banks' ﬁnancial conditions with the other regulators.
The study considers diﬀerent types of institutional arrangements: i) a single-regulator
arrangement without supervisory powers, where the LOLR and the DI functions are
performed by a single regulator, but banking supervision (i.e. the closure authority)
is allocated to a distinct agency; ii) a single-regulator arrangement, with banking su-
pervisory powers; iii) a multi-regulator, characterised by three independent institutions,
a central bank that is in charge of the LOLR function, a deposit insurer that cannot
16Repullo (2000) follows a political economy approach, in the sense that the two agencies are not
maximising social welfare. Otherwise, there would be no issue, since either of them would act optimally
as LOLR.
17The authors consider the term banking regulation in a broad sense, since it includes not only
formal rules, but also supervision, deposit insurance and lending of last resort.
46
withdraw DI coverage and a banking supervisor; and ﬁnally iv) a multi-regulator, where
the deposit insurer has supervisory powers. The main conclusions are that the best in-
stitutional arrangement seems to be the one described in iv), where the central bank is
only responsible for the LOLR assistance and the deposit insurer has the power to close
banks. This institutional arrangement is not a common allocation of functions, since de-
posit insurers usually are not assigned supervisory responsibilities. However, it assures
that banks invest eﬃciently in loans (as opposite to choosing an excessive level of re-
serves) and reduces excessive forbearance (i.e., regulators' reluctance to close the banks),
that arises in institutional frameworks such as i) and iii). These results were obtained
by assuming no informational frictions in the model. When informational asymmetry is
incorporated in the model by assuming that the proﬁtability signal is observed costlessly
only by banks, so that monitoring the banks is now a costly activity for regulators, it
is shown that, ﬁrst the regulator's incentives to obtain information depend on their re-
sponsibilities. Second, it is shown that regulators may prefer not to share information
that they obtain in an individual basis with other regulators.
Based on these studies, Ponce (2010) presents a formal model to derive the optimal
LOLR policy to manage liquidity shortages in individual banks.18 This model extends
the previous models in several aspects, but the most important innovation relates to a
ﬁrst attempt to model reputation risk and its implications for the optimal allocation of
banking supervision, by assuming that all bank regulators (central bank, deposit insurer
and bank supervisor) incur in political costs. These are of diﬀerent magnitude regarding
the type of regulator and are incorporated in the utility function of each regulator.
Under the assumption that information is symmetric (i.e. both the liquidity shortfall and
the solvency signal are veriﬁable), the main ﬁnding is that, for small liquidity shortfalls,
the central bank should be the lender of last resort (as in Repullo (2000)), whereas for
large shortfalls the illiquid bank should always be supported. This leads to an optimal
institutional arrangement of the regulatory system, in which the optimal lender of last
resort policy can be implemented when a central bank that is responsible for the LOLR
role, a deposit insurer that guarantees the central bank's last resort loans that exceed a
certain solvency threshold, and a supervisory agency that implements corrective actions
18Other innovations regarding the previous literature relates to i) the incentives of the bank supervisor,
who prefer to ﬁnancially assist illiquid banks in order to avert the political costs of bank failures; ii)
the policy instruments of the bank supervisor, which are a series of triggers to increase the eﬃciency
of banking regulation, instead of the authority to close the bank; or iii) the role also played by bankers
in determining the magnitude of their banks' liquidity problems, as opposite to the other papers, that
assume that bankers are passive agents.
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that are triggered by the provision of the last resort loans.19 These results do not change
even if the deposit insurance premium is positive or banks have capital diﬀerent from
zero.20
Under information asymmetry, results are largely the same as in Khan and Santos (2005).
Assuming that the central bank is the LOLR and the depositor insurer is the bank
supervisor (i.e. it gathers information about the bank's solvency), it is shown that for
certain solvency levels the deposit insurer will prefer to omit such information to the
central bank. In this situation, the central bank has to have supervisory powers in order
to perform his role eﬀectively.
In summary, the models present diﬀerent conclusions regarding the optimal institutional
regime. On one hand, Repullo (2000) and Ponce (2010) suggest that the central bank
shall have supervisory powers, since it performs the LOLR role more eﬀectively when
the liquidity shocks are small. On the other hand, Khan and Santos (2005) argue that,
in the hypothesis of information symmetry, the optimal institutional arrangement is one
that assures deposit insurer should have supervisory responsibilities, whereas the central
bank should perform the LOLR role. This type of institutional mandate would ensure,
according to the model, an eﬃcient allocation of bank resources and reduce excessive
forbearance. By introducing information asymmetry in the model, Khan and Santos
(2005) show as well that information sharing may depend on regulator's objectives and
incentives. In particular, Ponce (2010) shows that, for certain solvency levels, the deposit
insurer will prefer to omit such information to the central bank, justifying the allocation
of supervisory functions at the central bank to be able to perform his role eﬀectively.
Overall, results underscore that when it is assumed that regulators have distinct objective
functions, the analysis of the incentives underlying their actions has to be carefully
considered when designing an optimal institutional arrangement of banking regulation
and supervision. This literature could be further extended to assess the implications for
the optimal institutional arrangements of banking supervision of considering its interplay
with the monetary policymaker.
In what regards the macroeconomic approach of the interplay between monetary policy
and banking regulation and supervision, the study by Seater (2000) is one of the ﬁrst
to model this relationship and, particularly, the optimal structure of the institutional
19According to the author, there are two reasons that justify the use of deposit insurers as guarantors:
the money of taxpayers is not used and it increases transparency, since deposit insurance schemes are
mainly funded by the banking sector.
20However, the results change slightly when it is assumed that corrective actions are costly. In this
case, the results depend on the magnitude of the cost and liquidity shortages.
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arrangement for both policies. Based on a IS-LM model with rational expectations, a
ﬁnancial service provided by the banking system is introduced, i.e. bank monitoring of
its borrowers, and by aﬀecting the productivity of the output sector of the economy, it
provides a link between real economic activity and the ﬁnancial sector. Another innova-
tion is the introduction of a bank regulatory requirement, such as a reserve requirement
or minimum bank capital ratio requirement, imposed by a banking regulator to the
banking system. Results suggest that optimal regulatory and monetary policy should be
simultaneously chosen, implying that the institutions responsible for them must at least
coordinate their activities and perhaps even should be combined into one agency.
Cecchetti and Li (2008) provide an insightful contribution to this literature, by devel-
oping a model through which the conﬂicts that arise from diverse policy objectives of
monetary policymakers and banking regulators are analysed. The model extends the
Blum and Hellwig (1995) banking sector framework to include a central bank and de-
rive an optimal monetary policy rule, in which the potential procyclicality of capital
requirements is incorporated. The central bank and the banking regulator are separate
authorities and the game between the two is modelled by assuming that the central bank
moves ﬁrst and it is followed by the banking regulator, since monetary policy is usually
conducted on a daily basis, whereas banking regulation change slowly.
Results show that the central bank should respond to the banking system's balance
sheet in order to neutralize the procyclical eﬀect of prudential capital regulation. Thus,
in a situation of ﬁnancial distress and economic downturn, the optimal monetary pol-
icy stance should decrease interest rates more aggressively when the banking system is
capital constrained, counteracting the procyclicality of capital regulation and, simulta-
neously, stabilising the aggregate economic activity.21 In summary, the authors show
that capital regulation requires adjustments by monetary authorities, but they are not
an obstacle to the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy. Hence, the conﬂict of interest
between both policy's objectives can be overcome in a game where the central bank
reaction depends on whether the banking system is capital constrained.
Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) extend the Cecchetti and Li (2008) methodology to analyse
the interaction of the monetary policy and banking regulation instruments - in particu-
lar, to investigate whether interest rates and capital requirements may be substitutes in
stabilising the economy. They ﬁnd that the instruments are full substitutes for achieving
21Cecchetti and Li (2008) show that, from 1989 to 2000, the Fed has optimally decreased the federal
funds rate in response to a higher leverage ratio, that was embedded in its reaction function to capture
greater banking system distress under capital regulation.
49
a standard monetary policy goal of output and price stability, due to their similarities
regarding the transmission mechanism. They also show that introducing a ﬁnancial
stability goal impacts on the substitutability between interest rates and capital require-
ments. Coordination is, in this case, suggested to achieve full substitutability, but the
type of coordination also matters. The authors refer to the situation in which partial
coordination is assumed (where the authority in charge of ﬁnancial stability moves ﬁrst).
In this case, the worse outcomes may be attained, given that the policymakers do not
take each other's reactions into their optimisation problem.
Walque et al. (2010) develop a Real Business Cycle model with a heterogeneous banking
sector (banks of two types: merchant and deposit banks)with endogenous default prob-
abilities for both ﬁrms and banks and banking regulation and monetary policy.22 Given
the Real Business Cycle nature of the model, monetary policy is expressed in terms of
liquidity injections into the interbank market, which are represented by a supply of com-
modities. The aim is to understand the interconnections between the banking sector and
the rest of the economy, together with the role of supervisory and monetary authorities
in restoring ﬁnancial stability. In the optimal monetary policy exercise, the central bank
follows two separate objectives, output stability and ﬁnancial stability (by minimising
bank default ﬂuctuations), and it takes capital regulation as given. The banking sector
is constrained by both Basel I and Basel II capital requirements. Results show that,
under capital regulation, monetary policy increases the volatility of the ﬁnancial sector.
As explained by Walque et al. (2010), this occurs because liquidity injections imply an
artiﬁcially low interbank rate and hence an artiﬁcially high bank repayment rate.
Angeloni and Faia (2013) introduce banks in a standard DSGE model with nominal
rigidities23 to analyse the role of banks in transmitting shocks to the economy, the eﬀect
of monetary policy when banks are fragile and the way monetary policy and bank capital
regulation can be conducted as a coherent whole. In this model, the banking regulator
aims at reducing banks' risk, considered high under a unregulated regime, by setting
minimum capital requirements, imposed by a penalty on non-compliance. The mini-
mum capital requirement is represented by a time-contingent ratio between the required
banking capital and the total bank loan exposure, that, depending on some assumptions,
mimics i) the ﬁxed capital ratio under Basel I, ii) the minimum capital requirement im-
plied by the internal ratings (IRB) approach of Basel II, and iii) the anti-cyclical capital
22The banking sector follows the model by Goodhart et al. (2006).
23The banking sector is based on the Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) model.
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requirements under Basel III.24 Monetary policy is incorporated in the model through a
Taylor Rule's objective function, that is extended by including two alternative terms rep-
resenting a systematic reaction on ﬁnancial market conditions, in the form of a response
to asset prices or to changes in the deposit ratio. The interaction of monetary policy and
banking regulation is performed under four capital regimes (the Basel I, Basel II and
Basel III capital regimes, plus a free capital regime) and under six diﬀerent combinations
of monetary policy rules.25
Results suggest that an expansion of monetary policy increase bank leverage and risk.
Secondly, pro-cyclical capital requirements, similar to those under Basel II, enlarge the
reaction of output and inﬂation to other shocks, increasing the volatility of inﬂation
and output and reducing welfare. In turn, anti-cyclical bank capital ratios (Basel III)
have the opposite eﬀect. Findings are thus indicative of, while Basel II procyclicality
may lead to potential conﬂicting outcomes with monetary policy, the adoption of Basel
III capital regime (in which macroprudential instruments are envisaged) may provide a
hand to monetary policy. Moreover, in what regards the measurement of performance
of alternative policies, the authors conclude that the optimal combination includes a
mildly anti-cyclical capital requirement (Basel III) and a monetary policy that reacts
aggressively to inﬂation and reacts systematically to asset prices or to bank leverage.
Overall, these papers show that capital regulation has an impact on the level of output
and increase business cycle ﬂuctuations. In addition, the procyclical eﬀects in the econ-
omy of capital requirements are supported by this literature, mainly when the focus is on
Basel II capital adequacy requirements. Lastly, capital regulation requires adjustments
of the monetary policy, but there are circumstances where they are not an obstacle
to the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy. For example, as suggested by Angeloni
and Faia (2013), an optimal policy would be one that combines the anti-cyclical capital
requirement and a monetary policy that responds to inﬂation and ﬁnancial imbalances.
24In case of non-compliance, the model assumes that the regulator adjusts the return to bank capitalists
downward, to replicate the return to outside investors (depositors and capitalists) that, in an unregulated
regime, would prevail under a bank run.
25The performance of alternative policy combinations is assessed by three criteria, namely household
welfare, output volatility and inﬂation volatility.
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2.5 The degree of ﬁnancial supervision consolidation -
a political-economy approach
In the preceding sections, we have covered the theory and the empirical evidence con-
cerning the advantages and disadvantages of allocating the banking regulation and su-
pervision functions to the central bank. However, as concluded above, a theoretical
approach in which the beneﬁts and costs of diﬀerent institutional arrangements are bal-
anced, does not oﬀer an answer for what would be the optimal supervision architecture.
A political economy approach of the institutional arrangements of monetary policy and
banking regulation and supervision is therefore necessary since, in the real world, these
arrangements are the outcome of a political process (Masciandaro et al. (2008)). Fur-
thermore, the political choices are a consequence of policymakers' preferences, which are
under-studied. In fact, the policymakers' objective function in what concerns ﬁnancial
supervisory design is not studied in the economic literature (Masciandaro (2007)).
In this section, we will review the main factors determining the diﬀerences in the banking
supervision regimes from country to country and, particularly, how political preferences
may impact on the design of the ﬁnancial supervision architecture. The literature review
shows that the current institutional arrangements inﬂuence the policymakers choices
when deﬁning the ﬁnancial supervision structure. Masciandaro (2004), Masciandaro
(2007) and Pellegrina et al. (2010) investigate what features of the present ﬁnancial su-
pervision institutional regimes are more likely to aﬀect the policymakers' decisions. On
the other hand, Masciandaro et al. (2008), Masciandaro (2009) and Franck and Krausz
(2008) analyse the most important political characteristics explaining the ﬁnancial su-
pervision architectures.
Masciandaro (2004) highlights the heterogeneity between banking supervisory regimes.
By building up indices of the degree of uniﬁcation in ﬁnancial sector supervision and the
central bank's involvement in ﬁnancial supervision, based on institutional arrangements
from 69 countries, the author concludes that the degree of uniﬁcation of supervisory
powers in developed countries is increasing, particularly in European Union states.26
In addition, the study identiﬁes two distinct institutional arrangements, that are more
common across the world: a model with high level of uniﬁcation of supervisory powers
and a weak central bank's involvement, opposed to a model characterised by low levels
of uniﬁcation of powers and strong central bank's participation. Given these results, it
26In order to build this index, Masciandaro (2004) considers three possible ﬁnancial sectors: banking,
securities and insurance.
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is argued that a trade-oﬀ arises between the degree of ﬁnancial sector uniﬁcation and
the role of the central bank. There are some possible explanations for this central bank
fragmentation eﬀect. Masciandaro (2004) argues that the trade-oﬀ can emerge due to
the blurring hazard eﬀect, which argues that policymakers worry that the central bank
role as lender of last resort of the banking system might be extended to other ﬁnancial
sectors, such as insurance and securities industries. On the other hand, the trade-oﬀ
can be explained from a political economic point of view, in the sense that in a country
where the central bank is strongly involved in ﬁnancial supervision, the government may
fear an overly powerful bureaucratic agency and it will promote a less consolidated
supervisory regime. This interpretation is related to the `balance of powers' argument,
discussed above.
Masciandaro (2007) investigates the central bank fragmentation eﬀect using econometric
techniques as a complement to the descriptive analysis in Masciandaro (2004). The
paper argues that the policymakers' decision on supervision uniﬁcation level will depend
on the role the central bank plays in banking supervision.27 Based on the same indices
constructed in Masciandaro (2004) an econometric study is performed, where the central
bank fragmentation eﬀect is tested.28 In other words, it is empirically assessed whether
the involvement of central banks in ﬁnancial supervision is an important factor in deﬁning
the degree of supervisory uniﬁcation. The author expects a negative signal between the
central bank participation in ﬁnancial supervision and the degree of ﬁnancial supervision
consolidation. The results conﬁrm the descriptive trade-oﬀ between the participation of
the central bank in ﬁnancial supervision and the degree of supervision uniﬁcation: the
more the central bank is involved in ﬁnancial supervisory powers, the lower the degree of
concentration of those powers is likely to be.
The empirical study by Pellegrina et al. (2010) focus speciﬁcally on the eﬀect of central
bank independence and monetary policy settings on the probability of allocating banking
supervision to central banks. The dataset comprises 88 countries at diﬀerent stages of
economic development. Findings suggest that higher central bank operational indepen-
dence is associated with a reduced degree of supervisory powers and tighter monetary
27For clariﬁcation, uniﬁcation refers to single ﬁnancial authorities regimes, in which banking, securities
and insurance supervision are ruled by a same agency.
28The econometric models adopted are an ordered Logit model and an ordered Probit model. The
dependent variable is the Financial Authority Index, as described in Masciandaro (2004). The key
independent variable is the Central Bank Financial Authority Index, that indicates the involvement
of the central bank in supervision. The control variables are index for the private governance factor,
market capitalization over GDP, quality of public sector governance, GDP, binary variables for OECD
and European countries, binary variables for the law factor and latitude, for the endowment view.
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policy goals are related to higher central bank involvement in supervision.
Franck and Krausz (2008) present a political-economy explanation to the selection of
one of the two possible institutional frameworks. Using the contract theory framework,
they analyse whether the separation between monetary policy and banking regulation
is inﬂuenced by the political preferences on inﬂation of the Conservative and Liberal
parties. They assume that the Conservative party is more favourable to a price stability
environment and, in opposition, the Liberal party prefers inﬂation and lower unemploy-
ment. Results show that separation between those tasks better serves the interests of the
Conservative party, that aims for low-inﬂation policies and banking stability, once the
banking system is considered solid and the probability of banking failures is low. The
main conclusion is that diﬀerent political objectives regarding inﬂation have an impact
on the choice of the monetary policy and banking regulation's institutional regimes.
2.6 Macroprudential regulation and monetary policy
The recent crisis not only has revived the debate with respect to the role of the central
bank in banking supervision, but also highlighted the need for a macroeconomic dimen-
sion of traditional regulatory and prudential framework. As Blanchard et al. (2010)
pointed out, ﬁnancial regulation has played a key role in the crisis, by contributing
to amplify the eﬀects that converted the US housing bubble into a major world eco-
nomic crisis. The ﬁnancial regulation framework, by being characterised by a limited
perimeter of action, encouraged banks to create oﬀ-balance-sheet entities to avoid some
prudential rules and increase leverage (`shadow banking'). Moreover, mark-to-market
rules, together with constant capital ratios, forced ﬁnancial institutions to reduce their
balance-sheets, aggravating asset ﬁre sales, and deleveraging.
The crisis has also shown the lack of eﬀective mechanisms to deal with systemic risk,
stemming, for example, from systemically important institutions. The Fund (2011))
argues that this occurred because of an underlap issue in the ﬁnancial supervisory archi-
tecture: neither macroeconomic policymakers nor prudential regulators were responsible
for promoting the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole. In particular, monetary
policy was apparently insuﬃcient to deal with credit and asset-price booms without
inducing adverse collateral eﬀects on economic activity (Bean et al., 2010).
In the pre-crisis period, banking regulation and supervision was predominantly micro-
oriented, in the sense that aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual ﬁnancial
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institutions (Hanson et al., 2010), and was concerned with the protection of the con-
sumers (depositors and investors). Macroprudential policy, on the other hand, is a regu-
latory approach that recognises the importance of general equilibrium eﬀects, and seeks
to safeguard the ﬁnancial system as a whole, as argued by Hanson et al. (2010).29 In this
crisis context, macroprudential policy has hence been highlighted as having a potentially
signiﬁcant role in addressing system-wide risks and promoting ﬁnancial stability.30
In the aftermath of the crisis, a reform of the international regulatory framework is being
implemented to encompass a macroprudential oversight of systemic risk, among other
things. The ongoing debate among scholars and institutional authorities31 focuses on the
role of macroprudential policy and how it should relate to other macroeconomic policies,
particularly monetary policy and microprudential policy.
Among other questions that are being discussed, the introduction of a macroprudential
approach to the ﬁnancial system brings new challenges for the ﬁnancial supervisory ar-
chitecture and, in particular, for the institutional mandates of monetary policy, including
how policy coordination should put in place.
2.6.1 Objectives and Instruments of Macroprudential Policy
Although macroprudential policy generic goal is to promote ﬁnancial stability, there is
not a single deﬁnition of ﬁnancial stability, as Galati and Moessner (2012) argue.32 In the
29There is an old debate on whether monetary policy should react to expected inﬂation only or to asset
prices as well. For instance, Taylor (2010) considers that there is no need for new policy instruments,
such as discretionary countercyclical capital buﬀers, to ward oﬀ ﬁnancial crises in the future. He argues
that the motivation for using such instruments is lacking. (...) If one believes that low policy rates
were only a modest factor in the boom, then one is drawn to these alternatives.
30According to Galati and Moessner (2012), the term macroprudential ﬁrstly appeared in the late
1970's in unpublished documents prepared by the Cooke Committee, the precursor of the present Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, and in a document of the Bank of England.
31Bank of England, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund, G-20, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, among others.
32In what regards macroprudential policy speciﬁc goals, the literature is fruitful in deﬁnitions as
surveyed by Galati and Moessner (2012):
- Countervailing force to the natural decline in measured risks in a boom and the subsequent rise in
measured risks in the subsequent bust;
- Avoiding bubbles;
- Limiting the risk of episodes of system-wide distress that have signiﬁcant macroeconomic costs;
- Reducing systemic risk by explicitly addressing the interlinkages between, and common exposures
of, all ﬁnancial institutions, and the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system;
- To discourage individual bank strategies which cause systemic risk, a negative externality on the
ﬁnancial system;
- Controlling the social costs of a generalized reduction of assets in the ﬁnancial system.
55
literature, ﬁnancial stability could be referred to as the robustness of the ﬁnancial system
to external shocks or can be interpreted as the resilience to shocks originated within the
ﬁnancial system (endogenous nature of ﬁnancial distress). Overall, macroprudential
policy aims at limiting the risks and costs of systemic crises, thereby promoting ﬁnancial
stability. Macroprudential policy is, therefore, intimately related with the concept of
systemic risk and its sources, but there is no consensus deﬁnition for systemic risk,
as surveyed by Galati and Moessner (2012). Systemic risk can be deﬁned as a risk
of experiencing systemic events where institutions aﬀected in the second stage or later
fail as a consequence of the initial shock, even though they have been fundamentally
solvent before the shock. In alternative, systemic risk is seen as propagation risk, when
shocks disseminate beyond their direct economic impact, resulting in diﬀused distress
and disruption of the real economy. The endogenous nature of systemic risk is also
emphasized, by suggesting that systemic risk results from exposures to the evolution of
systematic risk through time, which is intimately linked to the business cycle.
Since systemic risk has diﬀerent sources, the literature oﬀers a wide variety of potential
instruments that can be used to mitigate systemic risk and prompt ﬁnancial stability.
The most popular is regulatory capital, such as capital surcharges for systemically im-
portant institutions, increasing regulatory capital requirements for particular exposure
types or time-varying capital requirements. Funding liquidity requirements are also an
alternative instrument, for instance, cyclically-dependent funding liquidity requirements
or concentration limits, as well as collateral arrangements, such as time-varying loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios. Risk concentration limits, quantitative limits to growth of individual
types of exposures and proﬁt distribution restrictions are other examples that could be
included in the macroprudential toolkit.
As an example of how a macroprudential tool could work, let us describe time-varying
capital requirements. This instrument requires banks to keep higher solvency ratios in
the upswing of the business cycle (good times) than in the downturn (bad times), with
the purpose of reducing balance-sheet shrinkage, due to credit crunches and ﬁre-sales.
Under such a rule, banks can release their capital buﬀers when an adverse shock hits the
economy and, as a result, the pressure to reduce assets or increase capital would decrease
in bad times. In bad times, the markets can be more demanding than regulators vis-a-vis
bank capital ratios, given a rise in the assets risks. Thus, in good times, the time-varying
capital requirements should be signiﬁcantly above the market-imposed standards in bad
times.
Financial stability is a primary goal of macroprudential policy, but it could also be
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fostered by alternative policies. In particular, monetary policy is also concerned with
ﬁnancial imbalances, due to the fact that ﬁnancial stability is crucial to achieve stability
of prices. Therefore, monetary and macroprudential policies are interconnected, because
they share the same concerns in what regards the stability of the ﬁnancial system, but
while for macroprudential policy it can be interpreted as an end in itself, for monetary
policy it can be viewed as a mean to achieve price stability. Against this background,
the advantages and disadvantages of combining monetary policy with macroprudential
policy are surveyed in the next section.
2.6.2 Institutional arrangements of macroprudential and mone-
tary policies
The mechanism of governance, accountability, transparency and coordination of macro-
prudential policy with other public policies that also aim at preserving ﬁnancial stability
are central features that should be addressed when designing the institutional architec-
ture of macroprudential policy.
In this section, we focus our analysis on the interplay with monetary policy. Benes
et al. (2014) enumerates some basic distinctions of macroprudential policy analysis and
traditional monetary policy analysis. First, monetary policy is conducted over regular
business cycles, whereas macroprudential policy functions with macro-ﬁnancial cycles
that are longer and more asymmetric. Second, monetary policy analysis is based on the
assessment of risks, which generally follows a normal pattern. Macroprudential policy, in
turn, deals with tail risks, i.e., plausible yet very unlikely scenarios. Third, monetary pol-
icy analysis is based on ﬂow variables and prices, while macroprudential policy analysis is
focused on balance sheets, stock-ﬂow relationships and aggregate risk. Fourth, monetary
policy in normal times can be modelled as a linear-quadratic optimal control problem.
In turn, macroprudential policy should be addressed as a highly nonlinear robust control
problem. Fifth, macroprudential policy deals with much more uncertain events than
monetary policy, which is characterised by stable trade-oﬀs that can be, most of the
times, empirically quantiﬁable by the use of standard empirical methods. Hence, given
the nonlinearities arising when the economy is subject to large distress, macroprudential
policy analysis must rely much more on judgement and simulation-based validation than
in empirical methods.
In practice, there are diﬀerent macroprudential policy institutional models that can be
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grouped in the following types, according to the Fund (2011):33 i) a model where a
speciﬁc institution is given a macroprudential mandate; ii) a model where a single
institution is tasked with carrying out macroprudential policy (...), but the decisions are
taken by some attached policy committee; and a model where an independent committee
or council fulﬁlls the role of macroprudential authority.
Considering these challenges, the literature provides both arguments for and against a
separate institutional regime, although they are not systematised as the ones we ﬁnd re-
lated to traditional view of banking regulation and supervision (microprudential policy),
due to the novelty of the topic. We suggest a similar classiﬁcation of the arguments as
presented before for the institutional mandates of monetary policy and banking super-
vision from a microprudential approach point of view.
Arguments against separation of macroprudential and monetary policies
 `Information Gains' argument
According to the Fund (2011), there are informational advantages to both policies. On
one hand, the macroprudential policy may be interested on the ﬁnancial stability risks
associated with a given monetary policy mindset in formulating its polices. On the
other hand, monetary policymakers may want to be informed of action or inaction of
macroprudential authority when calibrating monetary policy. Moreover, Borio (2011)
highlights that central banks have a comparative advantage due to their knowledge
about the functioning of ﬁnancial markets and the macro-economy, which justiﬁes their
leading role as macroprudential policymakers. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) agree with the
observation of the G-30 (2008), regarding the critical importance for central banks of
having information about large systemically important ﬁnancial institutions.
 `Qualiﬁed Staﬀ' argument
The Fund (2011) particularly enhances the advantage related to the accumulated ex-
pertise of the central banks and argues that it could be used to ensure eﬀectiveness
of macroprudential policy. For instance, the central banks have expertise in the anal-
ysis of systemic risks and in monitoring ﬁnancial markets and aggregate and sectoral
33Recent examples from a International Monetary Fund survey include European Union, Malaysia,
Mexico, United Kingdom and United States.
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developments, given his role in monetary policy and payment systems. In addition, ex-
pertise related to his role as a lender of last resort is also important for the deﬁnition of
macroprudential policy measures that aim to reduce the likelihood of individual failures.
Another example concerns the analytical skills of central bank staﬀ that can be used to
clarify the beneﬁts and costs of macroprudential policies.
Furthermore, the central bank has a strong interest in ensuring the eﬀectiveness of macro-
prudential policy. Otherwise, the costs of a failure of macroprudential policy will be borne
by the central bank, namely by ´leaning-against-the-wind´ operations, comprising the
main goal of price stability, or by cleaning, providing liquidity ex post. For this reason,
the central banking expertise should be seized to help the design of macroprudential
policy, having in mind the ultimate goal of eﬀectiveness.
Arguments for separation of macroprudential and monetary policies
 `Conﬂict of Interest' arguments
The price stability is the primary goal of monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability objec-
tives must have a secondary role. In other words, changes in monetary policy, such as
changes in interest rates, should not be recommended by the macroprudential authority,
because they can conﬂict with the principal monetary policy goal and jeopardize the
monetary policy independence (Fund (2011)). Nonetheless, it is important to promote
the mutual internalization of policy action in order to lead to an optimal policy mix.
Blanchard et al. (2010) also recognises that conﬂict of interest may occur, leading to a
more ﬂexible mandate on inﬂation, since increases in interest rates may have an adverse
eﬀect on bank balance sheets. However, these authors consider that this disadvantage
can be overcome by reinforcing transparency.
Beau et al. (2011) consider that the conﬂict of interest outcome will depend on the type
and dissemination of supply and demand imbalances across the ﬁnancial system and the
real economy. They present the following example. Consider a situation characterised
by an asset bubble and by downside risks to price stability. In this case, macroprudential
policy would limit credit and liquidity growth, but such stance could have adverse eﬀects
in aggregate activity and could increase downside risks to price stability. If the prices
fall as a consequence of macroprudential policy, than that may require the intervention
of the central bank, by further lessening the monetary policy stance. Therefore, the
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necessary measures to control ﬁnancial stability would have a negative impact on price
stability, resulting in a conﬂicting outcome.
In turn, an expansionary monetary policy can also impact adversely on ﬁnancial stability.
Lower interest rates can create incentives for banks and other ﬁnancial agents to take
more risk, when they operate in an environment featuring asymmetric information and
limited responsibility.
Under diﬀerent economic circumstances the outcomes on ﬁnancial and price stability of
both policies could be complementary, independent or conﬂicting (Beau et al., 2011).
Table 2.4 presents the circumstances where the conﬂicts between both policies could
arise:
Table 2.4: Conﬂicting outcomes of monetary and macroprudential policies
Inﬂation
above target
Inﬂation
close to
target
Inﬂation
below target
Financial exuberance Complementary Independent Conﬂicting
No imbalance Independent Independent Independent
Financial deﬂation Conﬂicting Independent Complementary
Source: Beau et al. (2011)
Therefore, conﬂicting goals are likely to arise when the economic business cycle is char-
acterised by ﬁnancial deﬂation and inﬂation above the target or by ﬁnancial exuberance
and inﬂation below the target. Source: Beau et al. (2011)
 `Reputation Risk' argument
Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that a disadvantage that comes from a single authority for
monetary and macroprudential policies is that the institutional regime would be more
complex and, therefore, less accountable. In these circumstances, there is, again, a need
for further transparency.
Discussion
Despite the arguments in favour of a separate mandate, there is a convergent stance in the
literature towards the back-up of a uniﬁed institutional arrangement of macroprudential
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and monetary policies or, at least, towards a regime that promotes close cooperation
between the two.34
Blanchard et al. (2010) defend that the macro institution will be the national central
bank and the micro institutions(s) will be one, or more, Financial Services Supervisory
institutions. They enumerate three reasons by which the central bank must conduct
macroprudential policy. Firstly, central banks monitor macroeconomic developments, so
they can use this expertise to analyse ﬁnancial trends. Moreover, the combination of
both functions into a single agency would avoid problems of coordinating the actions
of separate agencies during a crisis. Finally, monetary policy decisions have potential
implications for leverage and risk taking, which are areas concerning macroprudential
policy. Against this background, the authors consider that the decision for a uniﬁed,
single peak, approach in the United Kingdom was wrong and clearly recommend a
reversion to the prior twin-peaks approach, with one peak being the macro, systemic,
economic Central Bank, and the other being the micro, individual prudential (...), legal
and accounting FSA.
Garicano and Lastra (2010) argue that macroprudential measures should be allocated
to the central bank, because this institutional arrangement makes it possible to capture
the main synergies while avoiding most of the organizational costs. In particular, the
authors advocate that the multitasking, informational economies of scope and `reputa-
tion risks' apply typically to microprudential policy, as well as the `conﬂict of interests'
arise from the connections of that function and monetary policy. In turn, the role of
lender of last resort is a function that is more related with macroprudential supervision.
For these reasons, the authors support an institutional regime featuring the combination
of macroprudential supervision tasks with central banking, but leaving microprudential
responsibilities outside the scope of central banks, since this framework seems to provide
relevant beneﬁts while avoiding the main `organizational costs' associated to micropru-
dential regulation.
Blinder (2010), in his analysis of the U.S. context, has the view that the macroprudential
policy and the supervision of systemically important ﬁnancial institutions should be
assigned to the Fed, while the supervision and regulation of small institutions could
be allocated to a separate institution, since it lacks economies of scope compared to
the other functions. The reasons are: i) the separation of functions neglects the strong
economies of scope between ﬁnancial stability and monetary policy; ii) the role of lender
34Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Blanchard et al. (2010), Garicano and Lastra (2010), and the Fund
(2011).
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of last resort is an important instrument to pursue ﬁnancial stability, iii) a single agency
responsible for ﬁnancial stability is more accountable than a committee. Mishkin (2011)
also agrees with the view that a systemic (macroprudential) regulator should exist and
that it should be allocated to central banks, due to coordination advantages between
monetary policy and macroprudential regulation. In particular, Mishkin (2011) considers
that macroprudential policies are mainly useful to control the development of credit
bubbles (and not asset price bubbles in general).
In turn, the Fund (2011) does not have a clear perspective on this, concluding that
there are advantages and disadvantages of speciﬁc institutional mandates for the macro-
prudential policymaking and, thus, these issues requires further analysis, particularly
focusing on the interplay of macroprudential and monetary policies. The interlinkages
between both policies are surveyed in the following section.
2.6.3 The interactions of macroprudential and monetary policies
A main topic in the design of an eﬀective institutional mandate for macroprudential
policy is how it interacts with monetary policy, since both promote macroeconomic
stability and aﬀect real macroeconomic variables. The key questions we ﬁnd in the
literature are the following:
 How macroprudential policy tools should be set in conjunction with monetary
policy?
 Should the same institution (i.e. the central bank) set the two policy instruments
to achieve both price and ﬁnancial stability?
 Or should each instrument be designed to deal with each policy objective?
 Are there any gains from coordinating monetary policy and macroprudential pol-
icy?
 Attending to the fact that both policies are likely to aﬀect aggregate demand and
supply and conditions in the banking sector, is it possible that they are in eﬀect
perfect substitutes?
 Or, if they are suﬃciently independent and the instruments are set by diﬀerent
policymakers, would there be the case for a push-me, pull-you eﬀect?
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As this is a very recent topic in the literature, the answers to this questions are scarce.
According to Galati and Moessner (2012), the interaction between these policies depends
on whether ﬁnancial imbalances play a role in the monetary policy framework and they
also argue that the challenge of combining both policies is similar, to some extent, to
the challenge of coordinating monetary policy and ﬁscal policy. As for the case of the
monetary policy and ﬁscal policy game, the authors suggest that the problem may be
addressed by monetary policy taking macroprudential policy as given when setting short-
term interest rates since the frequency of macroprudential policy decisions is likely to be
lower than of monetary policy decisions. Beau et al. (2014) argue that macroprudential
policies may alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism, because the former will
act via the same channels as monetary policy, in particular the bank lending and the
balance-sheet channels, as already discussed above. To the extent that spillovers may
arise, fully optimal policy calls for at least some sort of coordination between these two
policies.
A number of papers oﬀer preliminary insights and suggest diﬀerent ways of combining
the macroprudential tool with the monetary policy instrument. De Paoli and Paustian
(2012) address these questions by adapting a New-Keynesian model from Carlstrom et al.
(2010). This microfounded macroeconomic model features an agency problem, that gives
rise to credit constraints and a `risk premium' that depends on the degree of the credit
constraints. The macroprudential instrument is a time-varying leverage ratio. The
interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies is analysed in a cooperative
solution under commitment and under discretion, in one hand, and in a Nash-equilibrium
and a leadership equilibrium games, on the other hand. Findings suggest that, under
a cost-push shock, welfare is improved if policy authorities coordinate and commit to a
speciﬁc policy stance. In the case macroprudential policy and monetary policy do not
cooperate and act under discretion, assigning a conservative policy mandate to both
institutions improves welfare. In particular, the assignment of a leadership role to the
macroprudential authority is also welfare beneﬁcial. Finally, authors show that selecting
a macroprudential instrument that resembles closely a monetary tool can cause costly
coordination issues.
Bean et al. (2010) extend a New-Keynesian DSGE model to incorporate both physical
capital and a simple banking sector, in order to analyse how the macroprudential policy
tools might impact on the conduct of monetary policy.35 As a macroprudential policy
instrument, it was selected a (lump-sum) levy / subsidy on the banking sector, which is
35The authors adapt the model from Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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used to inﬂuence the amount of bank's capital that is carried forward. First, they analyse
the conduct of monetary policy and macroprudential policy when a single policymaker
is in charge of both functions. Then, they compare the outcomes with the ones resulting
from a distinct arrangement, in which macroprudential policy is delegated to a diﬀerent
agency. The results suggest that the possibility of a push-me, pull-you outcome arise
under a mark-up shock, since macroprudential policy moves to maintain bank capital,
ignoring the impact on the inﬂation gap and, in turn, monetary policy raises the policy
rate more aggressively to contain inﬂation, not taking into account the capital gap. In
this case, conﬂicting outcomes arise, suggesting that both policies should be coordinated.
Angelini et al. (2014) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector
following Gerali et al. (2010) to analyse the interactions of the macroprudential policy
and monetary policy in order to determine if they can cooperate to stabilise the economy.
In this model, macroprudential policy is concerned with excessive lending and cyclical
ﬂuctuations of the economy. Therefore, the macroprudential policy authority minimises
a loss function whose elements are variances of the loans-to-output ratio and of the out-
put. The two instruments suggested are a capital requirement and a loan-to-value ratio
(LTV). Based on this analytical framework, the interplay between macroprudential and
monetary policies is modeled in two diﬀerence contexts. One is the cooperative context,
where both policies jointly and simultaneously set the parameters of their respective pol-
icy rules to minimise the weighted average of their two objective functions. The other is
the non-cooperative context where each authority minimises its loss function taking the
policy rule of the other as given.
Analysing the eﬀects of a technology shock, their ﬁndings suggest that the gains from
cooperation are small. In normal times, the contribution to macroeconomic stability of
macroprudential policy is negligible. However, in the non-cooperative case, conﬂicts may
arise, due to the macroprudential policy authority's incentive to stabilise the loans-to-
output ratio, neglecting the impact of its behaviour on the objectives of the monetary
authority. In particular, macroprudential policy becomes procyclical and monetary pol-
icy countercyclical. In this situation, it is also observed a substantial increase in the
variability of the policy instruments. In the presence of ﬁnancial and housing market
shocks, advantages of macroprudential policy become sizeable. In the cooperative game,
the central bank deviates from strict adherence to its objectives to help macroprudential
policy achieving its goals. Hence, when the economy is hit by sector shocks, it is possible
to observe a higher inﬂation volatility.
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In brief, this recent literature oﬀers diﬀerent ways of setting up macroprudential policy
together with monetary policy, exploring not only the distinct sources of ﬁnancial fric-
tions and macroprudential instruments, but also the possible institutional arrangements
that can be set. Overall, ﬁndings suggest that these policies are not perfect substitutes,
thus macroprudential policy may play a role in promoting ﬁnancial stability, even though
the magnitude of the gains of employing this type of policy depends on the type of shock
that impacts the economy. Furthermore, the papers suggest that there are gains from
coordination of policies, because when the instruments are set separately by diﬀerent
institutions, a push-me, pull-you eﬀect is likely to arise, under special economic situa-
tions. Thus, the conﬂict of interest argument seems to have some support in analytical
frameworks.
However, as Taylor (2010) points out, the stylised nature of this kind of models illustrate
how far we are from a monetary framework to evaluate such policies.
2.8 Concluding remarks
This survey clearly shows that the occurrence of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the sub-
sequent explicit introduction of ﬁnancial stability policy in the macroeconomic policies
set irreversibly changed the debate regarding the institutional arrangements of monetary
policy and banking regulation. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, we have witnessed
a change in the taxonomy used to refer to banking regulation and supervision to a more
general concept of prudential regulation, comprising both macroprudential and micropru-
dential approaches. This clear distinction between the macro and the micro prudential
purposes of banking regulation and supervision brought a new view in the discussion of
the design of monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture, that, although far from
being settled, in certain dimensions there is a more consensual understanding of what
the role of central banks should be on these grounds.
In addition, this review ﬁnds that nowadays there is a common view that central banks
should have an explicit ﬁnancial stability mandate, by playing a role in macroprudential
policy, but the microprudential dimension of banking regulation and supervision should
be assigned to an independent authority. This view is raised upon the stronger simi-
larities between monetary and macroprudential policies, as underpinned above, and the
allocation of ﬁnancial stability objectives would take the most of the synergies arising
from the interaction of the two policies (Smets, 2014). Nonetheless, this survey also
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highlights the need for empirical and theoretical evidence, which is still scarce, suggest-
ing that this view is not yet informed by empirical and theoretical analysis, but mostly
by personal opinions of researchers and policymakers.
As Smets (2014) clearly puts it, the design of optimal institutional setups of monetary
and macroprudential policies depends on the diﬀerent appreciation of the pervasiveness
of this interaction, the eﬀectiveness of independent macroprudential policies, the extent
to which monetary policy may be a source of ﬁnancial instability, and the extent to which
monetary policy can avoid being drawn into ﬁnancial stability concernsin particular,
in times of crisis. There is not yet a clear answer to all of these aspects and research is
therefore needed.
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Chapter 3
The Eﬀect of Financial Regulation
Mandate on Inﬂation Bias: A Dynamic
Panel Approach
3.1 Introduction
It is now well documented that many macroeconomic variables in several economies
have gone through the so-called `Great Moderation' period, which broadly correspon-
ded to lower levels and volatility of inﬂations rates, coupled with stable growth and low
unemployment. Until recently, ﬁnancial regulation did not feature prominently as a mac-
roeconomic policy tool, but, nevertheless, recent decades have seen substantial changes
in the institutional architecture of monetary policy and banking regulation across many
countries. It seems, therefore, relevant to assess how these changes have contributed to
macroeconomic outcomes and, in particular, inﬂation.
Historically, the institutional arrangements concerning the monetary policy and banking
regulation were mainly inﬂuenced by two distinct traditions; the Anglo-Saxon inﬂuence,
where monetary policy and banking supervision are combined under the central bank,
and a German-inﬂuenced approach, where these functions are separated.1 According to
Haubrich (1996), the origin of these diﬀerent traditions is related to the evolution of the
payment system. Countries that adopted the Anglo-Saxon tradition experienced a rapid
1For example, countries with an Anglo-Saxon inﬂuence include the United States, United King-
dom, Australia and Hong Kong, whereas countries with German inﬂuence include Austria, Germany,
Denmark, and Switzerland.
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expansion of credit through the introduction of alternative forms of money, where the
central banks naturally became the guarantors of the smooth functioning of the payment
system and the regulators in these market-based ﬁnancial systems. In contrast, countries
that experienced a slow expansion of credit developed a bank-based ﬁnancial system of
well-capitalised banks that were regulated by an independent authority following the
German tradition.
However, in the late nineties there was a tendency for the separation of these functions
following the German-style framework.2 Indeed, over the period from 1986 to 2006 for
a sample of 91 countries, Masciandaro (2009) demonstrates that 94% chose to reform
their ﬁnancial supervisory architecture and unify the ﬁnancial system regulators within
the same agency, but diﬀerent from the central bank. In particular, it is shown that the
degree of uniﬁcation of ﬁnancial regulators is inversely related to the central bank's role
in banking regulation and supervision. More recently, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis questioned
this apparent consensus towards the separation of functions, and several countries, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland, but also the euro area, implemented
reforms towards the reinforcement of the role of the central bank in banking supervision
(Pellegrina et al., 2010).
Notwithstanding the ﬁnancial supervisory architecture trends around the world, there
are strong arguments for and against separation of banking supervision from the central
bank in the academic literature. On the one hand, a combined institutional mandate, in
which the central bank is also in charge of banking supervision, provides gains in terms
of information, in the sense that the central bank has access to conﬁdential information
regarding banks' ﬁnancial situation.3 This type of information is useful in situations
in which the lender-of-last-resort support is deployed, since the decision to use this
mechanism to support banks in ﬁnancial distress should be based on accurate information
regarding the solvency of these institutions.4
On the other hand, it is argued that a combined institutional mandate may lead to con-
2Most notably, in 1999 the European Central Bank was assigned the responsibility for the conduct of
monetary policy in the euro area and the national authorities became in charge of the banking regulation
and supervision. Likewise, the United Kingdom and Australia have opted for the separation of these
functions.
3There are other arguments in favour of combined institutional mandates, such as the access to
expertise and qualiﬁed staﬀ argument (Garicano and Lastra, 2010) and the independence argument
(Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994).
4Supervisory data is also relevant as a source of information regarding economic conditions and,
therefore, it can also be used to improve the accuracy of economic forecasting, which is commonly one
of the core functions of central banks.
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ﬂicts in the objectives of monetary policy and banking supervision, in certain economic
circumstances.5 This argument in favour of the separation of policy regimes states that a
central bank responsible for banking regulation will be more ﬂexible in its inﬂation man-
date if it fears that tight monetary conditions may cause bank distress due to adverse
eﬀects of high interest rates on the proﬁtability and soundness of the banking sector
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993, 1995).
The aim of this paper is, thereby, to empirically examine the implications of diﬀerent
designs of monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture on the inﬂation rate dynam-
ics. In particular, this study investigates the potential monetary policy and banking
regulation conﬂicting goals by assessing whether institutional mandates in which the
central bank plays a banking supervisory role have, on average, led to higher inﬂation
rates in relation to a separate regime. In addition, we consider the impact on inﬂation
from other components of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture, namely
the degree of independence of central banks, whether they were assigned an explicit
inﬂation targeting mandate, or whether the establishment of deposit insurance systems
with the view to enhancing ﬁnancial stability by protecting deposits may inﬂuence the
monetary policy stance.
Building upon the work by DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and Copelovitch and Singer
(2008), we address several limitations in their models and extend the analysis in several
ways. As Copelovitch and Singer (2008) point out, some of their results should be
interpreted carefully due to the small size of the sample they are using, which is a
panel data that comprises 23 industrialised countries ranging from 1975 to 1999. Since
they opt for transforming the annual data into ﬁve-year averages, the sample size is
even more reduced. To overcome problems related to sample size, we introduce two
innovations. First, we suggest the use of annual panel data, instead of the ﬁve-year
average inﬂation rate approach. We also undertake the estimation of a dynamic panel
data model for inﬂation analysis, taking into consideration empirical evidence on the
persistence of inﬂation rates. Even more relevant are the improvements regarding the
estimation approach. Despite the construction of a panel data sample to measure the
eﬀect of the separation of banking supervisory powers from the central bank on inﬂation
outcomes, previous studies adopt simple estimation methods, such as ordinary least
squares, which do not take into account unobserved eﬀects that are typical of panel data
5Another argument against the combination of monetary policy and banking regulation refers to the
reputation risk that is associated to this type of institutional arrangement. It is argued that public
perception of central bank credibility may likely be aﬀected by its performance as a banking supervisor,
mainly if a bank failure occurs.
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analysis. We use appropriate methods to estimate panels, both static and dynamic,
namely the Fixed Eﬀects and the Arellano-Bover approaches.
Second, we extend the time span from 1999 to 2012, which results in a dataset covering
a suﬃciently wide time span of 38 years to allow for some of these countries to change
their institutional mandates of banking supervision more than once.6 For the remaining
countries, there is a predominance of jurisdictions that never changed their supervisory
arrangements (16 out of 25) and 7 countries introduced reforms during this period. The
period of the sample is wide enough to capture normal macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
times, characterised by the `Great Moderation' period, and a worldwide ﬁnancial and
economic crisis period .
Finally, we allow for the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that were not
considered in past analyses and that are likely to explain inﬂation behaviour. Indeed,
variables that aim at capturing other aspects of the ﬁnancial and monetary architecture,
such as the monetary policy regime (in particular whether or not an inﬂation targeting
regime is in place) and the presence of deposit insurance schemes, together with vari-
ables that account for the degree to which open economies are exposed to `imported'
inﬂationary shocks, are of crucial importance in studies on this topic.
Estimation results show that the institutional separation of banking supervision from
central banks does not have a signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation, suggesting that inﬂation
rates are not systematically above in countries in which a combined mandate of monetary
policy and banking regulation is in place. This result is robust to time spans not includ-
ing the ﬁnancial crisis period and to the dynamic version of the panel data model. More
interestingly, our ﬁndings suggest that there are other characteristics of the monetary
and ﬁnancial supervisory architectures that are driving forces of low inﬂation rates, such
as inﬂation targeting and deposit insurance systems. Developed economies implemented
major reforms in their monetary and ﬁnancial institutional setup in the last decades
of the twentieth century. These reforms included changes in the central banks' institu-
tional mandates, turning these institutions more independent from the political system
and transparent in what their goals are concerned, and the introduction of explicit de-
posit guarantee schemes, which have a crucial role in restoring depositors conﬁdence in
the banking system thereby promoting ﬁnancial stability. Our ﬁndings show that these
aspects of the institutional architecture of the monetary and ﬁnancial systems are im-
6 This is the case for Ireland which reviewed its banking supervisory institutional arrangement in
2003 and again in 2010, after the subprime crisis, and Luxembourg, which reviewed its supervisory
mandate in 1983 and 1999.
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portant to promote price stability in these economies. Deposit insurance schemes, in
particular, are seen as incentives to the banking industry to undertake riskier activities,
putting the stability of the banking system at stake. This study suggests that, on the
contrary, deposit insurance schemes are important institutional cornerstones for the sta-
bility of prices, by steering conﬁdence in the well functioning of the banking system. As
such, they contribute in a non-negligible manner to the stability of the overall economy.
The negative impact of these elements on inﬂation is a robust result for both normal
and crisis times. Finally, economic factors, such as the output gap, trade and capital
account openness, are also important determinants of inﬂation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy and how banking regulation and supervision may aﬀect these channels.
Section 3.3 presents the data, describes the methodology used in the empirical analysis
and the estimation results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Interactions of monetary policy and banking su-
pervision - a review
Monetary policymakers have distinct policy goals from banking supervisors. While the
former are focused on price stability, the latter look after the solvency of the individual
banks and the resilience of the banking system as a whole (microprudential and macro-
prudential approaches of banking supervision, respectively). Although they are distinct
policy objectives per se, they are likely to positively contribute to the ultimate goal of
macroeconomic stability. In this sense, policy objectives of monetary authorities and
banking supervisors are complementary at least in the long-run, since both promote the
economic and ﬁnancial conditions needed to achieve stability at the macroeconomic level.
Nonetheless, under speciﬁc economic circumstances, the outcomes on ﬁnancial and price
stability of banking supervision and monetary policy, respectively, can be conﬂicting,
due to the fact that banking supervision may alter the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. The monetary policy propagation channels more likely to interact with
bank stability and ultimately with the stability of the ﬁnancial system are mainly three:
i) the borrowers' balance-sheet channel, ii) the bank lending channel, and iii) the risk-
taking channel.7
7In this section we address only the transmission channels of conventional monetary policy.
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Through the borrowers' balance-sheet and bank lending channels, monetary policy shocks
have an impact not only on the level of interest rates, but also on the size of the ex-
ternal ﬁnancial premium (i.e. the diﬀerence between the cost of funds raised externally
and the opportunity cost of internal funds) (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The borrow-
ers' balance-sheet and the bank lending channels illustrate the link between monetary
policy decisions and the external ﬁnance premium. The borrowers' balance-sheet chan-
nel is based on the assumption that the external ﬁnance premium is directly related to
the borrowers' ﬁnancial condition, which, in turn, is positively determined by their net
worth (which may be thought as the sum of the liquid assets and the market value of
collaterals). Given that the borrowers' ﬁnancial situation aﬀects the external ﬁnance
premium, thus determining the general credit conditions available to them, variations
in the quality of borrowers' balance-sheets should likewise impact on credit terms they
face and, consequently, on their investment and spending decisions. Changes in interest
rates aﬀect the borrowers' net worth, at least in two ways. A rise in policy interest rates
increases the cost of liabilities, reducing cash ﬂows and deteriorating borrowers' ﬁnancial
position. In addition, it decreases the price of assets that can be used as collateral,
deteriorating borrower's ﬁnancial position and limiting the amount of lending provided
to borrowers. Indirectly, a rise in interest rates may also reduce demand for a certain
product, also aﬀecting ﬁrms' net cash ﬂows and collateral values. In both situations,
a tightening in monetary policy interest rates increases the external ﬁnance premium,
negatively aﬀecting the borrowers' ability to make loans (i.e. it reduces credit demand
in general) (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
The bank lending channel of monetary policy operates through the banks' balance-sheet.
Speciﬁcally, monetary policy may aﬀect the external ﬁnance premium by changing the
ﬁnancial intermediaries' supply of funds. A rise in interest rates induces a reduction in
the supply of funds, by raising the relative funding costs faced by banks, leading to a
fall in credit supply. In the case of a decline in credit supply, the most bank-dependent
borrowers, although they may not be completely excluded from credit, may have to face
higher funding costs themselves. The higher costs are likely to increase their external
ﬁnance premium and reduce real activity (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
The risk-taking channel, as ﬁrst argued by Borio and Zhu (2012), claims that low interest
rates boost assets and collateral prices and if the market believes that this is a sustain-
able rise, it prompts banks and borrowers to accept higher risks. Then, a softening
of credit standards can follow, which may lead to an excessive increase in loan supply.
By the means of the risk-taking monetary policy channel, low interest rates reduce risk
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perceptions and/or improve risk tolerance, thereby encouraging risk taking behaviour.
By promoting risk taking and search for yield behaviours, monetary policy may sow the
seeds for ﬁnancial instability.
Due to the sharing of transmission channels, interactions of banking supervision and
monetary policy may have conﬂicting goals. For example, in an economic downturn,
monetary policymakers' response is to avert deﬂationary pressures by decreasing inter-
est rates, whereas the banking supervisor, under the same economic circumstances, may
favour raising capital requirements to guarantee the resilience of the banking system to
economic shocks (Goodhart et al., 1993; 1995). The raise in capital requirements in a
deﬂationary economic environment may lead to a reduction on credit supply, exacerbat-
ing the adverse economic conditions and counteracting the monetary stimulus promoted
by the decrease in interest rates. This example illustrates a potential conﬂict between
the objective of monetary authorities, which aim at keeping inﬂation around the target
by decreasing interest rates, and banking supervisors, whose actions may constrain the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Another example comes from a situation in which strong inﬂationary pressures are de-
tected and the central bank increases interest rates to counteract the upward devel-
opments in prices. Nevertheless, high increases in interest rates may negatively aﬀect
banks' proﬁtability and solvency, depending on their magnitude (high interest rates may
pose more serious risks to banks' proﬁtability than lower rates), and on banks' balance
sheet structures. A high increase in short-term interest rates is likely to be an important
determinant of systemic banking crisis, since it may deteriorate banks' balance sheets.
Consider an increase in short-term interest rates. Banks adjust by raising the deposits
rate. Assuming that the assets side of the balance sheet is mainly composed by loans
with longer maturities at ﬁxed interest rates, the banks cannot pass through to borrowers
the increase in interest rates, and, as a result, the interest margins compress, reducing
banks' proﬁts. Even if the banks' loans are provided at a variable rate, allowing them to
pass on the rise in interest rates to borrowers, losses may result from a larger fraction of
non-performing loans, since the debt service augments, making some borrowers unable
to meet their obligations. Therefore, banking supervisors may prefer a gradual monetary
policy tightening in the presence of inﬂationary pressures than a sudden large increase
in interest rates.
Conﬂicts of this sort challenge the institutional arrangements of monetary policy and
banking supervision. In the case central banks are in charge of banking supervision, they
have to deal with these potentially conﬂicting goals: controlling inﬂation at the target
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levels, while maintaining ﬁnancial stability. These decisions may depend on the empha-
sis that is given to ﬁnancial stability, but the conﬂict of interest argument states that
central banks may opt for being more ﬂexible in their inﬂation mandates, when ﬁnancial
stability is at stake. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1995), among others, argue that central banks responsible for banking supervision have
incentives to be particularly attentive to the eﬀects of their interest rate decisions on the
proﬁtability and stability of the banking sector. Against this background, it is therefore
argued that an inﬂation bias may arise in institutional mandates characterised by cen-
tral banks with supervisory functions, in opposition to an institutional set-up in which
banking regulation is assigned to a separate authority.
The potential inﬂation bias stems from a less strict monetary policy stance towards
inﬂation than in the case in which the monetary policymaker is not concerned about
ﬁnancial stability. In this sense, the argument can be stated as follows: countries in
which central banks have banking supervisory powers will experience larger inﬂation
rates, on average, than countries in which banking supervision is assigned to an agency
other than the central bank.
The evidence in the literature supports the existence of conﬂicting goals between mon-
etary policy makers and bank regulators. Using data from the United States over the
period 1990-1998, Ioannidou (2005) examines whether monetary policy responsibilities
have implications in the conduct of the bank supervision when the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (Fed) is responsible for both functions.8 The results suggest that monetary policy
inﬂuences Fed's supervisory actions as it turns out to be more ﬂexible in its banks'
supervisory role when it tightens the monetary policy stance. Moreover, focusing on
25 industrialised countries over the period 1960-1996, DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) ﬁnd
evidence that average inﬂation rate is explained by countries' institutional mandate when
controlling for central bank independence from the government. The authors conclude
that central banks are less eﬀective in controlling inﬂation when they are responsible for
the regulation of the banking sector.
In a similar study, Copelovitch and Singer (2008) consider 23 industrial countries from
1975 to 1999 and found empirical evidence that inﬂation rates have been signiﬁcantly
lower, on average, in countries where the central bank and the banking supervisor are
8Note that the regulatory architecture of the banking system in the United States is such that the
Fed, along with the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), all share the supervisory powers, but the Fed is the only regulator responsible for
monetary policy.
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separate agencies.9 This eﬀect is conditional on the choice of the exchange rate regime
and the size of the domestic banking sector. In particular, the separation mandate has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on inﬂation under ﬂoating rates, but this eﬀect is only observed
at middle to high levels of banking sector size.10
The interlinkages between monetary policy and banking regulation are poorly addressed
in the theoretical literature. The few examples of studies investigating upon these issues
are from Cecchetti and Li (2008) and Cecchetti and Kohler (2014). Cecchetti and Li
(2008) develop a model through which the conﬂict of interest that arise from diverse pol-
icy objectives of monetary policymakers and banking regulators is analysed. The model
extends the Blum and Hellwig (1995) banking sector framework to include a central
bank and derive an optimal monetary policy rule, in which the potential procyclicality
of capital requirements is incorporated. The central bank and the banking regulator are
separate authorities and, due to the fact that monetary policy is usually conducted on a
daily basis, whereas banking regulation change slowly, interactions between the two are
modelled by assuming that the central bank moves ﬁrst and it is followed by the banking
regulator. Results show that the central bank should respond to the banking system's
balance sheet in order to neutralize the procyclical eﬀect of prudential capital regulation.
Thus, in a situation of ﬁnancial distress and economic downturn, the optimal monetary
policy stance should decrease interest rates more aggressively when the banking system
is capital constrained, counteracting the procyclicality of capital regulation and, simul-
taneously, stabilising the aggregate economic activity.11 The authors show that capital
regulation requires adjustments by monetary authorities, but they are not an obstacle to
9This paper uses as control variables: central bank independence (Cukierman's methodology 1992,
from Comparative Political Dataset), exchange rate regime (dummy, IMF classiﬁcation), trade openness
(measured as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, World Development Indicators database),
capital account openness (Chin-Ito index), log of GDP, GDP per capita (World Development Indicators
database), dummy variables (sum of individual year observations for each period of ﬁve years, divided
by 5) for currency crisis and banking crisis (Glick and Hutchinson, 1999), dummy for explicit deposit
insurance (World Bank's Deposit Insurance Around the World database), size of the domestic credit
provided by the banking sector as a % of GDP (proxy for the size of the domestic banking sector, World
Development Indicators), time trend variable (ranges from 1 to 5).
The authors also test for additional explanatory variables, such as lagged dependent variable, union
density, centralization and coordination of wage bargaining, veto players, the partisan composition of
government, unemployment rates, GDP growth, and a dummy for an election year and conclude that
these variables do not aﬀect the basic results.
10Under a ﬂoating exchange rates regime, the central bank maintain the ability to conduct autonom-
ous monetary policy, while, in contrast, with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, central banks do not have
independent monetary policy. In the latter case, institutional features are of little importance.
11Cecchetti and Li (2008) show that, from 1989 to 2000, the Fed has optimally decreased the federal
funds rate in response to a higher leverage ratio, that was embedded in its reaction function to capture
greater banking system distress under capital regulation.
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the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy. Hence, the potential conﬂicts between policies'
objectives can be overcome in a type of game where the central bank response takes into
account whether the banking system is capital constrained.
Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) extend the Cecchetti and Li (2008) methodology to investi-
gate whether interest rates and capital requirements are interchangeable instruments in
stabilising the economy. They ﬁnd that the instruments are full substitutes for achieving
a standard monetary policy goal of output and price stability, due to their similarities
regarding the transmission mechanism. They also show that introducing a ﬁnancial
stability goal impacts on the substitutability between interest rates and capital require-
ments. Coordination is, in this case, suggested to achieve full substitutability, but the
type of coordination also matters. In the case in which partial coordination is assumed
(where the authority in charge of ﬁnancial stability moves ﬁrst), the worse outcomes may
be attained, given that the policymakers do not take each other's reactions into their
optimisation problem.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis has the purpose to investigate the interactions of monetary and
ﬁnancial supervisory institutional arrangements. In particular, we aim at assessing the
validity of the conﬂicting goals argument, by analysing the impact of a combined mandate
of monetary policy and banking supervision on inﬂation rates. We choose to study the
impact of institutional mandates of monetary policy on inﬂation outcomes instead of
output not only because the 'conﬂict of interest argument' explicitly refers to inﬂation
rates, but more importantly central banks mandates on price stability are mainly focused
on controlling inﬂation rates around a certain level (target) or on targeting price growth
only. We also consider the impact on inﬂation from other components of the monetary
and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture, namely the degree of independence of central
banks, whether they were assigned an explicit inﬂation targeting mandate, or whether
the country has a deposit insurance scheme to protect depositors from bank failures.
Our dataset covers 25 developed countries along the time period from 1975 to 2012. We
consider distinct model speciﬁcations and use appropriate estimation methods for each
type of model speciﬁcation. Subsection 3.3.1 describes the data, subsection 3.3.2 presents
the regression model speciﬁcations and estimation results are reported in subsection 3.3.3.
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3.3.1 Data
We consider annual time series data for 25 OECD countries over the period 1975-2012.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual inﬂation rate while, in addition to
the explanatory variables considered in related empirical literature,12 a number of other
regressors is included in the analysis, since we expect they can be also related to inﬂation.
The regressors are grouped in four categories: institutional, external, economic and
banking structure. Descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in the Appendix,
together with a summary of the expected impact of each explanatory variable on inﬂation
rates, which can be found in Tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.1, respectively.
3.3.1.1 Institutional Factors
The characteristics of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture in each coun-
try are captured by several variables. The main institutional variable incorporated in this
study controls for monetary policy and banking regulation institutional arrangements in
each country. This variable is referred to as separate banking supervision and represents
the mandate of each central bank in terms of banking supervision responsibilities and
captures its impact on inﬂation rates behaviour. This is captured by a dummy that takes
value of 1 if the function of banking regulation is assigned to an authority independent
from the central bank, and value of 0 if banking supervision is a central bank's responsib-
ility (the latter case refers to a combined institutional arrangement).13 The classiﬁcation
of countries into these two groups (i.e. separate banking supervision or combined man-
date) is based on information disclosed in the Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys
(updated June 2008 and 2012) provided by the World Bank, which collects information
12See DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999), Copelovitch and Singer (2008) and Aisen and Veiga (2006).
13Note that the variable separate banking supervision does not account for whether a separate banking
supervision also oversees securities markets and / or insurance companies. The classiﬁcation only
captures the allocation (or exclusion) of banking supervision to central banking responsibilities. The
classiﬁcation of countries in terms of separate and combined institutional mandates is presented in Table
3.1 in Appendix B. For the euro area Member States, we consider a combined banking supervision
regime after their entrance in the European Monetary Union, in 1999 (except for Greece which joined
the European Monetary Union in 2001), due to the fact that national central banks are part of the Euro
system, which also comprises the European Central Bank, responsible for the conduct of monetary
policy. It can also be argued, though, that the European Monetary Union should be treated as a
separate mandate, given that monetary policy is centralised in the European Central Bank. We perform
a sensitivity analysis to assess for the latter case, in which we assume a separate institutional mandate
between monetary policy and banking supervision, whenever the national central bank is in charge
of supervisory responsibilities. The estimation results do not change substantially and are shown in
Appendix B, Tables 3.5.9 and 3.5.10.
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regarding the main aspects of regulation and supervision from supervisory authorities
located in 143 jurisdictions for the years 2008 and 2012.14
Data is complemented with other information sources. We consulted Copelovitch and
Singer (2008)'s classiﬁcation and in the cases for which there was uncertainty about the
type of mandate, the central banks and supervisory agencies websites were also employed
for cross-check. The survey by Courtis (2011) on international supervision arrangements
was also useful to conﬁrm our previous classiﬁcations. Still, there are some countries
for which a clear-cut separation of banking supervision responsibilities is diﬃcult to
undertake.
Table 3.1 shows the evolution of inﬂation rates and the institutional arrangements in the
25 countries included in our sample along the period 1975-2012. Over the sample period,
inﬂation rates decreased substantially: in 1975, the global sample inﬂation was 13.5% on
average, continuously falling during the 1980's and the 1990's, and stabilising around 2%
in the 2000's (i.e. in 2012 the country average inﬂation was 2.2%). This decreasing trend
was observed not only in countries with combined mandates of banking supervision, but
also in countries in which separate regimes of banking supervision were in place, although
the inﬂation rate average between 1975 and 2012 was lower in countries with separate
mandates (4.7%) than in countries with combined regimes (6.4%).
Table 3.1: Mandates of banking supervision and average inﬂation for 25 countries
Year
Mandates Inﬂation Rates (%; average)
Separate Combined Countries with Separate Mand. Countries with Combined Mand.
1975 8 17 11.5 14.5
1980 8 17 9.7 15.1
1985 7 18 5.1 9.2
1990 7 18 5.2 6.4
1995 7 18 1.9 3.8
2000 12 13 2.6 2.5
2005 14 11 1.9 2.3
2010 13 12 2.3 1.7
2012 11 14 1.9 2.5
According to our classiﬁcation, banking supervision responsibilities were assigned to
14This classiﬁcation is based on the answers given by the countries in this sample to questions 12.1
of the World Bank survey for 2008 utilized by the authors to compile the dataset. The questions are
stated as follows: in the 2008 survey, What body or agency supervises banks?, or, in the 2012 update,
What body/agency supervises commercial banks for prudential purposes?.
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the central bank in 17 OECD countries in 1975, whereas only 8 countries preferred
to allocate this responsibility to an independent authority. This distribution remained
stable until the late 1990's, a period from which it is observed an increase in the number
of countries that have opted to separate banking supervisory responsibilities from the
central bank. In the early 2000's, there was a balance in this sample between countries
with separate institutional arrangements of banking supervision and monetary policy
(12) and countries with combined mandates (13). In the 2000 decade, the number of
countries with separate banking supervision mandates outpaced the number of countries
with combined regimes, reaching a peak of 14 countries out of 25 from 2003 to 2009.
After the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008, and as a response to it some countries
reformed their institutional settings of banking supervision towards its allocation to
the central bank. This tendency is already to some extent reﬂected in 2012 ﬁgures,
which illustrate a decrease in the number of countries with separate banking supervision
mandates, from 14 in 2009 to 11 in 2012.
This can be considered a rich dataset in the sense that it covers a suﬃciently wide
time span to allow for some of these countries to change their institutional mandates
of banking supervision more than once. This is the case for Ireland which reviewed
its banking supervisory institutional arrangement in 2003 and again in 2010, after the
subprime crisis, and Luxembourg, which changed its supervisory mandate in 1983 and
1999. Iceland and the United Kingdom also have recently reformed their supervisory
arrangements for the second time since 1975, but since their entering into eﬀect was
in 2013 and 2014 respectively, these changes are not covered by our database. For the
remaining countries, there is a predominance of jurisdictions that never changed their
supervisory arrangements (16 out of 25) from 1975 to 2012 and only 5 introduced reforms
during this period.
There is a large literature following Cukierman et al. (1992) claiming that the degree of
independence of the central bank (thereafter CBI) has a signiﬁcant negative impact on
inﬂation outcomes. Accordingly, it is expected that a country with a higher degree of
central bank independence will also experience lower average inﬂation rates. The CBI
variable used in this study is based on the work of Arnone et al. (2007) who update
the Cukierman et al. (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) measures for central bank political
and economic autonomy. Political autonomy is interpreted as the power of central banks
to deﬁne and implement monetary policy, whereas economic autonomy evaluates the
central banks operational independence. Following the literature, we assume that CBI
measures computed in the late 80's do not vary until 2003, the year for which Arnone
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et al. (2007) update the index.15
The insurance of bank deposits is another common pillar of the ﬁnancial supervisory
architecture. Deposit insurance systems are considered necessary for the stability of the
ﬁnancial system and the protection of depositors. In 1933, the United States was the
ﬁrst country to establish a national deposit insurance system, but it was only over the
last quarter of the twentieth century that explicit deposit insurance has spread across
countries, rising from 12 in 1974 to 71 in 1999 (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). Cur-
rently, most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing countries feature
some sort of explicit depositor protection.
A country with an explicit deposit insurance scheme that provides depositors with pro-
tection from losses in the event of a bank failure will experience lower average inﬂation
rates. This is because the central bank can be aggressive on its inﬂation mandate as it
is less concerned about the eﬀect of interest rates on banking stability (Copelovitch and
Singer, 2008). In our dataset, the deposit insurance variable takes value of 1 for countries
with explicit deposit insurance and of 0 otherwise. The classiﬁcation uses information
from the World Bank Deposit Insurance Around the World Dataset, from 1975 to 2003,
and from the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), for the remaining
years.
To account for the eﬀects of inﬂation targeting on inﬂation behaviour, a dummy variable
is introduced taking the value of 1 at the year that a country adopted inﬂation target-
ing and onwards,16 and the value of 0 in the remaining cases based on Roger (2010)'s
classiﬁcation. Since this approach pursues an explicit public commitment to control in-
ﬂation as the principal policy goal, we expect that a country that has adopted inﬂation
targeting will experience lower inﬂation rates.
In addition, we include a Great Moderation Period dummy variable to control for
the persistent decline of inﬂation rates (and their volatilities) in the developed world
since the early 1980's. The breakpoint is 1984, according to McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), the year from which we consider the beginning of the great moderation
period. We build a dummy that takes value of 1 from 1984 until 2007, when the crisis
15As CBI measures are usually computed for speciﬁc periods of time, researchers circumvent the
problem of using a CBI index in panels by considering that CBI measures do not change signiﬁcantly
across time. We built the dataset based on the same assumption.
16In our sample, the countries that use inﬂation targeting are New Zealand (since 1990), Canada (since
1991), United Kingdom (since 1992), Sweden (since 1993), Australia (since 1993), Iceland (since 2001)
and Norway (since 2001). Finland and Spain adopted inﬂation targeting, in 1993 and 1995 respectively,
but abandoned it when they entered the in 1999.
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started. The remaining years covered in the dataset are assigned a value of 0. We also
condition our inﬂation estimations on an exchange rate regime variable that takes value
of 1 for all varieties of hard ﬁxed exchange rates and 0 for ﬂoating or managed ﬂoating
regimes. Data are based on the International Monetary Fund classiﬁcation by Ilzetzki
et al. (2008). Finally, in what institutional factors are concerned, euro membership is
included to control for the euro area countries' speciﬁc monetary policy mandate and it
takes the value of 1 from 1999 onwards for the euro area member countries, except for
Greece that entered the European Monetary Union two years later (2001).
3.3.1.2 External and Economic Factors
In order to capture the impact of external factors on inﬂation outcomes, we consider the
following explanatory variables: trade openness, capital account openness and oil imports
as percentage of GDP. Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports as
a percentage of GDP and data are taken from the Comparative Political Dataset (1960-
2011). An inverse relation between trade openness and inﬂation is expected as more
open economies beneﬁt from lower inﬂation, on average. According to Romer (1993),
the degree of openness of the economies aﬀects inﬂation through two diﬀerent channels.
First, a more closed economy has a higher incentive to engage in surprise inﬂation since
its impact on the real depreciation is less costly, given that the fraction of imported
goods is lower in this economy.17 Second, openness aﬀects the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ:
for a given increase in output, the rise in domestic prices will be higher as more open the
economy is, given the exchange rates disciplining eﬀect. Thus, monetary policymakers
incentives to engage in expansionary policies are lower in more open economies, and
therefore inﬂation is expected to be smaller. There is a broad empirical support for this
view, in which a strong and robust negative impact of openness on inﬂation outcomes is
shown to be present.
Capital account openness is measured using the Chinn-Ito index, developed in Chinn
and Ito (2008) for the period ranging from 1970 to 2012.18 This index accounts for re-
strictions on capital account transactions, current account transactions, requirements of
the surrender of exports proceeds and the presence of multiple exchange rates. Similarly
to trade openness, empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between ﬁnancial
openness and inﬂation (Gruben and McLeod, 2002; Gupta, 2008). For oil import coun-
tries, we expect that oil prices will have a positive eﬀect on inﬂation. The data for the
17In these models it is assumed that domestic and foreign goods are not perfect substitutes.
18The Chinn-Ito index is taken from the Comparative Political Dataset (1960-2009).
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value of oil imports is from the World Economic Outlook Database, published by the
International Monetary Fund. We consider the oil imports as percentage of national
GDP, to account for the diﬀerent dimensions across countries.
To account for the eﬀect of economic conditions on inﬂation, we include as regressors the
output gap, currency and banking crisis. Output gap measures the diﬀerence between
the actual level of national output and the estimated potential level. A positive output
gap implies upward pressures on inﬂation. Currency and banking crisis are dummy
variables that take value of 1 whenever the country is experiencing a currency or a
banking crisis.1920 The impact of banking crisis on inﬂation depends to a certain extent
on the monetary stance that can be maintained during a crisis and whether inﬂation
is kept as the primary policy objective (Garcia-Herrero, 1997). Currency crisis, on the
other hand, may have inﬂationary consequences.
3.3.1.3 Banking Sector Factors
In order to capture the possible inﬂuence on inﬂation outcomes of the characteristics of
the banking system in each country, we control for the size of the banking system, which
is measured by domestic credit over GDP. In our sample of industrialised countries,
there is signiﬁcant variation in the size of the banking systems. While the weight of the
banking system in the total economy has an average around 85%, the variation across
countries ranges from 15% to 311% (see Table 3.5.4, in appendix).
As argued by Copelovitch and Singer (2008), central banks with regulatory powers may
be more concerned with banking stability when facing a large banking system relative
to the overall size of the economy, due to the reputation costs stemming from bank
distress. In institutional frameworks in which central banks are also in charge of banking
19Although credit spreads could be used as a control variable to capture moments of ﬁnancial distress
in the banking sector, the lack of data for each individual country and for such a large time span
undermines its inclusion in the econometric model. Indeed, credit spreads are provided in an annual
basis by the International Monetary Fund, in its Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) dataset for 14
countries since 2005, but still with important limitations (for some of these countries there are only few
data points). Given that the sample used in this econometric study has a time dimension that starts at
1975 and ends at 2012 and covers 25 countries, data unavailability for credit spreads limits its inclusion
in the model. Nonetheless, cases of ﬁnancial distress of the banking sector are already controlled for
through a dummy variable accounting for banking sector crisis.
20Banking crisis data is based on Glick and Hutchison (1999), except for Australia and USA, for
which data comes from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). For the remaining years (2000-2010), data comes
from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Currency crisis data is based on Glick and Hutchison (1999), except
for Australia and USA, for which the data comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008). For the time span
2000-2010, data comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
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supervision, a large banking system may aggravate the inﬂation bias - therefore, we may
expect the size of the banking system to have a positive impact on inﬂation outcomes,
since when the banking system contributes to a larger share of the domestic economy,
central banks may fear to a greater extent the monetary policy eﬀects on bank stability.
3.3.2 Model Speciﬁcations
The following panel data regression model is adopted to estimate the relationship between
inﬂation rates and institutional arrangements of banking regulation and supervision:
pii,t = β0 + β1separate_supi,t + λXi,t + νi + ui,t, (3.1)
where pii,t is the (log) inﬂation rate for country i in year t, separate_supi,t is a binary
variable that takes value of 1 if the country is classiﬁed as having a separate banking
supervision at time t and value of 0 otherwise, Xi,t is a vector of control variables, as
described in the previous subsection, νi accounts for unobserved country speciﬁc eﬀects
and ui,t is the error term.
We consider three alternative speciﬁcations of this model. Model 1 is a simpliﬁed form
version of model in equation (3.1), in which the vector of controls is not included, keeping
only the variable of interest, separate_supi,t. Model 2 is the regression model in equation
(3.1), Models 1 and 2 are called hereafter static panel data models. Model 3 is an
extension of Model 2, allowing for the study of inﬂation dynamics, by adding to the
vector of regressors the one period lagged inﬂation:
pii,t = β0 + β1separate_supi,t + β2pii,t−1 + λXi,t + νi + ui,t, (3.2)
The inclusion of lagged inﬂation as an independent variable is motivated by a strand of
the literature regarding a hybrid version of the Phillips curve, in which inﬂation depends
on a combination of expected future inﬂation and lagged inﬂation.21 The lagged inﬂation
term in the hybrid Phillips curve has the purpose of capturing inﬂation persistence. As
pointed out by Gali and Gertler (1999), empirically, the hybrid Phillips curve provides
a good characterization of inﬂation dynamics at the annual frequency.
21See Gali and Gertler (1999) for an overview of the Phillips curve literature, from the traditional
version to the hybrid approach.
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We suggest the use of annual panel data, with a time-series dimension (T = the number
of years) of 38 years, from 1975 to 2012, and a cross-section pool (N = the number of
countries) of 25 advanced countries, which allows to capture the richness of the dynam-
ics of many variables, while simultaneously integrating cross-country heterogeneity in
the means of the dependent variable. Nonetheless, given that in panel data is highly
likely that country-speciﬁc characteristics (such as cultural factors, geographic location,
language, etc.) are correlated with the explanatory variables22, we resort to panel data
estimation with ﬁxed eﬀects,23 using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.24 Fixed
Eﬀects is an estimation method that deals directly with this source of correlation, by
applying a means-deviation transformation to each variable, in which the mean is com-
puted at the country level. This transformation rules out the unobserved individual
eﬀect from the original model and, in consequence, it enables to obtain coeﬃcients on
the regressors that do not suﬀer from bias due to the omission of relevant individual
attributes.25
With respect to Model 3, the dynamic panel data version of model 3.1, the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable pii,t−1 in a model with unobserved individual-speciﬁc
time-invariant eﬀects turns the OLS estimator inconsistent, since the error term is pos-
itively correlated with the explanatory variable pii,t−1 (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This
correlation does not disappear as the number of individuals in the sample gets larger.
22Namely with the variable of interest in this analysis, which refers to the separate banking supervision,
since, as already mentioned, the institutional arrangements of banking supervision are inﬂuenced by the
Anglo-saxon and the German traditions.
23Random eﬀects, on the other hand, assume that the unobserved individual eﬀects are uncorrelated
with the observed exogenous variables.
24In terms of estimation methods, previous studies, such as DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and
Copelovitch and Singer (2008), adopt pooled Ordinary Least Squares with corrected standard errors.
25In this model we also assume that slopes are homogeneous across countries, as widely used, mainly
when the pooled and the ﬁxed eﬀects estimators are adopted. This is justiﬁed by the panel dataset
composition, which comprises 25 countries that are considered the world's most advanced economies.
This classiﬁcation reﬂects similar basic economic country conditions that are used to distinguish these
economies from economies in transition or developing economies. As such, given that this is a model
to explain inﬂation rates dynamics, we may assume that the underlying drivers of inﬂation may be
similar across advanced economies, even because they are closely interconnected and are aﬀected by
the same shocks. In addition, the modus operandi of central banks to keep inﬂation close to the
target has widespread across developed countries, in which the institutional arrangements that ensure
independence and credibility to the monetary authority are widely implemented in these countries.
Against this background, we may assume that the slopes across countries are homogeneous. Still, we
recognize that this assumption may be too strong and therefore, we undertake the estimation of the
model using estimators suitable to estimate models in which this assumption is relaxed. For this, we use
the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group estimator. and we conclude that assuming heterogeneous
slopes does not change the main results regarding the lack of a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
variable separate banking supervisor on inﬂation rates. Results from estimation are available upon
request.
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Moreover, the Fixed Eﬀects estimator is also generally inconsistent, namely in the case
when N tends to inﬁnity and T is ﬁxed, because of the problem of incidental parameters
(Nickell, 1981). However, contrary to the OLS estimator, the Fixed Eﬀects estimator
becomes consistent when both T and N tend to inﬁnity.
On the other hand, the Arellano-Bond estimator is a dynamic panel data estimator with
the advantage that is designed to ﬁt linear functional relationships with a dependent
variable that depends on its own past values, additional independent variables, ﬁxed
individual eﬀects and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not
across them (Roodman, 2009). In addition, it is a more appropriate estimator for short,
wide dynamic panels (i.e. small T, large N type of panel datasets). Arellano-Bond
estimator (also known as Arellano-Bond diﬀerence GMM estimator) thereby corrects
those problems by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing all regressors to eliminate νi (i.e. unobserved country
speciﬁc eﬀects) and produce an equation estimable by instrumental variables:
D.pii,t = β0 + β1D.separate_supi,t + β2D.pii,t−1 + λD.Xi,t +D.ui,t, (3.3)
where D stands for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator and the variables and parameters are
deﬁned as in equation (3.2).
Dynamic panel data estimators do not assume that good instruments are available out-
side the immediate dataset. Instead, they assume that the only available instruments are
internal  based on lags of the instrumented variables.26 The Arellano-Bond estimator
uses as instruments the levels of the dependent variable lagged two or more periods, the
levels of endogenous variables, the lagged two or more periods and the ﬁrst diﬀerences
of the strictly exogenous regressors, which are used as their own instruments.
In the case we assume that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the indi-
vidual eﬀects, there are more moment conditions that can be used as instruments for
the levels equation, such as the lagged diﬀerences of the covariates and of the dependent
variable (see Arellano and Bover (1995)). The Arellano-Bond diﬀerence GMM estima-
tion is thereby augmented by estimating simultaneously two equations, one in diﬀerences
and another in levels, which are distinctly instrumented, originating the system GMM
estimator. As shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), this system GMM estimator is more
suitable than that of Arellano-Bond estimator when the dependent variable and / or the
independent variables are persistent.
26Nonetheless, they allow for the inclusion of instruments from outside the dataset.
85
Both diﬀerence and system GMM estimators are more adequate for small T, large N
samples, while the Fixed Eﬀects estimator is suitable for a dynamic panel data when we
have a sample with large T and small N type of panel data, because the panel data bias
tends to disappear as the T component expands. Taking into account that our panel
dataset features a T=38 and N=25, it can be considered one with large T and small N
type of panel data, Fixed Eﬀects estimator seems to be more adequate to estimate the
dynamic version of the model.
Against this background, considering the features of a dynamic panel data model and
recognizing the unsuitability of the OLS estimator for these type of models, we opt to
estimate the dynamic panel data model speciﬁcation (Model 3) using both Fixed Eﬀects
and Arellano-Bover estimators.
3.3.3 Estimation Results
3.3.3.1 Static Panel Data Models
The regression results based on the estimation of Model 1 and Model 2 for the period
1975-2012 are presented in Table 3.2, which are, respectively, the reduced and the full
versions in equation (3.1). The estimation procedure for both models follows the Fixed
Eﬀects estimator. F test and Wald Chi2 statistics for the global statistical signiﬁcance
are also reported.
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2
(log) inﬂation Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
Constant 0.606∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.130)
Separate Banking Supervision -0.229∗∗ −0.036
(1 = Yes) (0.083) (0.052)
Inﬂation Targeting - -0.165∗∗
(1 = Yes) (0.065)
CBI - -0.130
(index) (0.097)
Deposit Insurance - -0.117∗∗
(1 = Yes) (0.056)
Exchange Rate Reg. - -0.052
(1 = ﬁxed) (0.048)
Euro Area Member - -0.008
(1 = Yes) (0.047)
Time - -0.019∗∗∗
(1 = 1975; ... 38 = 2012) (0.004)
Great Moderation Period - -0.133∗∗∗
(1 = 1984-2007) (0.041)
Domestic Credit - 0.001∗∗
(% of GDP) (0.000)
Output Gap - 2.428∗∗∗
(0.654)
Banking Crisis - -0.011
(1 = Yes) (0.046)
Currency Crisis - 0.049
(1 = Yes) (0.064)
Trade Openness - 0.003∗∗
(0.002)
Capital Account - -0.073∗∗∗
Openness (0.021)
Oil imports - 2.245∗∗
(% GDP) (0.931)
Observations 961 639
No of Countries 25 24
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test 7.65∗∗∗ 171.15∗∗∗
(global signiﬁcance) (1, 24) (15, 23)
R squared (within) 0.02 0.56
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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Focusing ﬁrst on the institutional factors of inﬂation dynamics and starting with the
estimation results obtained for the variable separate banking supervision, we observe that
it is statistically signiﬁcant in the reduced form of the model (Model 1) in accordance
with DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and Copelovitch and Singer (2008) ﬁndings. However,
this result does not subsist when we control for more explanatory variables (Model 2),
including the remaining institutional factors. Estimation results of Model 1 suggest
thereby that, at a ﬁrst glance, it seems to exist an inﬂation bias, as advocated by the
conﬂicting goals thesis, but it tends to disappear when other factors are controlled for,
as in Model 2.
These ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the variable separate banking
supervision, namely for i) countries for which doubts concerning the classiﬁcation of the
institutional mandates were raised (this was the case of Australia, Austria, Denmark
and Finland), and ii) countries which joined the euro area. As an alternative option, for
this latter group it was assumed that the institutional arrangement is separate from the
moment it joined the euro area, regardless of the central bank having or not supervis-
ory powers. This assumption is based on the argument that the conduct of monetary
policy in the euro area was centralised within the European Central Bank, leaving the
national central banks powerless in this regard.27 Estimation results obtained under this
sensitivity analysis are reported in Appendix 3.5.4.
Regarding the other components of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture,
our ﬁndings from the estimation of Model 2 show that inﬂation targeting countries
beneﬁt from lower inﬂation rates than countries that do not pursue this speciﬁc type of
monetary policy mandate. The explanatory variable inﬂation targeting is statistically
signiﬁcant and it has an estimated impact on inﬂation rates of approximately −15%.28
By the same token, according to our results, a country with an explicit deposit insurance
scheme will have inﬂation rates that are on average −11% lower than a country without
deposit protection, all else equal. The other institutional variables, such as central bank
independence and exchange rate regimes, appear to have had a less signiﬁcant eﬀect on
inﬂation outcomes.
27With the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2013, which conferred banking
supervisory powers upon the European Central Bank, additional issues regarding the classiﬁcation of the
euro area countries in terms of their banking supervisory mandates will be raised. The SSM Regulation
empowers the ECB to supervise the signiﬁcant banks in each Member State, but the responsibility to
supervise the less signiﬁcant banks is still under in the national supervisory authorities domain.
28Since the dependent variable in our model is the log of inﬂation, the coeﬃcients of dummy variables
should be read as eβˆ − 1.
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In particular, it is worth discussing in more detail the results for central bank independ-
ence. There is a vast literature investigating the impact of central bank independence
on inﬂation rates which highlights its role on determining inﬂation outcomes. Although
early studies indicate a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of CBI on inﬂation rates (Grilli et al.,
1991; Cukierman et al., 1992), recent empirical work fails to ﬁnd a strong impact (Man-
gano, 1998; Crowe and Meade, 2007). Our ﬁndings are in line with studies that do not
ﬁnd a strong relationship between central banks independence and inﬂation. Estimation
results show that, although central bank independence enters the regressions with the
expected negative sign, it is not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining inﬂation outcomes.
The CBI variable used in our analysis is based on the work of Arnone et al. (2007),
which update a de jure measure of independence (following Cukierman et al. (1992))
and it assesses regulations only. As suggested by Cukierman et al. (1992), de facto
measures of central bank independence are also important to assess how regulations work
in practice. Our results seem to suggest that the degree of legal independence per se is
not suﬃcient to guarantee a signiﬁcant negative impact on inﬂation outcomes. The lack
of signiﬁcance of central bank independence may be due to measurement issues (given
that it does not address how regulations are implemented), which perhaps could lead to
a theoretical reconsideration of the association between central bank independence, the
banking structure and inﬂation.
Explanatory variables such as output gap, size of the banking system as percentage of
GDP and great moderation period are also statistically signiﬁcant and the estimated
coeﬃcients enter the regression with the expected sign. Furthermore, our results suggest
that a more open economy in terms of trade and capital ﬂows has a statistically signiﬁcant
impact on inﬂation rates, all else equal. The results for the degree of capital account
openness are consistent with previous empirical evidence by Gupta (2008) and consistent
with Copelovitch and Singer (2008), since they also observe a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect
of capital account openness on inﬂation rates. As for the degree of trade openness, results
suggest a positive signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation outcomes, which contradicts previous
empirical ﬁndings (see, for instance, Romer (1993)), in which a negative signiﬁcant
impact is reported. The eﬀect on inﬂation rates of the weight of oil imports in GDP is
also statistically signiﬁcant, implying that, in sum, external factors have an important
role in determining inﬂation behaviour.
The positive (although modest in magnitude) statistically signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation
rates of the size of the banking system relative to the economy suggests that countries
characterised by large banking sectors experience, on average, higher inﬂation rates than
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countries in which the banking sector is small. According to these ﬁndings, banking
system features may be relevant determinants of the regulatory central bank's bias.
As such, it would be interesting to empirically explore further this result in future ana-
lysis, not only by considering the size of the banking sector, but also its degree of con-
centration and how these features may impact on the transmission channels of monetary
policy and inﬂuence inﬂation outcomes. There are two distinct views in the literature
concerning the impact of banking concentration on the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. The more common perspective states that higher concentration implies less
competition, hence higher proﬁtability due to greater interest margins between deposits
and loans, and therefore a less eﬃcient transmission mechanism of monetary policy to
the real economy. In this case, we would expect higher bank concentration measures
to lead to higher levels of inﬂation. Alternatively, the eﬃcient-structure theory (Dem-
setz, 1973) argues that cost-eﬃcient banks could drive cost-ineﬃcient banks out of the
market and increase their market share, which would lead to higher concentration and
greater proﬁtability. In this case, proﬁtability is generated due to cost eﬃciency and the
transmission of monetary policy is not aﬀected as interest margins remain unchanged.
Therefore, according to this approach, a higher degree of concentration in the banking
industry would lead to lower inﬂation rates.
Finally, results suggest that the remaining explanatory variables, such as the ones that
control for the occurrence of currency and banking crisis, appeared to have had a less
signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation in industrialised countries. This ﬁnding may be related
to the fact that the occurrence of banking and currency crisis is not very frequent along
the period from 1975 to 2012 in our sample. Industrialised countries, such as the ones
included in our database, have more mature banking systems and economies, and, as
such, they are not so prone to be aﬀected by banking and currency crisis as emergent or
less developed economies.
In summary, estimation results of the static panel data models suggest that the design
of monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architectures has a non-negligible inﬂuence on
inﬂation rates in industrialised countries. Inﬂation rates are aﬀected by institutional
features, such as inﬂation targeting and deposit insurance, but not by the institutional
mandates of monetary policy and banking supervision. Other factors, such as the degree
of openness of the economy or economic developments are also important determinants
of inﬂation behaviour.
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3.3.3.2 Dynamic Panel Data Model
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the estimation results for the dynamic panel data model in
equation 3.2, obtained from using both Fixed Eﬀects and Arellano-Bover estimators.
The main conclusion is that the estimation results obtained for the static version of the
model (Model 2) are fully supported by the estimation results for the dynamic panel
data version (Model 3), particularly in what regards the lack of evidence of a signiﬁcant
impact of the institutional arrangements of banking supervision and monetary policy on
inﬂation outcomes.29 Estimation results conﬁrm, though, that one year lagged inﬂation is
statistically signiﬁcant in explaining current inﬂation behaviour and it has, as expected,
a positive impact on inﬂation, providing empirical support to the hybrid version of the
Phillips curve, to a certain extent.
Institutional factors such as deposit insurance schemes, belonging to the euro area, the
exchange rates regime or even inﬂation targeting practices do not reveal empirical evid-
ence of their inﬂuence on inﬂation rates. Exception is made to the independence of
central banks, which has a signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation when a dynamic panel data
model is considered.
External factors such as oil imports as percentage of GDP and the degree of capital
openness have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation. This result is robust in the
sense that it holds across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The same is observed for the
output gap: its impact on inﬂation is positive, as expected according to the Phillips
Curve theory, and very strong. The negative inﬂuence of the great moderation period
on inﬂation outcomes is also statistically signiﬁcant according to the dynamic panel data
estimation results.
29This ﬁnding holds even in the case we consider raw inﬂation as the dependent variable (instead of
the logarithm of inﬂation). We have performed the estimation of Models 1-3 assuming an alternative
measure of inﬂation rates, and we employed the same estimation procedure. Results obtained in this
robustness test stress the lack of statistical signiﬁcant of the variable separate banking supervision also
in this model speciﬁcation. Estimation results are available upon request.
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable: Model 3
(log) inﬂation Fixed Eﬀects Arellano-Bover
Constant 0.554∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.134)
Lagged Inﬂation (t-1) 0.356∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.095)
Separate Banking Supervision −0.012 −0.039
(Yes = 1) (0.050) (0.028)
Inﬂation Targeting −0.102∗∗ 0.023
(1 = Yes) (0.040) (0.046)
CBI −0.132∗ −0.117∗∗
(index) (0.062) (0.054)
Deposit Insurance −0.085∗ −0.019
(1 = Yes) (0.041) (0.035)
Exchange Rate Reg. −0.029 −0.025
(1 = ﬁxed) (0.024) (0.023)
Euro area member -0.033 0.058
(1 = Yes) (0.028) (0.039)
Time -0.012∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(1 = 1975; ... ; 38 = 2012) (0.002) (0.003)
Great Moderation Period -0.101∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(1 = 1984-2007) (0.030) (0.036)
Domestic Credit 0.001∗ −0.000
(% of GDP) (0.000) (0.000)
Output Gap 2.653∗∗∗ 1.986∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.638)
Banking Crisis -0.010 0.011
(1 = Yes) (0.033) (0.027)
Currency Crisis 0.040 −0.007
(1 = Yes) (0.061) (0.049)
Trade Openness 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital Account −0.039∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
Openness (0.002) (0.022)
Oil imports 1.613∗ 1.556∗∗
(% GDP) (0.808) (0.707)
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Notes: Observations: 623; No. countries: 24 and 22, respectively. For Fixed Eﬀects estimations, robust standard
errors are in brackets. Arellano-Bover estimations based on twostep system-GMM, using robust standard errors
corrected for ﬁnite samples (using Windmeijer's correction). Since the variable output gap can be aﬀected by
inﬂation, it was treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inﬂation, its lagged values two and three periods were
used as instruments in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations and its once lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences were used as instruments
in the levels equations. In total, 21 instruments were used.
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results (1975-2012) (cont. Table 3.3)
Dependent Variable: Model 3
(log) inﬂation Fixed Eﬀects Arellano-Bover
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test 624.14∗∗∗ 3228.20∗∗∗
(global signiﬁcance) (16, 23) (16)
Sargan Test (p-value) - 0.325
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.887
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
3.3.3.3 Robustness checks
The empirical ﬁndings are tested for robustness by using alternative speciﬁcations of
some important variables used in the analysis. With regard to the variable separate, the
classiﬁcation of the institutional mandates is ambiguous for Australia, Austria, Denmark
and Finland, as well as for countries that joined the Euro-area. In Australia, the insti-
tutional setup was classiﬁed as separate from 1998 onwards, based on the fact that the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, responsible for the regulation and supervi-
sion of the banking system, was established in that year as a single agency. Nonetheless,
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) always have had responsibility for the overall ﬁnan-
cial system and it is currently tasked to deal with threats to ﬁnancial stability which have
the potential to spill over to economic activity and consumer and investor conﬁdence.
In Austria, the Austrian Central Bank shares responsibilities in the banking supervisory
domain with the Financial Market Authority (FMA), which justiﬁes the classiﬁcation
into a combined institutional arrangement. Nevertheless, we test for the possibility of a
separate setup since the inception of the FMA, in 2002.
As for Denmark, classiﬁcation of institutional frameworks for banking regulation and
supervision are more diﬃcult. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), an
independent agency, was established in 1988 and was formed as part of the restructuring
of the Danish Ministry of Industry, suggesting that the Danish central bank has never
enrolled in supervisory tasks before that period. However, in the 2011 World Bank
dataset, is referred that the central bank and the Danish FSA were jointly responsible
for the supervision of the banking system. In addition, there is a memorandum of under-
standing dating from April 2005 between the central bank and the ﬁnancial supervisor,
which introduces more clarity into the division of ﬁnancial stability functions between
the two, indicating the engagement of the central bank, although they were not reported
in previous surveys. Taking this information into account, a combined setup classiﬁca-
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tion was tested from 1975 to 2012. The case of Finland appears simple to deal with,
given that the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) was established in
1922, being named as the Bank Inspectorate before 1993. In the World Bank surveys
it is always answered that the Financial Supervision Authority has the supervisory task
while no role is assigned to the central bank.As other authors, we have thereby classiﬁed
as separate. Nonetheless, looking deeper into its history, Bank of Finland was always re-
sponsible for the stability of the ﬁnancial system, suggesting an alternative classiﬁcation
as a combined setup.
Countries that joined the common currency can be considered instead to have a sep-
arate institutional arrangement as the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro-area is
centralised within the European Central Bank, leaving the national central banks power-
less in this regard. The robustness of our estimation results is tested against alternative
conﬁgurations of the institutional mandates and is reported in the Appendix in Ta-
bles 3.5.7 and 3.5.9 for Australia, Austria, Denmark and Finland. Tables 3.5.10and
3.5.12 provide the estimation results for the Euro-area countries. As already mentioned,
ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the variable separate banking super-
vision. Findings are robust to either alternative classiﬁcations of the variable separate
banking supervision. For countries for which doubts concerning the classiﬁcation of the
institutional mandates were raised (this was the case of Australia, Austria, Denmark
and Finland), estimation results do not change signiﬁcantly and majority of conclusions
hold. Changes in the classiﬁcation of institutional set ups in countries which joined
the euro area were performed more extensively, assuming that a previously considered
separate regime, could in fact be understood as a combined mandate. Still, estimation
results were very similar to those obtained before, suggesting that in the the euro area
supervisory tasks were under the national domain until 2012.
Moreover, in order to test whether the 2008 crisis has an eﬀect on the empirical ﬁndings
obtained, given that it motivated the reformulation of the institutional set ups of bank-
ing regulation and supervision in several countries, the three models are estimated for
the period from 1975 to 2007. This time period allows to capture in full the so-called
`Great Moderation' period, which corresponded to an economic environment character-
ised by lower levels and volatility of inﬂations rates, coupled with stable growth and low
unemployment. Appendix 3.5.4 - Robustness Checks, Tables 3.5.12 and 3.5.13 presents
the estimation results.
Estimation results are consistent to those obtained for the larger sample period, covering
both normal times until 2007 as well as the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 until
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2012, both for static and dynamic speciﬁcations of the annual panel data model, mainly
in what concerns the lack of a signiﬁcant statistical eﬀect of the variable separate banking
supervision on inﬂation rates. We again observe that, in the reduced form of the model
in equation (3.1), this variable is statistically signiﬁcant and has a negative eﬀect on
inﬂation rates. However, when controlling for other factors, the estimated coeﬃcient
of separate banking supervision no longer signiﬁcant in all of the econometric model
speciﬁcations.
In addition, main ﬁndings hold in normal times. In particular, results show that both
institutional factors inﬂation targeting and explicit deposit insurance schemes have neg-
ative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on average inﬂation rates and the magnitude of
this impact is close to the that obtained for each model speciﬁcation. The variables such
as output gap, the degree of capital openness, the share of oil imports in GDP and great
moderation period remain as statistically signiﬁcant, indicating similar estimated values
of the coeﬃcients. All in all, results from robustness checks conﬁrm that the separation
of banking supervisory powers from the central bank is not a signiﬁcant institutional
determinant of low inﬂation rates in industrialised countries.
3.4 Conclusions
The paper aims at investigating the implications of diﬀerent designs of the monetary and
ﬁnancial supervisory architecture on the inﬂation rate outcomes. In particular, the paper
empirically examines if monetary policy and banking regulation have conﬂicting goals
by assessing whether institutional mandates in which the central bank with a banking
supervisory mandate has, on average, led to higher inﬂation rates than a separate regime.
In addition, we consider the impact on inﬂation from other components of the monetary
and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture, namely the degree of independence of central
banks, whether they were assigned an explicit inﬂation targeting mandate, or whether
the establishment of deposit insurance systems with the view to enhancing ﬁnancial
stability by protecting deposits may inﬂuence the monetary policy stance.
This conﬂicting goals argument in favour of the separation of policy mandates states
that a central bank responsible for banking regulation will be more ﬂexible in its inﬂa-
tion mandate if it is concerned with the impact of tight monetary conditions on bank's
proﬁtability and soundness (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993, 1995). Under these cir-
cumstances, it is likely that the ﬂexibility in guiding monetary policy will lead to higher
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inﬂation rates. We build a panel data set comprising 25 OECD countries from 1975 to
2012 and we specify a regression model to explain the eﬀect of a separate mandate of
banking supervision on the inﬂation rate. We consider additional regressors to control
for other possible determinants of inﬂation rates.
Our analysis diﬀers from other studies in three ways. First, we have expanded the time
span of the sample (while maintaining the same group of countries under scrutiny);
second, we adopt more appropriate estimation methods to deal with country speciﬁc
eﬀects and their correlation with the explanatory variables; and third, we consider addi-
tional explanatory variables to control for the eﬀect on inﬂation rates, such as of inﬂation
targeting practices, oil imports over GDP, and output gap, among others. We have also
performed a battery of robustness tests, which supported the main conclusion of this
study.
Estimation results for both static and dynamic panel data speciﬁcations show that the
separation of banking supervision from the central bank does not have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact on inﬂation. In this sense, the conﬂicting goals argument against a mon-
etary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture in which the central bank has a supervisory
role is not supported by our empirical ﬁndings. Indeed, these results contradict previous
empirical evidence (see, as examples, DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and Copelovitch and
Singer (2008)). A possible explanation may lay in the argument that, even in institu-
tional mandates in which central banks do not have supervisory powers, they may still be
concerned with the stability of the banking system, since distress in the banking sector
may disrupt the bank transmission channels of monetary policy, impairing its eﬀective-
ness. Being this the case, central banks with a price stability mandate may guide their
monetary policy decisions also by attending to their impact on the banking system.
Although the allocation of banking regulation and supervision inside or outside the cent-
ral bank does not seem to be relevant in determining inﬂation rates, our ﬁndings indicate
that there are other features of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture that
may play a role in maintaining inﬂation rates in low levels, thereby contributing for the
stability of the economy. On one hand, results underline the importance of the establish-
ment of deposit insurance schemes in determining lower levels of inﬂation rates. In fact,
the central bank can be more aggressive in their inﬂation mandate when deposits are
protected, in a large extent, by these insurance systems. Therefore, our results suggest
that deposit insurance schemes can be seen not only as an important institutional pillar
in fostering ﬁnancial stability, but also in contributing to attaining the goal of price
stability.
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Another institutional feature related to low levels of inﬂation is the adoption of inﬂation
targeting mandates. Curiously, central bank independence does not arise as an indicator
of low inﬂation rates, even though there is an extensive literature suggesting its important
eﬀect on this macroeconomic variable. This result might be explained by the use of
imperfect measures of the degree of independence of central banks (Posso and Tawadros,
2013). Finally, economic factors, such as trade openness and capital account openness
have also strong eﬀects on inﬂation behaviour, but the output gap stands out in terms
of the magnitude of its impact on inﬂation.
Policy implications are that, given our empirical ﬁndings, the `conﬂict of interests' ar-
gument should not be considered a major obstacle when designing the institutional
architecture of banking supervision and monetary policy in developed countries. Other
concerns, such as `reputation risks' and `organisational costs', may pose higher challenges
for central banking than the `conﬂict of interests eﬀect'. Recent reforms to assign an
explicit ﬁnancial stability mandate to monetary authorities may imply new sources of
conﬂicts with monetary policy - see Smets (2014) for a review of potential conﬂicts and a
discussion on the optimal institutional arrangements of macroprudential and monetary
policies.
In this new institutional and supervisory environment in which central banks have price
and ﬁnancial stability mandates, the most important challenge for central banks is to
avoid that severe disruptions in the banking system or regulatory capture by the banking
industry damage its reputation as a monetary policymaker. In order to accomplish such
an outcome, Smets (2014) suggests that price stability remains as the ultimate goal for
central banks, while the objective of ﬁnancial stability should lay under the primacy of
stability of prices.
Future research should be focused on understanding the economic circumstances in which
these conﬂicts are more likely to arise, taking into account the interactions of monet-
ary, macroprudential and microprudential policies. In addition, deeper knowledge is
needed on the inﬂuence of each institutional component of the ﬁnancial and monetary
architecture in promoting the stability of macroeconomic aggregates.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Variables: deﬁnitions, expected impact on inﬂation and
sources
Table 3.5.1: Variables' description and expected impact on inﬂation
Variables Description Exp. Impact
on Inﬂation
Institutional Factors
Separate CB Yes = 1 −
CBI Central Bank
Independence Index
−
Inﬂation Targeting Yes = 1 −
Great Moderation 1975-83 & 2008-12 = 0;
1984-2007 = 1
−
Deposit Insurance Yes = 1 −
Exchange Rate Regime Fixed = 1 +
Euro Membership Yes = 1 ?
External Factors
Trade Openness Index −
Capital Accounts Openness Chinn-Ito Index −
Oil Imports (% GDP) Controls for oil
importing countries
+
Economic Factors
Output Gap Controls for economic
growth
+
Banking Crisis Yes = 1 +
Currency Crisis Yes = 1 +
Banking Structure Factors
Domestic Credit (% GDP) Controls for the
banking sector size
−
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Table 3.5.2: Variables - Sources and Deﬁnitions
Variables Sources and Deﬁnitions
Inﬂation Rate
(log)
World Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook database April
2003 (site IMF). Inﬂation (consumer prices; index and annual percent change). Data
for inﬂation are averages for the year, not end-of-period data. The index is based on
1995=100.
Separate Bank-
ing Supervisor
DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999); Copelovitch and Singer (2008); World Bank - Banking
Regulation Survey 2000 and 2008; Central Banks and Banking Supervisors
webpages for the years missing. Dummy=1 if a country has separated mandates for
monetary policy and banking regulation/supervision.
Output Gap Output gap is calculated by applying the HP ﬁlter to GDP at constant prices. GDP
is obtained from World Bank (2011): World Development Indicators (Edition:
September 2011). ESDS International, University of Manchester. GDP (constant
LCU): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural
resources. Data are in constant local currency.
Central Bank
Independence
Index
Data on CBI are based on Cukierman et al. (1992)'s methodology for calculating
legal independence and are compiled from the Comparative Political Dataset for the
period 1975-1996 (Armingeon et al., 2011) and Polillo and Guillén (2005) for the
remaining yearsCopelovitch and Singer (2008). China and Singapore are missing.
Central Bank Index 1971-1996 from Lijphart (1999).
Banking Crisis Glick and Hutchison (1999); for Australia and USA, data comes from Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003); for the years 2000-2010, data comes from Laeven and Valencia
(2010).. Dummy=1 when the country has a banking crisis.
Currency Crisis Glick and Hutchison (1999); for Australia and USA, the data comes from Laeven
and Valencia (2008). Dummy=1 when the country has a currency crisis, 0
otherwise. For the years 2000-2010, data comes from Laeven and Valencia (2010).
Openness of the
economy
Armingeon et al. (2011). Openness of the economy in current prices, measured as
total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP. 1960-2009.
Capital Account
Openness Index
Armingeon et al. (2011) and Chinn and Ito (2008). Index for the extent of openness
in capital account transactions. 1960-2009.
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Table 3.5.3: Variables - sources and deﬁnitions (cont.)
Variables Sources and Deﬁnitions
Deposit Insurance
Scheme
World Bank Deposit Insurance Around The World dataset.
Deposit Insurance Fund Dummy=1 if a country has deposit
insurance, 0 if not.
Exchange Rate
Regime
Ilzetzki et al. (2008). It takes the value of 0 for ﬂoating or
managed ﬂoating regime and 1 for all varieties of hard ﬁxed
exchange rates.
Euro Membership Dummy that takes a value of 1 if a country belongs to the euro
area and 0 otherwise.
Oil imports over
GDP
Own calculations. Value of oil imports in US dollars over GDP.
Value of oil imports in US dollars and GDP current prices ($):
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database, April 2013.
Domestic Credit
over GDP
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP). Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators (Financial Sector).
Time From year 1975 to 2012 takes value 1 to 38.
Inﬂation targeting Roger (2010); for Finland and Spain, data comes from Little and
Romano (2009). Dummy=1 if the country has Inﬂation
Targeting, 0 otherwise. We assume that the Member States of
Euro zone have inﬂation targeting.
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3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.5.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Inﬂation (%) 950 5.34 6.78 -1.89 84.28
Separate Bank. Supervision 950 0.38 0.49 0 1
Output Gap 950 0 0.02 -0.09 0.10
Degree of Commercial Openness 900 82.25 71.23 9.18 440.43
Degree of Capital Openness 876 1.44 1.32 -1.88 2.42
Deposit Insurance Scheme 950 0.67 0.47 0 1
Inﬂation Targeting 950 0.15 0.35 0 1
Bank Crisis 925 0.11 0.32 0 1
Currency Crisis 925 0.01 0.11 0 1
Domestic credit / GDP (%) 912 84.36 44.28 14.84 311.06
Exchange Rate Regime 887 0.55 0.50 0 1
Euro area member 950 0.17 0.38 0 1
Great Moderation Period 950 0.63 0.48 0 1
Oil imports / GDP (%) 803 0.04 0.06 0 0.66
Central Bank Independence Index 950 0.52 0.23 0.19 0.94
Time 950 19.50 10.97 1 38
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3.5.3 Countries classiﬁcation into separate and combined man-
dates of monetary policy and banking supervision
Table 3.5.5: Countries classiﬁcation - separate and combined mandates
Countries
Combined Mandate Separate Mandate
(Separate Bank. Sup. = 0) (Separate Bank. Sup. = 1)
Australia 1975-1997 1998-2012
Austria 1975-2012 -
Belgium 2011-2012 1975-2011
Canada - 1975-2012
China 1975-2002 2003-2012
Denmark 2011-2012 1975-2011
Finland - 1975-2012
France 1975-2012 -
Germany 1975-2012 -
Greece 1975-2012 -
Iceland 1975-1998 1999-2012
Ireland 1975-2002 / 2010-2012 2003-2009
Italy 1975-2012 -
Japan 1975-1997 1998-2012
Luxembourg 1983-1997 1975-1982 / 1998-2012
Netherlands 1975-2012 -
New Zealand 1975-2012 -
Norway - 1975-2012
Portugal 1975-2012 -
Singapore 1975-2012 -
Spain 1975-2012 -
Sweden - 1975-2012
Switzerland - 1975-2012
United Kingdom 1975-1997 1998-2012
United States 1975-2012 -
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3.5.4 Robustness Checks
Tables 3.5.6 and 3.5.7 show the estimation results for Models 1-3, to test for the robust-
ness of results to alternative classiﬁcations of the institutional mandates in countries for
which doubts were raised. This is the case for Australia, Austria, Denmark and Finland,
where there is indication that central banks, in speciﬁc periods of time, have also played
a role in banking supervision.
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Table 3.5.6: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable: (log) inﬂation Model 1 Model 2
Constant
0.590∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.954∗∗∗
(0.131)
Separate Bank. Superv. Alternative (1 = Yes)
-0.240∗∗
(0.081)
−0.046
(0.049)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes) -
-0.167∗∗
(0.064)
CBI (index) -
-0.122
(0.100)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes) -
-0.121∗∗
(0.056)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed) -
-0.050
(0.048)
Euro area member (1 = Yes) -
-0.008
(0.047)
Time (1975: 1, ...., 2012: 38) -
-0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)
Great Moderation Period (1 = 1984-2007) -
-0.132∗∗∗
(0.041)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP) -
0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Output Gap -
2.421∗∗∗
(0.653)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes) -
-0.007
(0.046)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes) -
0.050
(0.064)
Trade Openness -
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
Capital Account Openness -
-0.072∗∗∗
(0.022)
Oil imports (% GDP) -
2.225∗∗
(0.934)
Observations 961 639
No of Countries 25 24
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test (global signiﬁcance)
8.66∗∗∗
(1, 24)
165.74∗∗∗
(15, 23)
R squared (within) 0.02 0.58
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 3.5.7: Dynamic Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable:
(log) inﬂation
Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Arellano-Bover
Estimation
Constant
0.547∗∗∗
(0.087)
0.778∗∗∗
(0.135)
Lagged Inﬂation (t-1)
0.356∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.383∗∗∗
(0.094)
Separate Bank. Superv. Alternative
(1 = Yes)
−0.039
(0.040)
−0.020
(0.039)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes)
−0.101∗∗
(0.040)
−0.016
(0.047)
CBI (index)
−0.126∗
(0.069)
−0.114∗∗
(0.057)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes)
−0.088∗∗
(0.042)
−0.023
(0.036)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed)
−0.027
(0.025)
−0.028
(0.022)
Euro Area Member (1 = Yes)
-0.034
(0.027)
0.066∗
(0.038)
Time (1975: 1, ...., 2012: 38)
-0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007)
-0.101∗∗∗
(0.030)
−0.088∗∗
(0.035)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP)
0.001∗
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
Output Gap
2.659∗∗∗
(0.503)
1.933∗∗∗
(0.630)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes)
-0.007
(0.034)
0.011
(0.027)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes)
0.040
(0.061)
−0.005
(0.050)
Trade Openness
0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
Capital Account Openness
−0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.089∗∗∗
(0.022)
Oil imports (% GDP)
1.626∗
(0.800)
1.610∗∗
(0.752)
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
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Table 3.5.8: Dynamic Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2012) (cont. Table
3.5.7)
Statistical Tests Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Arellano-Bover Estimation
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test 656.17∗∗∗ 3467.75∗∗∗
(global signiﬁcance) (16, 23) (16)
Sargan Test (p-value) - 0.319
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.874
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Notes: Observations - 623. # Countries - 24. For ﬁxed Eﬀects estimations, robust standard errors are in
brackets. Arellano-Bover estimations based on twostep system-GMM, using robust standard errors
corrected for ﬁnite samples (using Windmeijer's correction). Since Output Gap can be aﬀected by
inﬂation, it was treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inﬂation, its lagged values two and three
periods were used as instruments in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations and its once lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences were
used as instruments in the levels equations. In total, 21 instruments were used.
Tables 3.5.9 and 3.5.10 show the estimation results for Model's speciﬁcations 1-3, to test
for the robustness of results to alternative classiﬁcations of the institutional mandates
in countries that joined the euro area. It is assumed that countries that joined the euro
area have separate institutional mandates of banking supervision, even in the cases in
which the central bank is the supervisory authority.
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Table 3.5.9: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable: (log)
inﬂation
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.717∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.969∗∗∗
(0.126)
Separate Bank. Supervisor -
euro area (1 = Yes)
-0.380∗∗∗
(0.049)
−0.038
(0.049)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes)
-
-0.163∗∗
(0.065)
CBI (index) - -0.138
(0.095)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes) - -0.114∗
(0.056)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed) - -0.052
(0.048)
Euro area member (1 = Yes) - -0.023
(0.061)
Time (1975: 1, ...., 2012: 38)
-
-0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007)
-
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.040)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP) - 0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Output Gap
-
2.432∗∗∗
(0.644)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes) - -0.009
(0.046)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes) - 0.050
(0.064)
Trade Openness - 0.003∗∗
(0.002)
Capital Account Openness -
-0.072∗∗∗
(0.022)
Oil imports (% GDP) - 2.264∗∗
(0.929)
Observations
961 639
No of Countries 25 24
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test (global
signiﬁcance)
60.20∗∗∗
(1, 24)
197.26∗∗∗
(15, 23)
R squared (within) 0.12 0.56
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 3.5.10: Dynamic Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2012)
Dependent Variable:
(log) inﬂation
Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Arellano-Bover Estimation
Constant
0.556∗∗∗
(0.087)
0.787∗∗∗
(0.133)
Lagged Inﬂation (t-1)
0.356∗∗∗
(0.048)
0.382∗∗∗
(0.095)
Separate Bank. Superv. - Alternative
(Yes=1)
−0.017
(0.045)
−0.038
(0.030)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes)
−0.101∗∗
(0.040)
−0.022
(0.046)
CBI (index)
−0.136∗
(0.067)
−0.120∗∗
(0.055)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes)
−0.083∗
(0.041)
−0.019
(0.035)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed)
−0.029
(0.024)
−0.025
(0.023)
Euro area member (1 = Yes)
-0.019
(0.043)
0.088∗∗
(0.040)
Time (1975: 1, ...., 2012: 38)
-0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007)
-0.101∗∗∗
(0.030)
−0.089∗∗
(0.035)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP)
0.001∗
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
Output Gap
2.657∗∗∗
(0.497)
1.980∗∗∗
(0.629)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes)
-0.009
(0.034)
0.012
(0.027)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes)
0.040
(0.061)
−0.006
(0.049)
Trade Openness
0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
Capital Account Openness
−0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.088∗∗∗
(0.022)
Oil imports (% GDP)
1.631∗
(0.806)
1.624∗∗
(0.691)
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
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Table 3.5.11: Dynamic Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2012) (cont. Table
3.5.10)
Statistical Tests Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Arellano-Bover Estimation
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test 843.13∗∗∗ 2856.91∗∗∗
(global signiﬁcance) (16, 23) (16)
Sargan Test (p-value) - 0.326
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.895
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Notes: Observations - 623. # Countries - 24. For ﬁxed Eﬀects estimations, robust standard errors are in
brackets. Arellano-Bover estimations based on twostep system-GMM, using robust standard errors
corrected for ﬁnite samples (using Windmeijer's correction). Since Output Gap can be aﬀected by
inﬂation, it was treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inﬂation, its lagged values two and three
periods were used as instruments in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations and its once lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences were
used as instruments in the levels equations. In total, 21 instruments were used.
Tables 3.5.12 and 3.5.13 report estimation results for the period prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008.
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Table 3.5.12: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Results (1975-2007)
Dependent Variable: (log)
inﬂation
Model 1 Model 2
Constant
0.689∗∗∗
(0.136)
1.069∗∗∗
(0.122)
Separate Bank. Superv. (Yes
=1)
-0.334∗∗
(0.049)
−0.083
(0.066)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes) -
-0.179∗∗
(0.069)
CBI (index) -
-0.119
(0.134)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes) -
-0.130∗∗
(0.058)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed) -
-0.064
(0.047)
Euro area member (1 = Yes) -
0.051
(0.052)
Time -
-0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007)
-
-0.154∗∗∗
(0.046)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP) -
0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Output Gap -
2.152∗∗∗
(0.660)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes) -
0.064
(0.048)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes) -
0.030
(0.060)
Trade Openness -
0.002
(0.002)
Capital Account Openness -
-0.071∗∗∗
(0.022)
Oil imports (% GDP) -
1.842∗∗
(1.137)
Observations 804 584
No of Countries 25 24
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test (global
signiﬁcance)
5.99∗∗
(1, 24)
281.82∗∗∗
(15, 23)
R squared (within) 0.04 0.58
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 3.5.13: Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2007)
Dependent Variable:
(log) inﬂation
Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Arellano-Bover
Estimation
Constant
0.554∗∗∗
(0.085)
0.748∗∗∗
(0.178)
Lagged Inﬂation (t-1)
0.428∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.425∗∗∗
(0.126)
Separate Banking Supervision
(1 = Yes)
−0.037
(0.073)
−0.033
(0.043)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes)
−0.085∗∗
(0.039)
−0.005
(0.056)
CBI (index)
−0.120
(0.078)
−0.108
(0.070)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes)
−0.076∗
(0.041)
−0.028
(0.041)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed) −0.026
(0.020)
−0.029
(0.025)
Euro area member (1 = Yes)
-0.026
(0.027)
0.082∗
(0.044)
Time
-0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007)
-0.098∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.079∗
(0.042)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP)
0.001∗
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
Output Gap
2.280∗∗∗
(0.432)
2.368∗∗∗
(0.704)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes)
0.036
(0.041)
0.004
(0.027)
(1 = Yes) (0.041) (0.027)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes)
0.021
(0.059)
−0.002
(0.063)
Trade Openness
0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
Capital Account Openness
−0.036∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.069∗∗∗
(0.026)
Oil imports (% GDP)
0.945
(0.785)
1.169
(0.908)
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
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Table 3.5.14: Dynamic Panel Data Model - Estimation Results (1975-2007) (cont. Table
3.5.13)
Statistical Tests Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Arellano-Bover Estimation
F Test / Wald Chi2 Test 576.57∗∗∗ 2668.33∗∗∗
(global signiﬁcance) (16, 23) (16)
Sargan Test (p-value) - 0.036
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.997
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Notes: Observations - 575. # Countries - 24. For ﬁxed Eﬀects estimations, robust standard errors are in
brackets. Arellano-Bover estimations based on twostep system-GMM, using robust standard errors
corrected for ﬁnite samples (using Windmeijer's correction). Since Output Gap can be aﬀected by
inﬂation, it was treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inﬂation, its lagged values two and three
periods were used as instruments in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence equations and its once lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences were
used as instruments in the levels equations. In total, 21 instruments were used.
3.5.5 Test for strict exogeneity of the variable separate banking
supervisor
Following Wooldridge (2010), we can test for strict exogeneity using ﬁxed eﬀects when
T>2, by specifying the model (static version) as in equation 3.1, but adding a new term,
that is the lead values in t+1 of the variable separate banking supervisor:
pii,t = β0 + β1separate_supi,t + αseparate_supi,t+1 + λXi,t + νi + ui,t, (3.4)
Then, we estimate the model using ﬁxed eﬀects and we obtain an estimate for the coeﬃ-
cient for the new variable separate_supi,t+1. Under null hypothesis of strict exogeneity,
α = 0 and we can perform a Wald test to verify whether the estimated coeﬃcient is
statistically diﬀerent from 0. Results of the test show that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of strict exogeneity.
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Table 3.5.15: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: (log)
inﬂation
Model 2
Constant 0.975∗∗∗
(0.128)
Separate Bank. Supervisor (t) 0.177
(0.189)
Separate Bank. Supervisor
(t+1)
−0.226
(0.169)
Inﬂation Targeting (1 = Yes) -0.158∗∗
(0.063)
CBI (index) -0.141
(0.096)
Deposit Insurance (1 = Yes) -0.118∗
(0.055)
Exchange Rate Reg. (1 = ﬁxed) -0.053
(0.049)
Euro area member (1 = Yes) -0.005
(0.046)
Time (1975: 1, ...., 2012: 38) -0.019∗∗∗
(0.004)
Great Moderation Period (1 =
1984-2007) -0.131
∗∗∗
(0.040)
Domestic Credit (% of GDP) 0.001∗
(0.000)
Output Gap 2.489∗∗∗
(0.662)
Banking Crisis (1 = Yes) -0.013
(0.047)
Currency Crisis (1 = Yes) 0.047
(0.064)
Trade Openness 0.003∗∗
(0.002)
Capital Account Openness
-0.072∗∗∗
(0.021)
Oil imports (% GDP) 2.246∗∗
(0.922)
Observations
639
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 3.5.16: Results for Strict Exogeneity Test on separate banking supervisor
Statistical Test Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
F Test 1.79
(global signiﬁcance) (1, 23)
∗p ≤ .10; ∗∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗∗p ≤ .01
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Chapter 4
Policy Mandates for Macroprudential
and Monetary Policies in a New
Keynesian Framework
The conjunction of liberalised ﬁnancial markets with credible price-stability-oriented
policies can result in signiﬁcant changes in the dynamics of the economy. Reaping the
full beneﬁts of the new environment while minimising its potential costs calls for closer
cooperation between monetary and prudential authorities. - Borio and White (2003)
4.1 Introduction
Prior to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 there was a convergent mindset on policy goals, the
instruments necessary to achieve them, and their implications for stabilising the econ-
omy. Back then, there was a common view that central banks should focus on price
stability goals and clean up after bubbles burst.1 As a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis
and its disruptive eﬀects on economic welfare, the debate regarding the role of monetary
policy and traditional regulatory and prudential frameworks on promoting macroeco-
nomic stability was revived. It is argued that the great recession was a consequence of
an excessively lax monetary policy stance that contributed to the increasing of housing
price inﬂation ((Taylor, 2007, 2010; Hofmann and Bogdanova, 2012)). On the other
1See Mishkin (2011) for a summary of the general doctrine stating that monetary policy should only
focus on inﬂation and output stability.
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hand, a large literature emphasizes the failure of ﬁnancial and banking regulation as a
ﬁnancial stabilisation tool (Blanchard et al., 2010; Fund, 2011).
Although it is clear that the achievement of ﬁnancial stability is crucial for the pursuit of
macroeconomic stability, there is no consensus on what economic policy should target the
stability of the ﬁnancial system.2 Mishkin (2011) suggests that monetary policy should
lean against credit-driven bubbles only (rather than responding to irrational exuberance
bubbles), pointing out that in the case of credit bubbles the argument about the diﬃculty
in detecting asset price bubbles is no longer valid. On the other hand, Vinals (2012)
considers that monetary policy rules should also lean by reacting to ﬁnancial variables,
such as credit and indebtedness, but only in the pursuit of price stability. In addition,
Curdia and Woodford (2010) suggest a Taylor Rule that also reacts contemporaneously
to credit spreads, showing that a modiﬁed Taylor Rule of this kind can not only decrease
the distortions originated by a ﬁnancial shock, but also improve the economy's reaction
to diﬀerent types of shocks.
In turn, it is argued that macroprudential regulation should deal with ﬁnancial market
distortions, while monetary policy should concentrate solely on stabilising inﬂation in
order to counter-act the ﬂuctuations of output caused by price rigidities. This type of
institutional framework raises some concerns. A main topic in the design of an eﬀective
institutional mandate for macroprudential policy is how it should interact with mone-
tary policy. Even though we agree that price and ﬁnancial stability are intermediate
objectives to attain the ultimate goal of macroeconomic stability, there are side eﬀects
from monetary policy on macroprudential targets (such as credit or leverage) and from
macroprudential policies on monetary targets (such as output and inﬂation). For in-
stance, as pointed out by Beau et al. (2011), it is likely that the implementation of a
macroprudential policy can alter the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, since
it acts through the same bank lending and balance sheet channels of monetary policy.
Under diﬀerent economic circumstances, the outcomes on ﬁnancial and price stability
of both policies can be complementary, independent or conﬂicting (Beau et al., 2011).
In particular, the conﬂicting outcome will depend on the type and dissemination of
2There is still a lack of a common deﬁnition of ﬁnancial stability. As summarized by Galati and
Moessner (2012), ﬁnancial stability can be deﬁned in terms of the degree of robustness of the ﬁnancial
system to external shocks or, in turn, it can be interpreted as the resilience of the ﬁnancial system
to shocks originated from within the system that can be associated to bank fragility. For the Bank
of England, 2009, the source of shocks is not so relevant, since ﬁnancial stability should be fundamentally
concerned with maintaining a stable provision of ﬁnancial services to the wider economy - payments
services, credit supply, and insurance against risk.
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supply and demand imbalances across the ﬁnancial system and the real economy and on
whether ﬁnancial imbalances play a role in the monetary policy framework (Beau et al.,
2011; Galati and Moessner, 2012). Moreover, some authors advocate the existence of
a risk taking channel, through which a loose monetary policy can contribute and even
promote the creation of asset bubbles, requiring a more aggressive intervention from the
macroprudential regulator to mitigate its eﬀects in the banks' balance-sheets and in the
ﬁnancial systems (Borio and Zhu, 2008). In turn, considering a situation characterized by
an asset bubble and by downside risks to price stability, macroprudential policy would
limit credit and liquidity growth. This action could have adverse eﬀects in aggregate
activity increasing the deﬂationary pressures and forcing the monetary policymaker to
intervene by lessening even further the monetary policy stance. Under these economic
conditions, the necessary measures to control ﬁnancial stability may have a negative
impact on price stability, resulting in a conﬂicting outcome (Beau et al., 2011).
Therefore, a main question in this debate is how macroprudential policy tools should be
set together with monetary policy, since both ultimately target macroeconomic stability.
Following the Tinbergen principle, there should be at least one instrument associated to
each policy goal. Assuming price and ﬁnancial stability as two distinct objectives, then
monetary policy should target the ﬁrst one and macroprudential policy should concen-
trate on counterveiling ﬁnancial imbalances. If we agree with this straight assignment of
policy objectives, a consequent issue refers to the allocation of the policy instruments,
namely whether the central bank, as the monetary policy maker, should set the two
policy instruments to achieve both price and ﬁnancial stability, or macroprudential tools
should be allocated to an independent authority.
The economic literature investigating these issues is still in its infancy, though there are a
number of papers oﬀering preliminary insights and suggesting diﬀerent ways of combining
monetary policy and macroprudential regulation. Despite the distinctive features of the
models used to assess these questions, all in all the ﬁndings suggest that there are sources
of conﬂict, mainly when these policies are not coordinated and shocks aﬀect the demand
side of the economy (De Paoli and Paustian, 2012; Bean et al., 2010; Beau et al., 2011;
Angelini et al., 2011; Angeloni, 2010).
This paper contributes to both sides of the debate and has two main purposes. Based on
a New Keynesian model with ﬁnancial frictions, the ﬁrst aim is to investigate whether
there is a welfare beneﬁt from monetary policy that `leans against the wind' by per-
forming welfare analysis. In this part of the study, macroprudential policies are absent.
Speciﬁcally, our model-based analysis enables us to examine the potential trade-oﬀs of
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using simple monetary policy rules that feed back on ﬁnancial variables, such as devia-
tions of credit, credit spreads or asset prices from its steady state values, by comparing
it with a standard Taylor rule. Two policy mandates are suggested to conduct this anal-
ysis. A policy mandate featuring a conventional monetary policy stance encompassing a
standard Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing and responding to inﬂation and output
gaps and a policy mandate in which the standard Taylor rule is augmented to feed back
on ﬁnancial variables. The former policy mandate is used throughout the paper as a
baseline case.
The main ﬁndings of this analysis suggest that it is welfare improving to have a mon-
etary policy stance that responds countercyclically to asset prices. Nonetheless, there
is a trade-oﬀ in terms of inﬂation stabilization, since an augmented Taylor rule of this
type would involve more prices volatility than a standard one. A compromise between
welfare maximization and inﬂation stability seems to be achieved under a policy regime
characterised by an augmented Taylor rule that feeds back on deviations of credit from
its steady state path.
The second main goal is to analyse the impact on welfare of introducing in the model
macroprudential policies reacting counter-cyclically to ﬁnancial imbalances. Again, the
ﬁnancial imbalances are captured by ﬁnancial variables like deviations of credit, credit
growth, credit spreads and loans-to-output ratio from their steady state values. By ex-
tending the framework to include macroprudential tools alongside with a monetary policy
instrument (i.e. the policy interest rate), it is possible to assess how the institutional
arrangements of monetary policy and macroprudential regulation could be designed in
the most eﬀective way. In fact, it is not consensual in the academic literature whether
the monetary authority should also concentrate responsibilities in banking regulation
and supervision. Arguments favouring an independent banking regulator, namely po-
tential sources of conﬂict between the two policies and reputation damage for the central
bank in the event of ﬁnancial distress or bank failures, oppose to arguments beneﬁting
a uniﬁed mandate, which privileges the central bank's role as lender-of-last-resort and
coordination synergies.
Against this background, we suggest two more policy mandates which we can compare
and evaluate in terms of their social welfare implications. The criterion used to assess
the most eﬀective institutional mandate is obtained from the welfare analysis, in which
policy rules are optimised to deliver the best level of lifetime utility. We start by examin-
ing a separate policy mandate, in which each policymaker targets their own policy goal:
the monetary policymaker (i.e the central bank) pursues price stability and the macro-
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prudential regulator focus on ﬁnancial stability. This institutional mandate is compared
with a uniﬁed regime, where both monetary and macroprudential policies react to ﬁnan-
cial imbalances. This comparison is made across all policy mandates considered in the
analysis, to rank the ones that minimize welfare losses.3
Given the way banking regulation is introduced in the macroeconomic model, it is feasible
to assess the impact on welfare of a macroprudential toolkit comprising a tax on loans
and a subsidy on bank net worth. This is a innovative feature of the framework, since
previous studies considering banking regulation instruments usually focus on a single
tool. We show that a tax on loans proves to be less welfare improving than a tool
targeting directly the net worth of banks, such as a subsidy on net worth, although
the former does in general a better job in promoting the stability of prices. The use of
either instrument is always welfare maximizing related to a baseline scenario in which a
standard Taylor rule is assumed. We describe in detail the optimal policy exercises when
a tax on loans is considered, although we also comment brieﬂy on the results attained
when the macroprudential instrument is a subsidy on net worth.
Findings from these optimal policy exercises suggest that there are welfare gains from
introducing macroprudential regulation, even when considering a separate regime given
by two independent agencies reacting to their own policy goal. In particular, gains are
slightly higher under a uniﬁed regime, in which both policies feed back on credit and
spreads. However, these gains are small as also shown by Angelini et al. (2011), De Paoli
and Paustian (2012) and Bailliu et al. (2012).
The model developed in this study extends the Gertler et al. (2012) framework in several
directions. The most important innovation comes from the introduction of nominal fric-
tions, in order to investigate the interaction of macroprudential regulation and monetary
policy. Hence, our focus is on conventional monetary policy rather than credit policy.
In addition, we simplify the banking sector component of the model, ruling out the role
of outside equity. In this case, banks' net worth increases are given solely by retained
proﬁts. The macroprudential tool is also distinct, since we suggest a non-neutral tax /
subsidy scheme.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, by
ﬁrst considering an unregulated banking sector and then comparing this baseline model
with one extended to introduce macroprudential regulation. Calibration of fundamental
3The separate mandate aims at mimicking the institutional arrangements of monetary and macropru-
dential policies in Germany, Finland and Norway, while the uniﬁed mandate represents the institutional
regimes in New Zealand, United Kingdom, Belgium and in the euro area.
119
parameters is also described in this part of the paper. Section 3 explains and performs
welfare analysis. This section shows and interprets the optimal policy results for the
policy mandates described above (standard monetary policy stance, a monetary policy
rule that leans against the build up of ﬁnancial imbalances, and for alternative policy
regimes that encompass a macroprudential policy rule). Section 4 concludes.
4.2 The Model
In this section, we introduce a model with ﬁnancial frictions and macroprudential regu-
lation. The model follows closely Gertler et al., 2012, but it is extended to include New
Keynesian features, in order to address the interplay between conventional monetary pol-
icy and macroprudential regulation. Financial frictions impact on real economy through
the amount of funds that are available to the banks, aﬀecting the liabilities side of their
balance sheet. The economy is populated by four types of economic agents: households,
ﬁnal goods producers, capital goods producers, retail producers and banks.
4.2.1 Households
In this model, there is a continuum of households of measure unity. Each household
consumes, saves and provides labour. The individuals belonging to each household can
be either workers or bankers, by a fraction of f and 1− f , respectively. The fraction f
of workers provides labour and the wages they earn come back to the household. On the
other hand, the fraction 1− f of bankers manages one of the banks that is owned by the
households and return to the household they belong any dividends they make over the
period they manage the bank. It is also assumed that members can interchange roles.
Bankers may become workers every period with probability 1−σB, which is independent
of how long the individual has performed that role. The probability that a member of
the household stays as a banker is given by σB. The banker only returns the accumulated
earnings to her family when she exits from the bank.
The assumption of a ﬁnite horizon for bankers is needed in order to avoid the accu-
mulation of net worth beyond a certain threshold that would made them independent
of external funding. Conversely, every period a similar number of workers randomly
becomes bankers.
Households' utility is given by
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Λt = Λ(Ct, Lt) =
((Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)L%t )1−σc − 1
1− σc (4.1)
where single period utility Λt is an increasing non-separable Cobb-Douglas function
of real consumption, Ct, relative to external habit, χCt−1, and leisure Lt and has a
functional form consistent with a balanced growth path. The parameters σc and % refers
to the elasticity of consumption and the households preferences, respectively.
Let Dt be the amount of deposits made by households on banks at time t, that pay R
ex
t
ex post gross real interest rate adjusted for gross inﬂation, Tt lump sum taxes, Υt the
net transfers from ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms owned by households and Wt the
nominal wage.4
Therefore, the household budget constraint is given by
Ct +Dt+1 = WtLt + Υt +R
ex
t Dt + Tt (4.2)
In a cashless version of the model, household behaviour is then described in equilibrium
by
Λt = Λ(Ct, Lt) =
((Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)L%t )1−σc − 1
1− σc
ΛC,t = (1− %)(Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)(1−σc)−1(1− ht)%(1−σc))
ΛL,t = %(Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)(1−σc)L%(1−σc)−1t (4.3)
Rext =
Rn,t−1
Πt
(4.4)
ΛC,t = βEt
[
Rext+1ΛC,t+1
]
(4.5)
ΛL,t
ΛC,t
=
Wt
Pt
(4.6)
Lt ≡ 1− ht (4.7)
where Rn,t, our monetary policy instrument, is the gross nominal interest rate set in
period t to pay out interest in period t+1, Πt ≡ PtPt−1 where Pt is the retail price level, ht
is hours worked and Wt
Pt
is the real wage. The Fischer and Euler equations are described
by equations (4.4) and (4.5) respectively.
The Euler consumption equation (4.5), where ΛC,t ≡ ∂Λt∂Ct is the marginal utility of con-
sumption and Et[·] denotes rational expectations based on agents observing all current
4Both deposits and government debt are one period real bonds that pay the same gross real return
from t to t− 1.
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macroeconomic variables (i.e., 'complete information'), describes the optimal consumption-
savings decisions of the household. It equates the marginal utility from consuming one
unit of income in period t with the discounted marginal utility from consuming the gross
income acquired, by saving the income. Equation (4.6) equates the real wage with the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
4.2.2 Goods Producers
Goods producers behaviour is given by
Y Wt = F (At, ht, Kt) = (Atht)
αK1−αt−1 (4.8)
Yt = (1− c)Y Wt (4.9)
PWt
Pt
Fh,t =
PWt
Pt
αY Wt
ht
=
Wt
Pt
(4.10)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + ψt+1(1− S(Xt))It (4.11)
Demand for capital is given by
Rk,t = ψt
(1− α)PWt
Pt
Y Wt /Kt−1 + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(4.12)
Equation (4.8) is a Cobb-Douglas production function for the wholesale sector, being
the wholesale product given by Y Wt , that is converted into diﬀerentiated goods, given
by Yt in (4.9) at a cost cY
W
t . Kt is physical capital that goods producers buy to capital
producers at price Qt , α and (1 − α) are the output elasticities to labour and capital
respectively, and At is the productivity shock. From the optimization problem we get
equation (4.10) for the demand of labour, where Fh,t ≡ ∂Ft∂ht equates the marginal product
of labour with the real wage, and (4.11) for the demand for capital. Demand for capital is
given by the return on capital Rk,t, that equalizes the gross marginal product of capital
net of depreciation (δ). Pt and P
W
t are the aggregate price indexes in the retail and
wholesale sectors respectively. Capital accumulation is given by (4.11) and we assume
convex investment adjustment costs a la Smets and Wouters (2007). Note here Kt is
end-of-period t capital stock and ψt is a capital quality shock, which destroys or enhances
capital available in period t to be used in period t+1. The production of physical capital
is determined in the next subsection.
122
4.2.3 Capital Producers
To determine investment, following Smets and Wouters (2007), we introduce capital
producing ﬁrms that at time t convert It of output into (1 − S(Xt))It of new capital
sold to goods producers at a real price Qt, commonly known as Tobin's Q. They then
maximize with respect to {It} expected discounted proﬁts
Et
∞∑
k=0
Dt,t+k [Qt+k(1− S (It+k/It+k−1))It+k − It+k]
where Dt,t+k = β
k
(
ΛC,t+1
ΛC,t
)
is the real stochastic discount rate over the interval [t, t+ k].
Deﬁning Xt ≡ ItIt−1 results in the ﬁrst-order condition
Qt(1− S(Xt)−XtS ′(Xt)) + Et
[
Dt,t+1 Qt+1S
′(Xt+1)X2t+1
]
= 1
We complete this set-up with the functional form for S(X),
S(X) = φX(Xt − (1 + gt))2
where g is the balanced growth rate. Note that along a balanced growth path Xt = 1+gt
and investment costs disappear. This is a convenient property because then the steady
state is unchanged from introducing investment costs.
4.2.4 Retail Producers
In order to introduce sticky prices, we follow the technique proposed by Calvo (1983).
We assume that there is a probability of 1− ξ at each period that the price of each retail
good m is set optimally to P 0t (m). If the price is not re-optimised, then it is held ﬁxed.
For each retail producer m, given its real marginal cost MCt, the objective is at time t
to choose {P 0t (m)} to maximize discounted nominal proﬁts
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkDNt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)− Pt+kMCt+k
]
(4.13)
subject to the equation for demand for investment by each producer
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Yt+k(m) =
(
P 0t (m)
Pt+k
)−ζ
Yt+k (4.14)
where DNt,t+k ≡ βk ΛC,t+k/Pt+kΛC,t/Pt is the nominal stochastic discount factor over the interval
[t, t+ k]. The solution to this is
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkDNt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)− Pt+kMCt+kMSt+k
]
= 0 (4.15)
where an exogenous stochastic mark-up to the steady state MS ≡ 1
1− 1
ζ
has been in-
troduced. The mark-up shock follows a AR1 process, which is described in subsection
4.2.7.
With indexing by an amount γ ∈ [0, 1], price dynamics in equilibrium are given by
Ht − ξβEt[Π˜ζ−1t+1Ht+1] = YtΛC,t (4.16)
Jt − ξβEt[Π˜ζt+1Jt+1] =
(
1/(1− (1
ζ
))
)
MCtMStYtΛC,t (4.17)
Π˜t ≡ Πt
Πγt−1
(4.18)
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)1−ζ
(4.19)
∆t = ξΠ˜
ζ
t∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)−ζ
(4.20)
where ∆t is a measure of price dispersion across retail ﬁrms each setting their prices at
diﬀerent periods.
Real marginal costs in the retail sector are given by
MCt =
PWt
Pt
(4.21)
The aggregate resource constraint in the economy is expressed by
Yt = Ct +Gt + It (4.22)
The real side of the model is completed with a balanced budget constraint with lump-sum
taxes:
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Gt = httaxt
Wt
Pt
(4.23)
where Gt is a government spending shock, which follows a AR 1 shock, as described in
subsection 4.2.7, and taxt is the tax rate, that is charged on households' income.
4.2.5 Banks
The banking sector model is inspired in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler et al.
(2012), with some diﬀerences. First, we assume that total net worth is given by the initial
transfer from households to new bankers and it accumulates through retaining proﬁts.
In our model, we rule out the role of outside equity and therefore increases in the net
worth of the banks are made exclusively through retained earnings. This feature has an
important implication for macroprudential policy, since a bank is likely to need more
time to recover from a shortage of net worth, making the impact of macroprudential
regulation more signiﬁcant (Angelini et al., 2011).
Financial frictions aﬀect real activity via the impact of funds available to the banks, but
there is no friction in transferring funds between banks and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Given
a certain deposit level a bank can lend frictionlessly to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms against their
future proﬁts. In this regard, ﬁrms oﬀer to banks a perfect state contingent security.
First, we start by describing a laissez-faire version of the banking sector, in which banking
regulation is not enforced. Then, macroprudential regulation is introduced and we show
how it changes the banking sector equilibrium.
The Laissez-Faire Banking Sector
The activity of the bank can be summarized in two stages. In the ﬁrst one, banks raise
deposits and equity from the households, over the period [t, t+1], the 'time period t'. In
the second stage banks use these deposits to make loans to ﬁrms. Loans (st) are priced
at a price Qt. Therefore, Qtst corresponds to the amount of loans that banks provide
in period t. The asset against which the loans are obtained is end-of-period capital Kt.
Capital depreciates at a rate δ in each period.
The banking sector's balance sheet is simple: the assets side is determined by loans,
while the liabilities side comprises household deposits and net worth. This implies a
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banking sector's balance sheet of the form:5
Qtst = nt + dt (4.24)
where st are claims on future returns from one unit of a goods producer's capital at the
end-of-period t to ﬁnance capital acquired at the end of period t for use in period t+ 1.
Qt is the price of a unit of capital. Therefore Qtst is the amount of loans that coincide
fully to the assets of the bank and they equal the sum of deposits (dt) and net worth
(nt).
Net worth of the bank accumulates according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 (4.25)
Rk,t are real returns on bank assets given by
Rk,t =
[Zt + (1− δ)Qt]
Qt−1
where Zt is the gross return (marginal product) of capital and Zt + (1− δ)Qt represents
the net return after depreciation.
Banks face an exogenous probability of exiting of 1−σB ∈ [0, 1] per period and therefore
survive for i− 1 periods and exit in the ith period with probability (1− σB)σi−1B . Given
the fact that the representative bank pays dividends only when it exits, the banker's
objective is to maximize expected discounted terminal wealth Vt
Vt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− σB)σiBΛt,t+1+int+1+i (4.26)
where Λt,t+i = β
iΛC,t+i/Pt+i
ΛC,t/Pt
is the stochastic discount factor, subject to an incentive
constraint for lenders (households) to be willing to supply funds to the banker.
To understand this dynamic problem better we can substitute for dt from (4.24) and
rewrite (4.25) as
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 (4.27)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at the real
riskless rate Rext nt−1 plus the excess return over the latter on the assets. With these
5In a slight departure from notation elsewhere, lower case denotes the representative bank. Upper
case variables later denote aggregates.
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returns and Qt exogenous, the bank net worth in all future periods is determined by its
choice of {st+i} subject to a borrowing constraint.
To motivate an endogenous constraint on the bank's ability to obtain funds, we introduce
the following simple agency problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). We assume that
in the period of time from having obtained funds from households and making loans,
but before paying their debts to its creditors, the bankers may steal a fraction of assets
Θ ∈ [0, 1] to her family. In the recognition of this possibility, households limit the funds
they lend to banks. The fraction of funds that a banker can divert is determined by the
balance sheet composition. If a banker diverts assets for her personal gain, he defaults
on his debt and shuts down and the creditors may reclaim the remaining fraction 1−Θ
of funds. Since creditors are aware of the banker's incentive to divert funds, they will
restrict the amount of funds they provide to the bank.
In this way a borrowing constraint may arise. In order to ensure that bankers do not
divert funds the following incentive constraint must hold:
Vt ≥ ΘQtst (4.28)
The incentive constraint states that for households to be willing to supply funds to a
bank, the banker's franchise value Vt must be at least as large as her gain from diverting
funds.
The optimization problem for the bank is to choose a path for borrowing, {st+i}, to
maximize Vt subject to (4.24) and (4.25) or equivalently (4.27) and (4.28). To solve this
problem we guess a linear solution of the form:
Vt = Vt(st, nt) = µs,tQtst + νd,tnt (4.29)
where µs,t ≡ νs,tQt − νd,t is the excess value of bank assets over deposits and νd,t is the
marginal value of deposits.
The banker's Bellman equation for a given path of nt can be written in the form
Vt−1(st−1, nt−1) = EtΛt−1,t[(1− σB)nt + σB max
st
Vt(st, nt)] (4.30)
Then, we perform the optimization by maxst Vt(st, nt) subject to the incentive constraint
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(4.28). The Lagrangian for this problem is
Lt = Vt + λt[Vt −ΘQtst] = (1 + λt)Vt − λtΘQtst (4.31)
where λt > 0 if the constraint binds and λt = 0 otherwise.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimization problem are:
st : (1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
λt : µs,tQtst + νd,tnt ≥ ΘQtst
We now deﬁne φt to be the leverage ratio of the representative bank that satisﬁes the
incentive constraint:
Qtst = φtnt (4.32)
where φt is given by
φt =
νd,t
Θ− µs,t (4.33)
Using (4.32) we can write (4.29) as
Vt = [µs,tφt + νd,t]nt (4.34)
and hence (4.30) becomes
Vt(st, nt) = EtΛt,t+1[1− σB + σB(µs,t+1φt+1 + νd,t+1)]nt+1
≡ EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1nt+1
= EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1[Rk,t+1Qtst −Rext+1dt] (4.35)
using (4.25) and deﬁning Ωt = 1 − σB + σB(νd,t + φtµs,t). Ωt+1 is a term augmenting
Λt,t+1, the household's stochastic discount factor, given that banker's horizon is diﬀerent
from household's, due to the exit probability bankers have to face. With σB > 0, Ωt+1
represents the shadow value of an extra unit of net worth.
Comparing (4.35) with (4.29) and equating coeﬃcients of st and dt, we arrive at the
determination of νs,t and νd,t :
νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
νs,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1QtRk,t+1
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Hence
µs,t ≡ νs,t
Qt
− νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1) (4.36)
At the aggregate level, the banking sector balance sheet is:
QtSt = Nt +Dt
and net worth is the sum of existing (old) bankers and new bankers:
Nt = No,t +Nn,t
Net worth of existing bankers equals earnings on assets held in the previous period net
cost of deposit ﬁnance, multiplied by a fraction σB, the probability that they survive
until the current period:
No,t = σB{(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)St−1 −Rext Dt−1}
Since new bankers cannot operate without any net worth, we assume that the fam-
ily transfers to each one the fraction ξB/(1 − σB) of the total value assets of exiting
entrepreneurs. This implies:
Nn,t = ξB[Zt + (1− δ)Qt]St−1 (4.37)
Introducing a capital quality shock not only aﬀects the capital accumulation process
and the return on capital, but, in models with a banking sector in the lines of Gertler
and Karadi (2011), it also has an impact on the balance sheet of banks, aﬀecting the
accumulation of net worth and the credit spread. A negative shock in the quality of
capital reduces output in period t + 1 and banks' net worth, thereby tightening the
incentive constraint. This disturbance is used to model a ﬁnancial crisis.
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The complete banking sector model is, thus, given by:
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt =
φtNt
(1 + ξBRk,tφt)
φt =
νd,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1ψt − σBRext Dt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
µs,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1)
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(νd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
The Regulated Banking Sector
In this section we introduce macroprudential regulation, assuming a tax / subsidy
scheme, in the lines of Gertler et al. (2012) and De Paoli and Paustian (2012). We
assume two diﬀerent instruments, that alter the balance-sheet composition of the banks.
One instrument is a tax / subsidy on loans and it changes according to diﬀerent macro-
prudential policy rules. On the other hand, we also introduce a subsidy / tax on the
net worth of banks. Based on some recent literature modeling macroprudential regu-
lation, the choice of the instruments does not aim at reproducing exactly the current
countercyclical capital requirements deﬁned in Basel III regulatory framework. However,
as countercyclical time-varying capital requirements, it also reacts countercyclically to
ﬁnancial variables variations, such as credit, credit-to-GDP ratio and credit spreads.
Total taxes from the macroprudential regulation scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (4.38)
The macroprudential regulatory scheme diﬀers from Gertler et al. (2012) in the sense
that it is non-neutral in terms of its ﬁscal impact.
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The timing of the tax regime is as follows. In period t − 1, tax and subsidy rates τt−1,
τ st−1 are set to be paid or received on the value of end-of-period t − 1 (or beginning of
period t) loans Qt−1st−1 and end-of-period net worth nt−1 respectively. The net worth
of the bank then accumulates in period t according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 + τ st−1nt−1 − τt−1Qt−1st−1 (4.39)
That is, net worth equals gross returns minus gross costs of borrowing, plus subsidies
minus taxes carried over from the previous period. Banks are atomistic and take the tax
rate and subsidy as exogenous.
With this timing for taxes or subsidies, the balance sheet of the bank in period t remains
as before:
Qtst = nt + dt (4.40)
which says that net worth plus subsidies plus deposits can be used to ﬁnance loans net
of tax.
As before we can substitute for dt from (4.40) and rewrite (4.39) to give
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 − TMRt−1
= (Rext + τ
s
t−1)nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext − τt−1)Qt−1st−1 (4.41)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at a real riskless
rate plus the excess return over the latter on the assets plus subsidies minus taxes carried
over from the previous period.
The optimization problem for the regulated banking sector is similar to the one de-
scribed above, but it takes into account the changes in the balance-sheet derived from
the introduction of regulatory tools.
Aggregation follows as before and now total net taxes from the macroprudential regula-
tion scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (4.42)
The government budget constraint now becomes
Gt = taxtht
Wt
Pt
+ TMRt (4.43)
so that tax revenues from the scheme alter the lump-sum taxes required to ﬁnance
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government expenditure.
The complete banking model is summarized by
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt = φtNt
φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1ψt − σBRext Dt−1 − σBTMRt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt
µn,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
t+1 + τ
s
t )
]
µs,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt))
]
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
with τ st or τt exogenous. Clearly in the absence of taxes or subsidies, i.e. τt = τ
s
t = 0,
we get back to the previous set-up.
It is worth highlighting that µs,t, the excess value of assets over deposits, and µn,t, the
excess value of net worth over debt are similar to νd,t and νs,t, apart from the fact
that they are aﬀected by the macroprudential regulation instruments, τt and τ
s
t . The
inclusion of macroprudential instruments of this kind alters the shadow value of assets
and net worth, by altering the cost of borrowing and the interest margin of lending
(spreads). Therefore, it modiﬁes the franchise value of banks and, in particular, it has
an impact on the optimal composition of banks' balance sheets. The cost of borrowing,
Rext+1, increases by τ
s
t , the subsidy on net worth, which makes more attractive for banks
to fund themselves by raising net worth instead of collecting deposits. On the other
hand, the interest margin obtained from lending activities decreases by τt, the tax on
loans, making lending less proﬁtable.
Although we impose some strong assumptions on the bank side of the model - no outside
equity; net worth is accumulating through retained proﬁts; banks raise deposits and
equity from households ruling out money markets as a vehicle to compensate for liquidity
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shortages - the features that are embedded in the model are suﬃcient to motivate a
wedge between the funding interest rate and the lending interest rate and to introduce a
role to macroprudential policy. Indeed, remaining characteristics of the model based on
Gertler and Karadi (2011); Gertler et al. (2012) were kept in the model - a representative
bank, which delivers the traditional banking activities of ﬁnancial intermediation  to
raise deposits from households and to grant credit to ﬁrms, subject to an incentive
constraint. The aim of such a model is to show that, even with a very simpliﬁed banking
system, macroprudential policy can be useful in dampening the credit cycle and, as a
consequence, the economic business cycle.
There are other modelling alternatives to study macroprudential regulation without the
inclusion of a explicit model of a banking sector, such as in Bailliu et al. (2012); Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2013), studies that follow the Bernanke et al. (1999) and the Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) types of ﬁnancial frictions, respectively. Our model of the banking
sector diﬀers from those because it explicitly models a banking sector, allowing the in-
vestigation of the role played by leverage-constrained banks in macroeconomic dynamics
and how macroprudential instruments may be suitable to regulate leverage and act as a
stabilization tool. Our modelling choices also makes it possible to assess the transmission
mechanisms of capital requirements, which incorporates a channel to lending and output
through funding costs and bank incentive eﬀects.
4.2.6 Policy Rules
To close the model, we introduce monetary and macroprudential policy rules. We suggest
not only a standard Taylor rule but also monetary rules that `lean against the wind', by
responding to ﬁnancial variables behaviour, such as deviations of credit and asset prices
from their steady state. We also propose alternative macroprudential rules, which also
feed back on variables related to the ﬁnancial sector, to assess the performance of these
ﬁnancial indicators in improving social welfare. A comparison across diﬀerent policy
rules is implemented and the optimal rules are those whose policy coeﬃcients maximize
social welfare, measured by the intertemporal utility.
We follow the approach of using optimal simple and conventional rules, which requires
the knowledge of the eﬃcient levels of output. For a matter of comparison, we also
follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), who recommend the use of implementable rules,
given their advantage of setting policy variables as a function of a small number of easily
observable, macroeconomic indicators, which do not require the eﬃcient levels of output.
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Results for implementable rules are reported in Appendix 4.2. These policy rules provide
the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy and are commonly used in the
macroeconomic literature, see for example Bailliu et al. (2012) and Lambertini et al.
(2013).
Based on this set of monetary and macroprudential policy rules, four policy mandates are
investigated. The ﬁrst policy regime assumes a sole monetary policy mandate, featuring a
standard Taylor rule pursuing inﬂation stability. In this policy mandate, macroprudential
tools are ignored and this institutional framework is set as a baseline case, that will be
compared with policy regimes comprising `leaning against the wind' monetary rules and
macroprudential policy. This leads us to the second policy regime, in which a `leaning
against the wind' monetary policy is considered.
The third and fourth policy regimes result from the extension of the ﬁrst and second
regimes to include macroprudential policy instruments. In the third policy regime,
macroprudential rules are introduced alongside with a standard monetary policy rule.
This regime mimics an institutional framework in which the central bank is in charge of
price stability only and the macroprudential authority is concerned with ﬁnancial stabil-
ity. In this case, there are two economic authorities that operate independently of each
other. The fourth regime relaxes this assumption by considering a partially uniﬁed insti-
tutional regime, since it is assumed that both the central bank and the macroprudential
authority target ﬁnancial stability.6
Monetary Policy Rules
In these study we assume that monetary policy can be a standard Taylor rule, reacting
to inﬂation and output gaps, or it can also respond to ﬁnancial variables. Following
Curdia and Woodford (2010), we consider an augmented Taylor rule that feeds back on
credit spreads. In addition, we also suggest credit and asset prices as alternative ﬁnancial
indicators.
The baseline policy regime is then given by a conventional Taylor rule, of the type:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)]
+ log(MPSt)
6In contrast with a fully uniﬁed institutional regime, that would be one in which both the monetary
and the macroprudential authorities would target price and ﬁnancial stability.
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where Y Ft is the ﬂexi-price level of output, and log(MPSt) is the monetary policy shock,
as speciﬁed in subsection 4.2.7. The conventional Taylor rule stabilises output about its
ﬂexi-price level which is that determined by solving the real business cycle core of this
model. The coeﬃcient ρr controls for the degree of interest rate smoothing, while θr,pi
and θr,y control for the degree of aggressiveness of the policy rate response to inﬂation
and output. The remaining terms represent the deviation of inﬂation and deviation of
interest rates in t− 1 from their steady state values.
As already explained, this monetary policy rule is used as a baseline scenario for com-
parison with the alternative policy rules considered in the analysis.
The general augmented monetary policy rule takes the form:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)
+ θr,Q log
(
Qt
Q
)
+ θr,s log
(
1 + Et
[
Rk,t+1 −Rext+1
]
1 +Rk −Rex
)
+ θr,QS log
(
Qtst
Qs
)]
+ log(MPSt)
where Et[Rk,t+1 − Rext+1] is the credit spread, Qtst is credit and Qt is Tobin's Q, that
represents asset prices in this model. The coeﬃcient ρr controls for the degree of interest
rate smoothing, while θr,pi, θr,y, θr,Q, θr,s, and θr,Qs control for the degree of aggressiveness
of the policy rate response to inﬂation, output, asset prices, spreads and credit, respec-
tively. Lastly, log(MPSt) is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock. The variables without time
subscripts denote their respective steady state values and Y Ft refers to the ﬂexi-price
output.
This general augmented simple rule is divided in four diﬀerent combinations, depending
on the ﬁnancial indicator(s) chosen to infer the their eﬀectiveness in improving welfare
outcomes. Therefore, we examine simple augmented Taylor rules feeding back alterna-
tively on credit, credit spreads, assets prices or credit and credit spreads simultaneously.
Macroprudential Policy Rules
The objectives, instruments and targets of monetary policy rules are already quite es-
tablished in the literature. In contrast, issues still remain concerning the objective of
macroprudential policy and what tools should be used in order to achieve its goal.7 In
this paper, we follow the view of the Bank of England, 2009 (BoE, 2009, thereafter), that
establishes that macroprudential regulation is implemented to assure ﬁnancial stability
7For a discussion, see Galati and Moessner 2012.
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through the monitoring of the credit supply during upswings and downturns. The BoE
(2009) approach states that macroprudential policy has the role of creating a capital
buﬀer during upswings and relax credit conditions during economic downturns. The
view that credit booms are related to ﬁnancial and business cycle crisis is claimed by
Minsky (1972) and it is underpinned in empirical works, including Jorda et al. (2011)
and Schularick and Taylor (2012). Against this background, the paper provides a charac-
terization of macroprudential policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation policy instrument
rather than as a means of preventing ﬁnancial crises.
The literature suggests a range of indicator variables related to credit booms,such as
credit growth, output growth, credit-to-GDP ratio, credit spreads, among others.8 The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) underscores the advantages of using
credit-to-GDP ratio over credit growth, namely referring that this measure being a ratio,
it is not aﬀected by the cyclical behaviour of credit demand, since it is normalised by
the size of the economy (given by output). In addition, it shows smoother behaviour
patterns than credit growth.
Focusing our analysis on one ﬁnancial indicator only may be misleading to assess the
eﬀectiveness of macroprudential policy. Based on the literature, we suggest the use of
credit, credit spreads, loan-to-GDP ratio and credit growth as deviations from their
steady state. We examine diﬀerent simple Taylor-type macroprudential rules feeding
back on these indicator variables.
Regarding the regulatory tools, we ﬁrst select the tax on loans, τt, to be used alongside
the nominal interest rate.9 The general form of the macroprudential regulation rule is
then given by
log
(
1 + τt
1 + τ
)
= ρτ log
(
1 + τt−1
1 + τ
)
+ (1− ρτ )[ατ,QS log
(
Qtst
Qs
)
+ ατ,s log
(
1 + Et
[
Rk,t+1 −Rext+1
]
1 +Rk −Rex
)
+ ατ,QS/Y log
 QtstYt
Qs
Y Ft
+ ατ,∆Qs cgt
cgss
]
+ log(MRSt)
where QtSt
Y t
represents the loan-to-GDP ratio at time t , cgt =
Qtst
Qt−1st−1
represents credit
growth at time t regarding the previous period t − 1 and cgss is the steady state value
8See Bank of England, 2011 and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.
9For this purpose, we set the subsidy on net worth equal to zero, τst = 0 .
136
of cgt. The remaining feedback variables are credit spreads and credit, as already de-
scribed for the monetary policy rule, and log(MRSt) is a i.i.d. macro-prudential policy
shock. In addition, the coeﬃcients of the macroprudential policy rule are given by ρτ ,
which measures the degree of persistence of the macroprudential instrument, ατ,Qs, ατ,s,
ατ,∆Qs and ατ,Qs/Y , which denote the degree of response of the macroprudential policy
tool to deviations in credit, credit spreads, credit growth and loan-to-GDP ratio. We
expect ατ,Qs, ατ,Qs/Y , ατ,∆Qs > 0 and ατ,s < 0, as conditions to ensure a counter-cyclical
macroprudential regulation.
If credit, credit growth and loan-to-GDP ratio exceed their respective steady states,
taxes are raised thereby lowering loans and dampening the business cycle; on the other
hand, if credit spreads exceed their steady state, taxes are lowered, increasing lending
and bursting the business cycle. As before, variables without time subscripts denote
their respective steady state values and Y Ft refers to the ﬂexi-price output.
4.2.7 Shock Processes
Our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model features standard macroeconomic
shocks as well as a ﬁnancial crisis shock. Regarding the former, we consider monetary
policy (MPSt), macroprudential policy (MRSt), government spending (Gt), technology
(At), trend (1 + gt) and mark-up (MSt) shocks. In what concerns the ﬁnancial crisis
shock (ψt), we follow Gertler and Karadi (2011), that suggest a capital quality shock to
mimic the subprime crisis of 2007/2008. All the disturbances follow a AR1 process of
the form:
log(MPSt) = %MPS log(MPSt−1) + MPS (4.44)
log(MRSt) = %MPS log(MRSt−1) + MRS (4.45)
log(Gt) = (1− %) logG+ %G logGt−1 + G (4.46)
log(At) = %A log(At−1) + A (4.47)
log(1 + gt) = log(1 + g) + Atrend (4.48)
log(MSt) = %MS log(MSt−1) + MS (4.49)
log(ψt) = %ψ log(ψt−1)− ψ (4.50)
where MPS, MRS, G, A, Atrend, MS, ψ ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2i).
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4.2.8 Calibration of Fundamental Parameters
The values for the model parameters are summarized in Table 4.2.1. We choose standard
values in the literature for preference and technology parameters and we deﬁne as a time
unit a quarter.
Table 4.2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.9921
Growth Rate g 0.0184/4
Government expenditure-output ratio gy 0.20
Labour Share α 0.70
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Habit in consumption χ 0.7
Substitution elasticity of goods ζ 7.0
Fixed cost c 1ζ = 0.14929
Preference parameter % 0.8806
Investment parameter φx 2.0
Indexing parameter γ 0.2
Elasticity of Consumption σc 2.0
Banking Parameters
Bankers Survival Probability σB 0.975
Transfer for New Bankers ξ 0.002
Asset divertibility Θ 0.410
Regarding the banking sector parameters, our calibration follows closely those adopted in
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler et al. (2012). We set σB, the rate of survival of
banks, by assuming that banks survive for 40 quarters on average (10 years). Therefore,
40 = 1
1−σB and σB = 0.975. The values of the fractions of initial net worth and assets
divertibility, ξ and Θ respectively, are computed to hit an economy wide leverage ratio
of four and to have an average credit spread of 100 basis points per year. In the AR1
shock processes, standard deviations of i.i.d shocks are calibrated at 1% and persistence
parameters at 0.75. The preference parameter % is calibrated to hit a hours worked
steady state target of h = 0.35.
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4.3 Welfare Analysis
We compare the performance of alternative policy regimes in terms of social welfare.10
This section is structured in two subsections, based on the policy regimes under analysis.
The ﬁrst subsection deals with policy regimes in which only monetary policy rules are
considered. Speciﬁcally, a standard monetary policy stance is implemented and used as
a baseline scenario to which alternative policy regimes are compared. These alterna-
tive policy regimes consider augmented Taylor rules responding to ﬁnancial imbalances.
Welfare analysis is then conducted for both policy regimes and results are shown and
commented.
The next subsection presents policy regimes featuring not only monetary policy rules,
but also macroprudential policy rules, under separate and partially uniﬁed mandates.
In each policy regime, the optimal policy rules are those whose policy coeﬃcients grant
the consumption and hours worked paths that maximize the inter-temporal utility (Λ),
given by
Λt = Et
[
(1− β)
∞∑
n=0
βnΛt+n
]
(4.51)
where Λt = U(Ct, ht) is the household's single-period utility function.
These welfare comparisons across policy regimes can also be interpreted in terms of con-
sumption equivalence calculation. Given a particular equilibrium path for consumption
and hours worked, Ct and ht, we compute the increase in the steady state single-period
utility, following a 1% increase in consumption:
CEt ≡ Λt (1.01Ct, 1.01Ct−1, ht)− Λt (Ct, Ct−1, ht) (4.52)
Then, we compute the consumption equivalent percentage (ce1(%)) by ﬁrst selecting the
rule among a set of distinct policy rules that maximizes welfare (Λ∗) and using it as a
10In Appendix 4.3 we present impulse response functions obtained following some shocks, using simple,
not optimized, monetary and macroprudential policy rules. The feedback coeﬃcients used in this exercise
were chosen in a ad hoc fashion, based on the literature. We acknowledge the scarce information
regarding how policymakers may react to certain ﬁnancial variables dynamics, which have led us to
concentrate on the optimal policy outcomes. Still, the exercise presented in this Appendix provides
similar conclusions in terms of the dynamics of the model under diﬀerent regimes of monetary and
macroprudencial policies.
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benchmark. Then, we calculate the welfare deviation of each policy rule from the max-
imum welfare value (Λ∗) and we normalise it by the percentage change in consumption
in the deterministic steady state that would give households the same unconditional ex-
pected utility in the stochastic economy, CE = 0.00224, in our model. Among a subset
of policy regimes, ﬁgure ce1(%) represents the loss in welfare from considering policy
regimes distinct from the one that maximizes welfare. For the policy regime that max-
imises welfare we set ce∗1(%) = 0%. The consumption equivalent percentage is useful to
compare welfare outcomes within each subset of policy regimes.
Nevertheless, a measure of welfare performance is needed to compare outcomes across
all sets of policy regimes, which is represented by ce2(%). The normalisation procedure
is then adopted to make the comparison of welfare outcomes across diﬀerent policy
regimes more comprehensible. By considering the consumption equivalent concept, the
normalisation is calculated by the welfare deviation of each policy rule (Ω0) from the
welfare ﬁgure obtained under laissez-faire (i.e. under a standard Taylor rule). The
denominator of this ratio remains the same, CE = 0.00224. Therefore, we obtain a
measure of the change of welfare for each policy regime over the standard Taylor regime.
A negative ﬁgure indicates a welfare cost and a positive ﬁgure indicates a welfare gain.
The parameters of the model are kept constant across all policy regimes.
4.3.1 Optimal Standard Taylor Rule and Leaning-Against-The-
Wind Monetary Policy
With the aim of investigating whether, in a macroeconomic model with nominal and
ﬁnancial frictions, monetary policy should also respond to ﬁnancial imbalances, we com-
pute optimal simple rules for monetary policy feeding back on ﬁnancial variables. For
this purpose, we compare an interest rate smoothing standard Taylor rule, that reacts to
inﬂation and output gaps, with augmented rules that also respond to ﬁnancial variables,
such as credit, credit spreads and asset prices. Then, from a set of monetary policy
rules, we identify the one that is welfare maximizing. Three diﬀerent augmented mone-
tary rules are considered in this analysis: a rule reacting to inﬂation, output and credit
gaps; a rule targeting inﬂation, output and credit spreads gaps and a rule responding to
inﬂation, output and Tobin's Q gaps. The format of these rules was described in section
4.2.6.
Table 4.3.1 summarises the computation results for the welfare-optimised coeﬃcients for
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each of these monetary policy rules.11
Table 4.3.1: Optimal Monetary Policy Rules - Optimised Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes ρr (1− ρr)θr,pi (1− ρr)θr,y (1− ρr)θr,QS (1− ρr)θr,s (1− ρr)θr,Q
1 Std Taylor Rule (TR) 0.1697 4.4243 0.0711 - - -
2 Aug TR react. Credit 0.7029 5.0000 0.0000 0.0316 - -
3 Aug TR react. Spreads 0.5335 4.4803 0.0000 - -1.9619 -
4 Aug TR react. Tobin's Q 0.2053 3.4922 0.0000 - - 0.5174
We ﬁnd that monetary policy should respond to increases in credit or asset prices regard-
ing their steady state values by raising interest rates, on one hand. On the other hand,
monetary policy should lower interest rates in the case of a rise in credit spreads. Thus,
results show that an optimal monetary policy that `leans against the wind' would react
countercyclically to credit, credit spreads or even asset prices. The ﬁnding associated to
a simple rule that also reacts to credit spreads is in line with results from Curdia and
Woodford (2010), which also demonstrate that monetary policymakers should relax the
monetary policy stance whenever credit spreads increase. Previous literature does not
back up our result for a rule feeding back on asset prices. In particular, in a model with
credit market imperfections, Faia and Monacelli (2007) show that an optimal monetary
policy strategy is one that reacts to asset prices increases by lowering interest rates.
Our ﬁndings also show that the optimal reaction to output ﬂuctuations around its ﬂexi-
price level would be zero, whenever we consider a monetary policy stance feeding back
on ﬁnancial variables.
The policy regimes are ranked using a welfare criterion. Table 4.3.2 shows the computed
welfare outcomes, both in absolute (Λ) and normalised (ce2(%)) terms. As already
mentioned, the normalisation procedure is adopted to facilitate comparison of welfare
performance across policy regimes in distinct tables and it is calculated by dividing the
welfare outcome in absolute terms for each policy rule by the welfare outcome under
laissez-faire, which, in our model, we assume it is given by the welfare outcome under
the standard Taylor rule. Table 4.3.2 is completed with the consumption equivalent
11The computation procedures are implemented in Dynare 4.2.4, using a second-order perturbation
solution of the model with a particular policy rule interfaced with a standard Matlab minimization
procedure.
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criterion (ce1(%)) and the standard deviations of interest rates (σr), inﬂation (σpi) and
output (σy).
12
Table 4.3.2: Optimal Monetary Policy Rules - Welfare Losses / Gains and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR -1.886534 0.0615 baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
2 Aug TR react. Credit -1.886529 0.0593 0.0022 0.0097 0.0018 0.0227
3 Aug TR react. Spreads -1.886480 0.0375 0.0241 0.0100 0.0027 0.0210
4 Aug TR react. Tobin's Q -1.886396 0.0000 0.0615 0.0103 0.0036 0.0189
Welfare outcomes suggest that the monetary policy rule that minimizes welfare losses is
an augmented one that reacts to asset prices (captured by the variable Tobin's Q in this
model). Compared to this rule, the alternative regimes imply welfare losses ranging from
0.04% (policy regime 3) to 0.06% (policy regime 1) in terms of consumption equivalent.
Moreover, every augmented Taylor rule considered in this analysis would perform better
than the standard, conventional Taylor rule, as indicated by the welfare gains ﬁgures. In
fact, a standard Taylor rule is more welfare costly than `leaning against the wind' policy
mandates in a macroeconomic framework in which ﬁnancial frictions are also modelled,
implying a welfare loss of 0.06% in ce1(%).
From the point of view of inﬂation stabilisation however, a rule responding to credit
spreads would have a worse performance than a standard one. In fact, rules reacting to
credit spreads and asset prices are related to higher inﬂation volatility, as claimed in the
literature. Therefore, our results suggest that the monetary policy rule that seems to
make a compromise between welfare maximization and inﬂation stability is one reacting
to ﬂuctuations in credit around its steady state, since it delivers a smaller welfare loss
than a standard Taylor rule, at the same time it leads to lower inﬂation, output and
interest rate volatility.
12As explained in Section 3, we compute the consumption equivalence percentage by ﬁrst selecting the
rule that maximizes welfare (Λ∗) and using it as a benchmark. Then, we calculate the welfare deviation
from each policy rule from the maximum welfare value (Λ∗) and we normalise it by the percentage
change in consumption in the deterministic steady-state that would provide households with the same
unconditional expected utility in the stochastic economy.
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4.3.2 Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
In this section, we assess the eﬀectiveness of macroprudential policy in terms of welfare
maximization and macroeconomic stabilisation. We also determine the most eﬃcient in-
stitutional arrangement of monetary and macroprudential policies. The macroprudential
instrument adopted in this exercise is a tax on bank loans, τt, although given the way
the banking regulation is modelled in this paper, it is feasible to apply the same type
of welfare analysis using a subsidy on net worth instead. This innovative feature of the
model allows us to compare the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent macroprudential tools in terms
of welfare impact. We opt for showing in detail the optimal policy outcomes when a tax
on loans is considered as a macroprudential instrument, although we also comment on
the results attained when the macroprudential tool is a subsidy on net worth.
Our analysis is conducted based on two additional policy mandates. First, we consider
a policy mandate featuring macroprudential policy rules alongside a standard monetary
policy stance. In other words, we assume that each policy maker focuses on their own
policy objective, suggesting that the monetary authority sets interest rates to respond
to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output, whereas the macroprudential regulator sets taxes
on loans to control for deviations of ﬁnancial variables from their paths. Second, we
propose a policy regime in which both monetary and macroprudential rules respond to
ﬁnancial imbalances, to assess a partially uniﬁed institutional mandate. In this case,
we admit a monetary policy maker that not only pursues price stability, but it is also
concerned about the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole, as a mean to maximize
households' utility. Therefore, we suggest an augmented monetary policy rule, alongside
a macroprudential policy rule.13
Then, we recover the welfare and macroeconomic stabilization outcomes from 4.2.6 for
the baseline case given by a standard Taylor rule, and we contrast them with the results
obtained for policy regimes comprising macroprudential regulation.
As before, we assess the welfare losses / gains using consumption equivalent measures.
Furthermore, the stabilization eﬀects of adding macroprudential policy on output, inﬂa-
tion and interest rates are investigated as well, by computing the volatility for each of
13We could have suggested a totally uniﬁed policy mandate, by assuming that macroprudential policy
reacts not only to ﬁnancial imbalances, but also to price stability (by considering it was also feeding
back on inﬂation ﬂuctuations around its steady state). Nonetheless, we consider that a partially uniﬁed
regime is a more realistic scenario, since there is a consensual view among academics and policy makers
that the macroprudential policy goals should focus exclusively on ﬁnancial system stability, leaving
inﬂation volatility as a monetary policy responsibility.
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these three variables. Since we are interested in assessing the impact of macropruden-
tial regulation in normal times as well as abnormal times, a multi-shock environment is
considered, including all the shocks already described above: productivity, government
spending, mark-up, monetary policy, macroprudential policy, capital quality and trend
shocks. Then, we optimize macroprudential policies in this multi-shock scenario, con-
sidered more realistic since macroprudential regulation is expected to deal with diﬀerent
sources of economic shocks simultaneously (Angelini et al. 2011).
Results from computation of optimal simple rules are shown in the following sections for
each policy mandate: separate and partially uniﬁed.
Results for the Separate Policy Mandate
To simulate a separate mandate, we assume that each policymaker is solely concerned
with their own policy goal. The monetary policymaker is a conventional one in the
sense it targets price stability only, by following a standard Taylor rule. On the other
hand, to investigate the role of macroprudential policy in stabilising the economy, we
deﬁne alternative types of macroprudential policy rules, by considering distinct ﬁnan-
cial stability targets. Against this background, a macroprudential rule is set so that
it reacts exclusively to credit, credit spreads, loan-to-GDP ratio or credit growth. Ad-
mitting the possibility of having a macroprudential policy rule feeding back on more
than one ﬁnancial indicator, we also analyse a rule reacting to credit and credit spreads,
simultaneously.
The coeﬃcients are computed jointly for each type of rule, and their optimised values
are shown below, in Tables 4.3.3 and 4.3.4:
Table 4.3.3: Separate Mandate - Monetary Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes
Monetary Policy Rules
ρr (1− ρr)θr,pi (1− ρr)θr,y
1 Std TR 0.1697 4.4243 0.0711
5 Std TR + MR Credit 0.3770 3.5734 0.0473
6 Std TR + MR Cred. Spreads 0.9411 1.6036 1.0000
7 Std TR + MR Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.3285 3.3181 0.0744
8 Std TR + MR Credit Growth 0.3814 3.5988 0.0455
9 Std TR + MR Credit & Spreads 0.6128 1.6821 1.0000
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Table 4.3.4: Separate Mandate - Macroprudential Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes
Macroprudential Policy Rules
ρτ (1− ρτ )ατ,QS (1− ρτ )ατ,s (1− ρτ )ατ,QS/Y (1− ρτ )ατ,cgt/cgss
5 STR + MR Credit 0.0000 0.0145 - - -
6 STR + MR Cred. Spreads 0.1195 - -1.5600 - -
7 STR + MR Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.0000 - - 0.0167 -
8 STR + MR Credit Growth 0.0000 - - - 0.0146
9
STR + MR Credit &
Spreads
0.0000 0.0079 -1.7147 - -
There are two main ﬁndings from this exercise. First, introducing an additional policy
instrument (i.e. a tax on bank loans) leads to a decrease on the aggressiveness of the
response of a standard Taylor rule to deviations of inﬂation from its steady state. Under
a standard Taylor rule, the degree of aggressiveness is (1− ρt)θr,pi = 4.4, whereas under
a policy regime that combines both a standard Taylor rule and a macroprudential rule,
it ranges from a minimum of (1 − ρt)θr,pi = 1.6 when reacting to ﬂuctuations in credit
spreads, to a maximum of θr,pi = 3.6, when responding to ﬂuctuations in credit or credit
growth around their steady state. Therefore, the need for the monetary policy maker
to react strongly to ﬂuctuations of inﬂation rates around its steady state is attenuated
when macroprudential policy is in place. This result may suggest that the macropru-
dential authority can give a hand to the monetary policy maker in certain economic
circumstances. Regarding its eﬀects on the magnitude of monetary policy reaction to
the output gap, results are mixed, since although some policy regimes, such as 5 and 8,
register output gap optimised coeﬃcients below the baseline rule, there are other policy
regimes in which this does not verify (policy regimes 6, 7 and 9).
Second, the optimal reaction of macroprudential policy is a rise in the tax on loans to
increases in credit and loan-to-GDP ratio and a cut on taxes following a rise in credit
spreads. Hence, results conﬁrm the countercyclical nature of macroprudential regula-
tion. Moreover, it is worth noting that the degree of persistence of the macroprudential
instrument is non-existent for almost all the policy rules considered in this analysis, ex-
cept when a policy regime comprising a standard Taylor rule and a macroprudential rule
feeding back on credit spreads is in place. In this policy regime, the optimal response
for the macroprudential policy tool is 0.1195.
Table 4.3.5 shows the computed welfare losses and standard deviations for interest rates,
inﬂation and output for each macroprudential rule. An important result of this analysis
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is that macroprudential regulation improves welfare. This is observed based on the con-
sumption equivalence outcomes, since the largest loss in consumption is achieved when
monetary policy alone reacts to the shocks aﬀecting this economy (0.06% of consumption
loss, when comparing with the welfare maximizing policy regime featuring a standard
Taylor rule and a macroprudential policy rule feeding back on spreads and credit). In
the case macroprudential regulation is deployed, the welfare loss decreases, achieving
its minimum in a mandate in which a standard Taylor rule is coupled with a macro-
prudential rule reacting to both credit and credit spreads. Nonetheless, the gains of
having macroprudential policy are small in this economy, varying from a minimum of
0.04% (policy regime 6) to a maximum of 0.06% (policy regime 9). This ﬁnding is in line
with the conclusions of Angelini et al. (2011) and De Paoli and Paustian (2012), whom
also found modest gains of introducing macroprudential regulation based on alternative
economic frameworks.
Table 4.3.5: Separate Mandate - Welfare Losses / Gains and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welf. Loss Welf. Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 STR only -1.88653 0.0638 Baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
5 STR + MR Credit -1.88644 0.0228 0.0415 0.0114 0.0021 0.0157
6 STR + MR Credit Spreads -1.88645 0.0263 0.0375 0.0094 0.0023 0.0155
7 STR + MR Loan-to-GDP Ratio -1.88645 0.0245 0.0392 0.0116 0.0022 0.0159
8 STR + MR Credit Growth -1.88644 0.0223 0.0415 0.0113 0.0021 0.0157
9 STR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.88639 0.0000 0.0638 0.0102 0.0017 0.0143
The ﬁndings suggest that the policy regime that minimizes welfare losses also attains a
lower volatility in inﬂation (σpi = 0.0017) and output (σy = 0.0143), being thereby more
eﬃcient in stabilising the economy.
Apart from this policy regime #9, in terms of inﬂation stability a STR only is preferable
to a policy regime comprising macroprudential policy (except regime #9, as already
mentioned), since inﬂation volatility is lower under this regime (σpi = 0.0020). Regarding
output stabilization, this is better achieved under policy regimes that couple a standard
Taylor rule with a macroprudential rule, reaching its minimum under a STR + MR
reacting to Credit Spreads mandate (#6).
Rules that target diﬀerent proxies for credit imbalances, namely credit deviations from
steady state values, loan-to-GDP ratio and credit growth, provide very similar results in
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terms of welfare. However, the rule that seems to work best is the one reacting to credit
growth, since it delivers the lowest welfare loss (0.0223%, in consumption equivalence
terms). This rule also minimizes inﬂation and output volatility, as well as a rule reacting
to credit deviations from its steady state values. Among these three policy rules, the
one that performs worst is that reacting to the loan-to-GDP ratio, since it does not
improve the outcomes produced by the other two alternative rules: inﬂation and output
are more volatile and welfare loss is larger under this policy arrangement. In addition, a
macroprudential policy rule feeding back exclusively on credit spreads does not provide
better outcomes than the one responding to loan-to-GDP ratio, both in terms of welfare
and inﬂation stabilization.
Furthermore, from the analysis of the standard deviations obtained for interest rates,
and given that the volatility of interest rates declines whenever a macroprudential policy
arrangement is introduced, the conclusion is that incorporating macroprudential policy
in this set up decreases the probability of the economy hitting the zero lower bound.
Results for the Partially Uniﬁed Policy Mandate
In this section, the welfare and stabilization outcomes from the joint optimization of
mandates composed by monetary policy rules reacting to ﬁnancial variables and macro-
prudential regulation are explored. This exercise aims at mimicking a partially uniﬁed
institutional regime, in which both monetary and macroprudential policies feed back
on ﬁnancial stability variables. This regime is diﬀerent from a complete uniﬁed regime,
which would be characterized by each policy targeting both price and ﬁnancial stability.
However, it seems unrealistic to assume that macroprudential regulation would be also
concerned about inﬂation stabilization, being more likely to consider a wider scope of
intervention for monetary policy.
It should be noted though that, unlike for example De Paoli and Paustian (2012) and
Gelain et al. (2013), we are not comparing coordination in the form of joint maximization
with a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for non-coordination. For both regimes the
same welfare criteria is used, so with given forms of simple rules a Nash equilibrium
would be a `team-optimal solution' and give an identical outcome as with coordination
(see Basar and Olsder (1982), chapter 6). Rather the uniﬁed and separate mandates
both jointly (though it could be in a Nash equilibrium) maximize the welfare, but under
diﬀerent constraints on the rules that reﬂect the diﬀerent targets for the nominal and
regulatory instruments in the two cases.
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In order to simulate a partially uniﬁed regime, we consider alternative combinations of
augmented Taylor rules and macroprudential regulation rules. First, we assume that
both monetary and macroprudential rules feed back on deviations of credit from its
steady state. The second and third policy regime alternatives combine a monetary
policy and macroprudential rule reacting both to credit spreads and loan-to-value ratio,
respectively. As a last combination, we broaden the range of ﬁnancial targets that
policies feed back on, assuming that they react jointly to credit and credit spreads.
Tables 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 show the optimised coeﬃcients under these alternative policy com-
binations. Results are in line with the ones obtained for a separate regime. First, the
optimal magnitude of monetary policy reaction to inﬂation decreases whenever macro-
prudential regulation is deployed suggesting that monetary policy does not need to be
that aggressive whenever macroprudential tools are in place. Second, the optimal macro-
prudential policy is of a countercyclical nature, since it responds positively to deviations
of credit and loan-to-GDP ratio from their respective steady state values and negatively
to deviations of credit spreads from their steady state values.
Table 4.3.6: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Monetary Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
#
Policy Regimes Monetary Policy Rules
Aug TR + MR reacting to: ρr θr,pi θr,y θr,QS θr,s θr,QS/Y θr,cgt/cgss
10 Credit 0.396 3.782 0.010 0.014 - - -
11 Spreads 0.231 3.212 1.058 - -0.415 - -
12 Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.366 3.566 0.042 - - 0.022 -
13 Credit Growth 0.387 3.715 0.036 - - - 0.015
14 Cred. & Spreads 0.331 2.808 0.945 0.027 -0.518 - -
Table 4.3.7: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Macroprudential Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
#
Policy Regimes Macroprudential Policy Rules
Aug TR + MR reacting to: ρτ ατ,QS ατ,s ατ,QS/Y ατ,cgt/cgss
10 Credit 0.00 0.014 - - -
11 Spreads 0.00 - -2.369 - -
12 Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.00 - - 0.016 -
13 Credit Growth 0.00 - - - 0.014
14 Cred. & Spreads 0.00 0.016 -1.817 - -
Table 4.3.8 shows computation outputs for welfare losses and standard deviations for
the partially uniﬁed alternative policy regimes. To facilitate comparison across the al-
ternative policy regimes, this table also displays the baseline policy regime, given by a
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standard Taylor rule only, and the policy regime with better performance so far in what
concerns welfare maximization, given by a separate regime featuring a standard Taylor
rule and a macroprudential policy rule responding to credit and spreads.
In what regards the impact of diﬀerent policy mandates on welfare losses, we conclude
that the partially uniﬁed regime promotes an increase in welfare compared to a separate
mandate, but only when macroprudential regulation reacts simultaneously to credit and
credit spreads (the welfare gain is 0.07%, greater than the attained by policy regime 9,
0.06%). Otherwise, a separate regime is preferable to a partially uniﬁed one, according
to these outcomes. Nevertheless, the gains from coordination are still modest: in con-
sumption equivalent terms, a separate regime implies a 0.01% welfare loss and a standard
Taylor rule implies a 0.07% loss, when compared to a partially uniﬁed regime that reacts
to credit and credit spreads.
Inﬂation stabilization, on the other hand, is better achieved in a separate mandate, com-
posed by a standard Taylor rule and macroprudential regulation responding jointly to
credit and spreads. Another result worth highlighting is that, as before, a macropruden-
tial policy reacting to the loan-to-GDP ratio does not provide an improvement over a
rule responding to credit deviations only. This indicator also performs poorly not only
in terms of welfare losses minimization, but also regarding inﬂation, output and interest
rate stabilization.
Table 4.3.8: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Welfare Losses/Gains and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR only -1.886534 0.0740 Baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
9 Std TR + MR
Credit & Spreads
-1.886391 0.0103 0.0638 0.0102 0.0017 0.0143
Aug TR + MR reacting to:
10 Credit -1.886437 0.0308 0.0433 0.0112 0.0021 0.0156
11 Spreads -1.886403 0.0156 0.0584 0.0112 0.0019 0.0151
12 Loan-to-Y Ratio -1.886440 0.0321 0.0419 0.0113 0.0022 0.0157
13 Credit Growth -1.886437 0.0308 0.0433 0.0112 0.0021 0.0155
14 Credit & Spreads -1.886368 0.0000 0.0740 0.0108 0.0018 0.0127
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4.3.3 Subsidy on Net Worth as a Macroprudential Tool
Since we conceived a model in which is possible to assess the degree of eﬀectiveness of
alternative macroprudential tools, such as a tax on loans or a subsidy on net worth, we
performed the same optimal policy approach, but now using the subsidy on net worth as
a macroprudential tool. These are distinct tools since the tax on loans has a direct eﬀect
on lending, while the subsidy on net worth aﬀects ﬁrst the net worth of the bank and, only
indirectly, the amount of loans. The subsidy on net worth resembles the countercyclical
capital buﬀer, as established in Basel III, which is a time-varying instrument working
through the net worth channel of the banks.
The subsidy on net worth works distinctly from the tax on loans. It should be expected
that, when credit surpasses its steady state path, subsidies on net worth are reduced,
thereby contracting loans and dampening the business cycle. In turn, when credit spreads
exceed their steady state values, subsidies on net worth are raised, thereby increasing
lending and expanding the business cycle.
Table 4.3.9 summarises these outcomes. The use of a subsidy on net worth is also welfare
improving and results from optimal policy suggest that a subsidy on net worth is more
welfare improving than a tax on loans. In every policy regime considered in the analysis,
the welfare gains are substantially larger from macroprudential policy rules in which a
subsidy on net worth is used, ranging from a maximum of 0.16% (in consumption equiv-
alence terms) to a minimum of 0.11%. From a policy perspective, this ﬁnding suggests
that macroprudential instruments that directly target net worth of banks produce higher
welfare gains than instruments that have a direct eﬀect on loans. Nevertheless, a tax on
loans does, in general, a better job in promoting the stability of prices.
Table 4.3.9: Comparison of Macroprudential Tools
Subsidy on Net Worth Tax on Loans
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
ce1 (%) ce2 (%) ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR only -1.88653 0.1597 Baseline 0.0638 Baseline
5 Std TR + MR Credit -1.88621 0.0161 0.1436 0.0228 0.0415
6 Std TR + MR Spreads -1.88625 0.0339 0.1258 0.0263 0.0638
9 Std TR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.88618 0.0000 0.1597 0.0000 0.0392
Augmented TR + MR
10 React. to Credit -1.88621 0.0156 0.1441 0.0308 0.0433
11 React. to Spreads -1.88628 0.0459 0.1137 0.0156 0.0584
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4.4 Conclusions
This paper aims at contributing to the debate regarding the role of monetary policy and
traditional regulatory and prudential frameworks on promoting macroeconomic stability.
We built a DSGE model with price rigidities and ﬁnancial frictions a la Gertler and
Karadi (2011) in order to assess the importance of macroprudential and monetary policies
in improving welfare and stabilising the economy. In particular, we investigate whether
it is welfare beneﬁcial to have a monetary policy strategy that also leans against the
build up of ﬁnancial imbalances and we compare it with a policy mandate in which
macroprudential regulation is also considered.
Our optimal policy exercises, obtained in the context of a linearised model that excludes
ﬁnancial (in)stability and default, provide three main ﬁndings. First, it is welfare im-
proving to have a monetary policy stance that reacts countercyclically to asset prices.
Nonetheless, there is a trade-oﬀ in terms of inﬂation stabilization, since an augmented
Taylor rule of this type would involve more prices volatility than a standard one. A
compromise between welfare maximization and inﬂation stability seems to be achieved
under a policy regime characterised by an augmented Taylor rule that feeds back on
deviations of credit from its steady state path.
Second, the consideration of a policy mandate in which monetary policy is complemented
by macroprudential regulation is welfare improving, regardless of the type of policy
mandate adopted. The welfare maximizing mandate is one in which an augmented
Taylor rule reacting to credit and credit spreads is combined with a macroprudential rule
that responds to credit and credit spreads as well. The welfare gains from a partially
uniﬁed mandate are of the order of a consumption equivalent improvement of 0.07% when
compared with the baseline case, given by a standard Taylor rule only. This improvement
is, in fact, small, but aligned with previous ﬁndings in the literature (see, for instance,
De Paoli and Paustian (2012); Angelini et al. (2011)). Inﬂation stabilization, on the other
hand, is better accomplished in a separate mandate, in which we have a standard Taylor
rule feeding back on inﬂation and output gaps, and a macroprudential rule responding
to credit and spreads. Lastly, the countercyclical nature of macroprudential instruments
is optimal from the point of view of welfare optimization, as optimal policy simulations
show.
Moreover, from the comparison of the eﬀectiveness of macroprudential instruments in
maximizing welfare, we show that a tax on loans proves to be less welfare improving
than a tool targeting directly the net worth of banks, such as a subsidy on net worth.
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Nevertheless, a tax on loans does in general a better job in promoting the stability of
prices. The use of either instrument is always welfare maximizing related to a baseline
scenario in which a standard Taylor rule is assumed.
The ﬁndings of this paper must be interpreted carefully, since they result from DSGE
models with typical solution techniques based on log-linearization, which do not allow
for the non-linear dynamics that usually characterize boom-bust episodes. Despite the
absence of nonlinearities in these models, the importance for monetary policy to `lean
against the wind' and for considering macroprudential policy as an ancillary tool to deal
with ﬁnancial imbalances is entirely conﬁrmed by simply granting a non-negligible role
to ﬁnancial intermediation provided by the banking system.
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Appendix 4.1
The regulated banking sector
Assuming a tax / subsidy scheme, in the lines of Gertler et al. (2012) and De Paoli and
Paustian (2012), total taxes from the macroprudential regulation scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (4.53)
The timing of the tax regime is as follows. In period t− 1, tax and subsidy rates, τt−1,
and τ st−1 respectively, are set to be paid or received on the value of end-of-period t − 1
(or beginning of period t) loans Qt−1st−1 and end-of-period net worth nt−1 respectively.
The net worth of the bank then accumulates in period t according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 + τ st−1nt−1 − τt−1Qt−1st−1 (4.54)
That is, net worth equals gross returns minus gross costs of borrowing, plus subsidies
minus taxes carried over over from the previous period. Banks are atomistic and take
the tax rate and subsidy as exogenous.
With this timing for taxes or subsidies, the balance sheet of the bank in period t remains
as before:
Qtst = nt + dt (4.55)
which says that net worth plus subsidies plus deposits can be used to ﬁnance loans net
of tax.
As before we can substitute for dt from (4.55) and rewrite (4.54) to give
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 − TMRt−1
= (Rext + τ
s
t−1)nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext − τt−1)Qt−1st−1 (4.56)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at a real riskless
rate plus the excess return over the latter on the assets plus subsidies minus taxes carried
over from the previous period.
As for the laissez-faire banking sector model, the optimisation problem for the banks to
chose a path for borrowing to maximize Vt subject to the incentive constraint 4.58:
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Vt(st, nt, ) = µs,tQtst + µn,tnt (4.57)
s. t.
Vt ≥ ΘtQtst (4.58)
and write the Bellman equation for a given path for nt in the form
Vt−1(st−1, nt−1) = EtΛt,t+1[(1− σB)nt + σB max
st
Vt(st, nt)] (4.59)
Again we perform the optimization maxst Vt(st, nt) subject to the incentive constraint.
The ﬁrst order conditions for this optimization problem are as before with a slight
notational diﬀerence that νd,t is replaced with µn,t:
st : (1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
λt : µs,tQtst + µn,tnt ≥ ΘQtst
Again deﬁne φt to be the leverage ratio:
Qtst = φtnt (4.60)
Assuming the incentive constraint always binds, φt is given by
φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t (4.61)
Using (4.61) we can write (4.57) as
Vt = [µs,tφt + µn,t]nt (4.62)
and hence (4.59) becomes
Vt(st, nt) = EtΛt,t+1[1− σB + σB(µs,t+1φt+1 + µn,t+1)]nt+1
= EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1[(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt)Qtst + (Rext+1 + τ st )nt] (4.63)
deﬁning Ωt = 1 − σB + σB(µn,t + φtµs,t), the shadow value of a unit of net worth, and
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using (4.39).
The equilibrium of the banking model is given by
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt = φtNt
φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1 − σBRext Dt−1 − σBTMRt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt
µn,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
t+1 + τ
s
t )
]
µs,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt))
]
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
with τ st or τt exogenous. Clearly in the absence of taxes or subsidies, i.e. τt = τ
s
t = 0,
we get back to the previous set-up.
Appendix 4.2
In this appendix, we present welfare results for the optimization of implementable rules,
i.e., rules that do not require the knowledge of the eﬃcient level of output. Thereby, the
standard monetary policy rule is described as such:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ log(MPSt)
where Y refers to the steady state level of output and the other arguments are as de-
scribed above. The macroprudential policy rules remain the same, since they do not
depend on the output gap. The instrument used in this exercise is a tax on loans.
Simulation results of optimal policy using implementable rules are close to the ones
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obtained by optimizing conventional policy rules, supporting the main conclusions of
this chapter. Firs, a mandate in which the central bank has only the mission to stabilise
prices following a optimised standard Taylor rule provides the worst outcomes for social
welfare. Second, the ﬁrst four mandates that grant the highest welfare gains remain the
same, regardless of the type of rule being optimised. By order of highest welfare gains,
those are: uniﬁed regime in which both monetary and macroprudential rules respond
to credit and spreads simultaneously; separate regime featuring a standard Taylor rule
and a macroprudential rule feeding back on credit and spreads; a augmented monetary
policy rule reacting to asset prices and without macroprudential policy intervention and,
ﬁnally, a uniﬁed mandate in which both monetary and macroprudential policymakers
respond to credit spreads.
Moreover, another question is whether the optimisation of implementable policy rules
allow for highest welfare gains than that of conventional policy rules. Results are mixed
given that in some cases, gains are higher under conventional rules and in other situations
gains are higher under implementable rules. However, welfare gains are quite similar in
general, not pointing out to a stronger type of policy rule for welfare optimisation.
Table 4.4.1: Implementable Policy Rules
Implementable Policy Rules Conventional Policy Rules
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Gain Welfare Gain
ce2 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR only -1.88654 Baseline Baseline
2 Augmented TR with credit -1.88653 0.002 0.002
3 Augmented TR with spreads -1.88650 0.014 0.024
4 Augmented TR with Tobin's Q -1.88639 0.067 0.062
5 Std TR + MR Credit -1.88644 0.042 0.041
6 Std TR + MR Spreads -1.88644 0.045 0.037
9 Std TR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.88638 0.068 0.064
Augmented TR + MR
10 both reacting to Credit -1.88644 0.042 0.043
11 both reacting to Spreads -1.88642 0.053 0.058
12 both reacting to Credit & Spreads -1.88635 0.083 0.074
Finally, looking at volatilities of interest rate, inﬂation and output, the conventional type
of policy rules are stronger in the sense that, for interest rates and inﬂation, they provide
lower variability in these variables. Exception is made to output, which achieves lower
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volatility under implementable rules, in almost all mandates.14
Appendix 4.3
In this appendix, we present results for the calibrated model without recurring to optimal
policy simulations. The main diﬀerence is that the coeﬃcients used in the monetary
and macroprudential policy rules are chosen ad hoc (i.e. they are not optimized), in
accordance to the literature. Main results support the ones obtained from optimal policy.
Table 4.4.2: Separate Mandate - Monetary Policy Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes
Monetary Policy Rules
ρr θr,pi θr,y θr,y
1 Std TR 0.7 2.0 0.5 -
5 Aug TR with Credit 0.7 2.0 0.5 0.1
6 Aug TR with Cred. Spreads 0.7 2.0 0.5 -0.5
Table 4.4.3: Separate Mandate - Macroprudential Policy Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes
Macroprudential Policy Rules
ρτ ατ,QS ατ,s
5 Credit 0.7 0.5 -
6 Cred. Spreads 0.7 - -3.0
14Results for volatilities are provided under request.
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Figure 4.1: Monetary Policy Rules only: Productivity Shock
Figure 4.2: Monetary Policy Rules only: Capital Shock
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Figure 4.3: Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Rules: Productivity Shock
Figure 4.4: Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Rules: Capital Shock
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Chapter 5
A macroeconomic framework to assess
the interaction of monetary policy and
the macroprudential toolkit
5.1 Motivation
As a legacy of the ﬁnancial crisis and its disruptive eﬀects on economic welfare, policy-
makers around the globe have enhanced the role of macroprudential supervision in their
broader economic policy frameworks. At the same time, the interaction of speciﬁc macro-
prudential policy measures with other policy domains  and in particular with monetary
policy  is still subject to important knowledge gaps.
The emerging institutional landscape in the euro area is an interesting case in point:
upon inception of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the European Central Bank
(ECB) is granted certain tools to address macroprudential risks, which will accompany
its new task to assess the safety and soundness of individual credit institutions under the
microprudential arm of the SSM. But its toolkit remains incomplete: for example, the
ECB is authorized to raise countercyclical capital buﬀers on euro area banks, whereas
loan-to-value ratios remain at the discretion of national authorities in euro area countries.
At the same time, the macroprudential tools available to the ECB and those available to
national authorities are imperfect substitutes. For example, a real-estate bubble might
be best addressed by raising loan-to-value ratios, thus putting the onus of action on
national authorities. But what if national authorities refrain from leaning against the
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bubble, e.g. because they do not fully internalize the associated ﬁnancial stability risks,
which will partly spill over to other countries?
To the extent such risks complicate the ECB's task to maintain price stability, there
may be monetary policy rationale to respond to them. But, in this simpliﬁed example,
it would have to choose between policy-controlled interest rates or counter-cyclical cap-
ital buﬀers, both of which could only partly mitigate the risks. The question is which
tool would be best suited, in this second-best scenario, to counteract the price stability
implications of the bubble.
To capture the problem, it is necessary to model a macroprudential toolkit composed
of distinct types of instruments that work through diﬀerent transmission channels. In
particular, the analysis should be focused on the aforementioned macroprudential policy
tools: a countercyclical capital ratio and a loan-to-value ratio. On this basis, we will
ﬁrst assess how eﬀective macroprudential policy is in counteracting the eﬀects of shocks
in the business cycle, assuming a perfect control of both instruments and considering
two scenarios: one including a monetary policy response and the other abstracting from
monetary policy.
As a ﬁrst step towards answering these questions, a New Keynesian (NK) model with
two types of ﬁnancial frictions is developed in this chapter. The inclusion of two distinct
sources of ﬁnancial disruptions aims at providing a motivation for the deployment of
diﬀerent macroprudential policy instruments, such as loan-to-value ratios and counter-
cyclical capital requirements. To the extent of my knowledge, there are so far only a
few examples of studies in which more than one type of macroprudential policy instru-
ment is considered (see, for instance, De Paoli and Paustian (2012), Brzoza-Brzezina
et al. (2013) and Clerc et al. (2015)). Moreover, studies focusing on the interaction of
macroprudential toolkit and monetary policy are even scarcer.
Based on a NK model with a banking sector based on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and
Gertler and Karadi (2011), that already incorporates an incentive constraint between
households and banks (as already described in Chapter 3), we extend it to include a sec-
ond ﬁnancial friction along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005).
The latter type of ﬁnancial disruption arises from the possibility that an entrepreneur
may not repay its debt obligations to the bank, giving rise to a collateral constraint
between the borrower and the ﬁnancial intermediary, which limits the amount of funds
that the latter is willing to provide to the borrower. While the ﬁnancial friction a la
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) aﬀects the supply of credit,
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the ﬁnancial friction based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005) con-
strains the demand for credit. Therefore, in this extended framework, the provision of
funds from banks to entrepreneurs is not only constrained by the amount of funds that
households are willing to deposit on the banking system, but also by the limits on the
borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs that are impacted by the loan-to-value ratio.
This otherwise standard New Keynesian framework will be used to examine the diﬀerent
transmission mechanisms of macroprudential policy instruments and how they interact
with monetary policy. In future research, we will assume that the central bank can only
deploy one of the instruments at a time. This will allow us to analyse: the consequences
of having only one instrument to respond to the diﬀerent sources of disruptions that
aﬀect the economy; the relative eﬀectiveness of countercyclical capital requirements,
which are broader in scope (since they imply a rise in the supervisory capital-to-assets
ratio, without making considerations on how this ratio may be attained by the individual
banks), versus loan-to-value ratios, which are considered sectoral requirements (usually
applied to mortgage lending); and most importantly, the monetary policy response to
diﬀerent types of shocks when commanding over an incomplete macroprudential toolkit.
For these purposes, in this chapter, we present the New Keynesian (NK) model with
a banking sector modelled to allow the inclusion of both types of ﬁnancial frictions.
To keep track of the dynamics of the model, in a ﬁrst stage, we opt to not to include
any macroprudential policy regulation, developing instead a model with a laissez-faire
(non-regulated) banking sector. This model is then compared to a baseline framework,
featuring a standard New Keynesian model, and to the versions of the model that result
from switching oﬀ each one of the ﬁnancial frictions.
Then, the dynamics of the proposed framework are assessed by conducting a simulation
analysis under two shocks - a negative technology shock and a monetary policy tightening
shock. Lastly, ﬁrst insights are provided regarding how a macroprudential instrument
such as time-varying loan-to-value ratios may impact on the monetary shock propagation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes an otherwise standard general
equilibrium framework with a laissez-faire banking sector, featuring both collateral and
incentive constraints. Section 5.3 discusses, on one hand, the dynamics of the baseline
version of the model when a technology shock and a monetary shock are considered.
On the other hand, it shows how the model compares to the New Keynesian version
of the model (without any ﬁnancial frictions) and with the frameworks resulting from
switching oﬀ one ﬁnancial friction at a time. In Section 5.4 we present a ﬂavour of
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what a macroprudential policy could do by assuming an alternative calibration for the
loan-to-value ratio and how it could interact with monetary policy. Main preliminary
conclusions are reported in Section 5.5.
5.2 The Model with a Laissez-Faire Banking Sector
In this section, a New Keynesian framework with a banking sector that is impacted by
two sources of ﬁnancial frictions is described. This economy is populated by households,
goods producers, capital producers, retail producers, entrepreneurs and a banking sector.
Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of how these economic agents are interlinked in this
model. A central bank that is in charge of monetary policy and a government that is
responsible for ﬁscal policy are also important components of the model. In a later stage,
the model will be extended as to integrate a macroprudential policymaker.
The model draws considerably on the model described in Chapter 3, namely in what
regards the behaviour of households, goods producers, capital and retail producers. The
main innovation comes from the introduction of entrepreneurs in the model and by
extending the banking sector to incorporate an additional ﬁnancial friction. Both sectors
will be described in detail.
5.2.1 Households, Goods, Capital and Retail Producers
The behaviour of these economic agents was already described in Chapter 3, in the
corresponding subsections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4. Against this background, we opt
for recalling only the equilibrium equations for each sector.
Household behaviour is thus described by, in balanced-growth equilibrium
Λt = Λ(Ct, ht) =
((Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1− ht)ρ)1−σc − 1
1− σc (5.1)
ΛC,t = (1− ρ)(Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1(1− ht)ρ(1−σc) (5.2)
Rext =
Rn,t−1
Πt
(5.3)
ΛC,t = β(1 + Stochgt+1)
(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1Et
[
Rext+1ΛC,t+1
]
(5.4)
Wt
Pt
=
%(Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1−σc)(1− ht)ρ(1−σc)−1
ΛC,t
(5.5)
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Figure 5.1: New Keynesian Model with a banking sector with two ﬁnancial frictions
where Wt
Pt
is the real wage and Rn,t, our monetary policy instrument, is the gross nominal
interest rate set in period t to pay out interest in period t + 1, and Πt ≡ PtPt−1 where Pt
is the retail price level. The term (1 + Stochgt) denotes the balanced-growth rate in the
model.
The Euler consumption equation ((5.4)), where ΛC,t ≡ ∂Λt∂Ct is the marginal utility
of consumption and Et[·] denotes rational expectations based on agents observing all
current macroeconomic variables (i.e., 'complete information'), describes the optimal
consumption-savings decisions of the household. It equates the marginal utility from
consuming one unit of income in period t with the discounted marginal utility from
consuming the gross income acquired, by saving the income. Equation ((5.5)) equates
the real wage with the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours
worked.
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Goods producers behaviour is given by
Y Wt = F (At, ht, Kt) = (Atht)
α(Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt))1−α/∆t (5.6)
Yt = (1− c)Y Wt (5.7)
PWt
Pt
Fh,t =
PWt
Pt
αY Wt
ht
=
Wt
Pt
(5.8)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt) + (1− S(Xt))It (5.9)
S(Xt) = φx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt))2 (5.10)
Xt =
It
It−1
(1 + Stochgt) (5.11)
Demand for capital is given by
Rk,t =
(1− α)PWt
Pt
Y Wt /Kt−1 + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(5.12)
Equation ((5.6)) is a Cobb-Douglas production function for the wholesale sector that
is converted into diﬀerentiated goods in equation ((5.7)) at a cost cY Wt . Kt is physical
capital that goods producers buy to capital producers. From the optimization problem
we get equation ((5.8)), for the demand of labour where Fh,t ≡ ∂Ft∂ht equates the marginal
product of labour with the real wage, and equation (5.13) for the demand of capital.
Demand of capital is given by the return on capital that equalizes the gross marginal
product of capital net of depreciation.Pt and P
W
t are the aggregate price indexes in
the retail and wholesale sectors respectively. Capital accumulation is given by equation
((5.9)) and we assume investment adjustment costs a la Smets and Wouters (2007). Note
here Kt is end-of-period t capital stock. The production of physical capital is determined
in the next subsection.
Balanced-growth equilibrium for capital producers is given by:
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Kt = ((1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− φx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt))2)It)ψt (5.13)
Xt =
It
It−1
(1 + Stochgt) (5.14)
DDt,t = β
ΛC,t
ΛC,t−1
(1 + Stochgt)
(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1 (5.15)
1 = Qt
(
1− φx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt))2 − 2Xtφx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt)
)
+ Z1,t+1(5.16)
Z1,t = Et−1
[
DDt,tQt2φx (Xt − (1 + Stochgt))X2t
]
(5.17)
Z2,t = (1− α)P
W
t
Pt
Y W
Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt)
+ (1− δ)Qt (5.18)
Rk,t = ψt(Z2,t/Qt−1) (5.19)
For the retail sector, we introduce sticky prices a la Calvo (1983).
With indexing, the balanced-growth equilibrium is given by:
Ht − ξβEt[Π˜ζ−1t+1Ht+1(1 + Stochgt+1)(1−ρ)(1−σc)] = YtΛC,t (5.20)
Jt − ξβEt[Π˜ζt+1Jt+1(1 + Stochgt+1)(1−ρ)(1−σc)] =
(
1/(1− (1
ζ
))
)
MCtMStYtΛC,t(5.21)
Π˜t ≡ Πt
Πγt−1
(5.22)
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)1−ζ
(5.23)
MCt =
PWt
Pt
(5.24)
∆t = ξΠ˜
ζ
t∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)−ζ
(5.25)
5.2.2 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, indexed by j. They consume and acquire phys-
ical capital at price Qt to capital producers. Consumption and capital acquisitions are
ﬁnanced by revenues from renting capital services to goods producers and also by bank
loans. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and the extended version of the model by
Iacoviello (2005), capital acquisitions are ﬁnancially constrained. We allow for the pos-
sibility that an entrepreneur may not repay its debt obligations to the bank. This poses
a limit on the amount of funds banks are willing to lend to the entrepreneurs, which
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is a function of the expected value of physical capital used as collateral in borrowing
operations.
The entrepreneur at time t maximizes her intertemporal utility that depends only on
their consumption:1
Et
[ ∞∑
0
βtEΛ
E
t (C
j
E,t)
]
(5.26)
where
ΛEt (C
j
E,t) =
(CE,t − χECE,t−1)1−σE
1− σE
where CE,t is entrepreneur's consumption, χE is the entrepreneur's habit parameter and
σE > 0 , meaning that entrepreneurs are not risk-neutral.
Entrepreneurs are subject to two constraints. A budget constraint, that in real terms is
given by:
CE,t +QtKt +R
ex
l,tLt−1 = Rk,tQt−1Kt−1 + TE,t + Lt (5.27)
where Lt are loans in real terms and TE,t denotes transfers from households to en-
trepreneurs. The real ex post interest rate, Rexl,t , is given by
Rexl,t =
Rl,t−1
Πt
(5.28)
where Rl is the loan rate to be decided in the loan contract.
The real ex post gross return of capital follows
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(5.29)
where Zt = (1− α)P
W
t
Pt
YWt
Kt−1
is the gross real return of capital.
Given the budget constraint, we can deﬁne net worth of the entrepreneurs, NWE, as
NWE,t = QtKt − Lt = Rk,tQt−1Kt−1 + TE,t − CE,t −Rexl,tLt−1 (5.30)
1For a clear understanding of the entrepreneurs optimization problem, we opt to assume a zero-
growth path in this section, only for description purposes.
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This equation means that entrepreneurs' net worth can be raised by the entrepreneur
choosing to reduce her consumption. We then deﬁne leverage as
φE ≡ QtKt
NWE,t
=
QtKt
QtKt − Lt (5.31)
The second constraint arises from the assumption that entrepreneurs may fail on their
obligations, originating a collateral constraint below (in nominal terms)
Rl,tLt ≤ mEt [Πt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt] (5.32)
The collateral for the loan is provided by end-of-period capital sold in period t+ 1 after
depreciation and m is the loan-to-value ratio. Since we assume βE < β, the collateral
constraint is binding at the vicinity of the steady state.
Deﬁning the Lagrangian
`t ≡ Et
{ ∞∑
0
βtE[Λ(C
j
E,t) + λt
(
Rk,tQt−1Kt−1 + TE,t + Lt − CE,t −QtKt −Rexl,tLt−1
)
+ ΘE,t(mΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt −Rl,tLt)]
}
(5.33)
First Order Conditions:
Lt : Et
[
β0Eλt − βEλt+1Rexl,t+1 − β0EΘE,tRl,t
]
= 0 (5.34)
Kt : Et
[
βEλt+1Rk,t+1Qt − β0EλtQt + β0EΘE,tmΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)
]
= 0 (5.35)
CE,t : Et
[
β0E(CE,t − χECE,t−1)−σE − λt
]
= 0 (5.36)
From equation (5.36),
λt = Λ
E
C,t (5.37)
where
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ΛEC,t = (CE,t − χECE,t−1)−σE
Replacing it into equation (5.35), we get
Et
[
βEΛ
E
C,t+1Rk,t+1Qt + ΘE,tmΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)
]
= ΛEC,tQt
Then, divide both sides by ΛEC,tQt to get
Et
[
βEΛ
E
C,t+1Rk,t+1
ΛEC,t
+
ΘE,tmΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)
ΛEC,tQt
]
= 1 (5.38)
which is the ﬁrst order condition with respect to Kt. This equation is the intertemporal
condition driving the choice between capital acquisitions and consumption. It requires
the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current consumption to the gain obtained
from owning capital. This gain depends on two components: i) the discounted return on
capital obtained from renting capital to goods producers and ii) the marginal value of
using capital as a collateral, that is proportional to the shadow value of borrowing when
ΘE > 0, but disappearing when the constraint is not binding, i.e. when ΘE = 0.
Combining equations (5.37) and (5.34) yields
Et
[
βEΛ
E
C,t+1R
ex
l,t+1 + ΘE,tRl,t
]
= ΛEC,t
dividing both sides by ΛEC,t ,
Et
[
βER
ex
l,t+1
ΛEC,t+1
ΛEC,t
+
ΘE,tRl,t
ΛEC,t
]
= 1 (5.39)
Equation (5.39) is the ﬁrst order condition obtained after taking the derivative with
respect to Lt. This equation is the intertemporal condition for the choice of assets
holdings. It states that with a binding collateral constraint the entrepreneur's marginal
utility of current consumption must be equal to the marginal cost in t+ 1 of borrowing
an extra unit in period t. The marginal cost of borrowing is given by two components:
i) the discounted value of the real cost of loans in t + 1 and ii) the shadow value of
borrowing at t that is positive when the constraint binds.
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The balanced-growth equilibrium of the model is then given by:
DDEt,t+1 = βE
ΛEC,t+1
ΛEC,t
(1 + Stochgt+1)
−σE (5.40)
Et
[
DDEt,t+1R
ex
l,t+1 +
ΘE,tRl,t
ΛEC,t
]
= 1 (5.41)
Et
[
DDEt,t+1Rk,t+1 +
ΘE,tmΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)
ΛEC,tQt
]
= 1 (5.42)
φE =
QtKt
QtKt − Lt (5.43)
Rl,tLt = mEt [Πt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt] (5.44)
CE,t +QtKt +R
ex
l,tLt−1/(1 + Stochgt) = Rk,tQt−1Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt) + TE,t + Lt(5.45)
ΛEt =
(CE,t − χECE,t−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−σE)
(1− σE) (5.46)
ΛEC,t = (CE,t − χECE,t−1/(1 + Stochgt))−σE(5.47)
Rexl,t =
Rl,t−1
Πt
(5.48)
5.2.3 Banking Sector
The net worth of the bank at period t accumulates according to:
nt = R
ex
l,tLt−1 −Rext dt−1 (5.49)
Net worth at time t is determined by the gross real payoﬀ on loans funded at t − 1,
(Rexl,tLt−1), net of the real cost of deposits (R
ex
t dt−1). Banks lend to entrepreneurs only
and raise deposits from households. The credit spread is then given by Rexl,t −Rext . As in
the model described in the previous chapter, banks raise net worth only through retained
earnings. The bank's balance sheet is given by:
Lt = nt + dt (5.50)
Using the balance sheet condition, we replace dt into equation (5.50):
nt = R
ex
l,tLt−1 −Rext (Lt−1 − nt−1)
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nt = (R
ex
l,t −Rext )Lt−1 +Rext nt−1 (5.51)
Given that bankers exit with probability (1−σB), the objective of the banker at the end
of period t is to maximize the expected present value of the future dividends: Vt(Lt, nt).
Thus, we look for a solution of the form:
Vt(Lt, nt) = µL,tLt + µn,tnt (5.52)
The Bellman equation is:
Vt−1(Lt−1, nt−1) = EtΛt,t+1 [(1− σB)nt + σBmaxL,tVt(Lt, nt)] (5.53)
The bankers' optimization problem is:
Max Vt(Lt, nt) s. t. Vt ≥ ΘBLt
The incentive constraint is introduced to motivate a limit on the assets expansion by
the bank. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), it is assumed that bankers can steal the
fraction ΘB of assets and transfer it to the household of which the banker is an element.
This assets diversion by bankers implies a cost, which results from the possibility that
depositors may force them to fail and recover the remaining fraction 1 − ΘB of assets.
The left side of the incentive constraint is the cost for the banker if he / she decides to
divert a fraction of assets, whereas the right side is what the banker gets by stealing it.
When the incentive constraint is binding, the banks' assets are constrained by its net
worth.
The Lagrangian is then,
Lt = Vt + λt [Vt −ΘLt] = (1 + λt)Vt − λtΘtLt (5.54)
where λt = 0 if the constraint binds and λt > 0 otherwise.
Recall that
Vt(Lt, nt) = µL,tLt + µn,tnt
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First Order Conditions:
Lt : (1 + λt)µL,t − λtΘt = 0
(1 + λt)µL,t = λtΘt (5.55)
λt : Vt −ΘBLt = 0
Replacing Vt(Lt, nt) by µL,tLt + µn,tnt:
µL,tLt + µn,tnt = ΘBLt (5.56)
Deﬁning φB as the bank's leverage ratio:
φB,t =
Lt
nt
(5.57)
Then,
Lt = φB,tnt (5.58)
Rearranging equation (5.56) in order to Lt and then replacing it in equation (5.58), yields
µn,tnt = (ΘB − µL,t)Lt
µn,tnt
(ΘB − µL,t) = Lt
φB,t =
µn,t
ΘB − µL,t (5.59)
which can be combined with equation (5.58) to give:
Lt =
µn,t
ΘB − µL,tnt (5.60)
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), if the constraint binds, the amount of loans that the
banker can provide to entrepreneurs depends positively on the bank's net worth, leverage
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ratio and the expected discounted marginal gains of assets and net worth. Holding net
worth constant, expanding loans raises the banker's incentive to steal funds. However,
the constraint limits the banks leverage ratio to the point where the banker's incentive to
steal is exactly balanced by its cost. In this situation, an endogenous capital constraint
arises on the bank's capacity to raise deposits and, therefore, to acquire assets. Since
bank's net worth is positive, the constraint binds only if 0 < µL,t < ΘB. It is proﬁtable
for the banker to expand assets, because the expected discounted marginal gain of assets
(µL,t) is positive.
Note that the leverage ratio that depositors will tolerate is increasing with µL,t. The
larger is µL,t, the greater is the opportunity cost to the banker from being forced into
bankruptcy. If µL,t is greater than ΘB, the bank is no longer constrained by its equity
capital, and can borrow from depositors as much as he / she desires. In this situation,
however, the franchise value of the intermediary is always above the cost from diverting
funds, and so there is no incentive to steal.
The higher the fraction of assets that the bankers can steal, the smaller the leverage ratio
that households would allow, everything else held constant. Thus, leverage is limited by
this fraction.
Now, we can write
Vt(Lt, nt) = µL,tLt + µn,tnt
as
Vt(Lt, nt) = µL,tφB,tnt + µn,tnt = (µL,tφB,t + µn,t)nt
by using equation (5.58).
Therefore,
Vt−1(Lt−1, nt−1) = EtΛt,t+1 [(1− σB)nt + σBmaxL,tVt(Lt, nt)]
becomes
Vt(Lt, nt) = EtΛt,t+1 [(1− σB)nt+1 + σBmaxL,t+1Vt+1(Lt+1, nt+1)] (5.61)
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Vt(Lt, nt) = EtΛt,t+1 [(1− σB)nt+1 + σB(µL,t+1φt+1 + µn,t+1)nt+1] (5.62)
Deﬁning
Ωt = (1− σB) + σB(µL,tφt + µn,t) (5.63)
we get
Vt(Lt, nt) = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1nt+1 (5.64)
Now, replace nt+1 by equation (5.51), yielding
Vt(Lt, nt) = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1[(R
ex
l,t+1 −Rext+1)Lt +Rext+1nt] (5.65)
Comparing equation (5.65) with equation (5.52), we get
µl,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
l,t+1 −Rext+1) (5.66)
µn,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1 (5.67)
Equations (5.66) and (5.67) are, respectively, the shadow value of bank assets and the
shadow value of net worth. The variable µn,t is the expected discounted marginal gain
to the banker of raising its net worth by one unit, keeping Lt constant, whereas µL,t is
the expected discount marginal gain of expanding assets by a unit, holding net worth
constant. The credit spread corresponds to (Rexl,t+1−Rext+1), that is, the diﬀerence between
the gross ex post real interest rate on loans to entrepreneurs and the gross ex post real
interest rate on deposits.
Note that there is an important diﬀerence between our banking sector setup and the
one described in Gertler and Karadi (2011) (hereafter GK's model). In GK's model,
the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms acquire capital each period by obtaining funding from banks.
To get the funds to buy capital, the ﬁrms issue a quantity of claims that equals the
number of units of capital acquired and price each claim at the price of a unit of capital
(that is given by Tobin's Q). Hence, in GK's framework it is assumed that loans are
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represented by the value at time t of the ﬁnancial claims on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that the
ﬁnancial intermediary holds. Since there are no frictions in the process of non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms obtaining loans from banks, credit granted to ﬁrms is only limited by the incentive
constraint aﬀecting the amount of deposits banks can raise.
In turn, in our model we assume the amount of loans is not only limited by the incentive
constraint arising from the liabilities side of the balance-sheet (which determines credit
supply), but also by the collateral constraint that entrepreneurs face whenever demand-
ing for credit. These distinctive features impacts signiﬁcantly on the dynamics of the
model, as it will be analysed in Section 5.3.
At the aggregate, net worth is the sum of the old banks' net worth and new banks' net
worth:
Nt = No,t +Nn,t
For old banks, the evolution of net worth is given by:
No,t = σB
[
Rexl,tLt−1 −Rext Dt−1
]
And the evolution of net worth for new banks follows
Nn,t =
ξB
(1− σB)(1− σB)
[
Rexl,tLt−1
]
where ξB
(1−σB) is the fraction of assets given by households to new bankers.
Therefore, total net worth can be written as
Nt = σB
[
Rexl,tLt−1 −Rext Dt−1
]
+ ξB
[
Rexl,tLt−1
]
Nt = (σB + ξB)(R
ex
l,tLt−1)− σBRext Dt−1 (5.68)
The balanced-growth equilibrium of the banking sector can now be summarised as:
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(1 + λt)µL,t = λtΘt
Lt = φB,tNt
φB,t =
µn,t
ΘB,t − µL,t
µL,t = max
{
0,ΘB,t − µn,t
φB,t
}
Nt = (σB + ξB)R
ex
l,tLt−1/(1 + Stochgt)− σBRext Dt−1/(1 + Stochgt)
Dt = Lt −Nt
µn,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
]
µL,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
l,t+1 −Rext+1)
]
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µn,t + φtµL,t)
Λt,t+1 = β(
ΛC,t+1
ΛC,t
(1 + Stochgt+1))
(1−%)(1−σc)−1
5.2.4 Monetary Policy and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The monetary policy rule is in the lines of a standard Taylor rule, in which interest rates
are determined as a response to deviations of inﬂation and output from their steady
state values and by the degree of interest rates persistence:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ log(MPSt)
(5.69)
where Rn, Π and Y correspond to the steady state values of the monetary policy rate,
inﬂation rate and output and MPS,t represents the monetary policy shock.
We assume the following calibration for the Taylor Rule, based on Curdia and Woodford
(2010):
Parameters Deﬁnition Value
ρr interest rate smoothing 0.8
θr,pi response to inﬂation gap 2.0
θr,y response to GDP gap 0.125
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The aggregate resource constraint in the economy is expressed by
Yt = Ct + C
E
t +Gt + It (5.70)
The model is completed with a government balanced budget constraint:
G = httaxt
Wt
Pt
(5.71)
5.2.5 Calibration of Fundamental Parameters
The values for the model parameters are summarized in Table 5.2.1. We choose standard
values in the literature for preference and technology parameters and we deﬁne as a time
unit a quarter.
Table 5.2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Symbol Value
Discount Factor β 0.998
Growth Rate g 0.0046
Government expenditure-output ratio gy 0.20
Labour Share α 0.70
Depreciation Rate δ 0.025
Habit in Consumption χ 0.7
Substitution elasticity of goods ζ 7.0
Fixed Cost c 1ζ = 0.14929
Preference parameter % 0.903
Investment parameter φx 2.0
Indexing parameter γ 0.2
Elasticity of Consumption σc 2.0
Banking Parameters
Bankers Survival Probability σB 0.975
Transfer for New Bankers ξ 0.002
Asset divertibility Θ 0.621
Entrepreneurs Parameters
Discount Rate βe 0.99
Elasticity of Consumption σe 0.5
Degree of External Habit Formation χe 0.7
Loan-to-Value Ratio m 0.35
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Regarding the banking sector parameters, our calibration follows closely the one adopted
in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler et al. (2012). We set σB, the rate of survival of
banks, by assuming that banks survive for 40 quarters on average (10 years). Therefore,
40 = 1
1−σB and σB = 0.975. The values of the fractions of initial net worth and assets
divertibility, ξ and Θ respectively, are computed to hit an economy wide leverage ratio
of four and to have an average credit spread of 200 basis points per year. The preference
parameter % is calibrated to hit a hours worked steady state target, h = 0.35. The
entrepreneurs' discount factor is computed to hit a consumption to output ratio of 0.1.
5.2.6 Shock Processes
This dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model features standard macroeconomic
shocks, namely monetary policy (MPSt), government spending (Gt), technology (At),
trend (1 + gt) and mark-up (MSt) shocks. All the disturbances follows a AR1 process
of the form:
log(MPSt) = %MPS log(MPSt−1) + MPS (5.72)
log(Gt) = (1− %) logG+ %G logGt−1 + G (5.73)
log(At) = %A log(At−1) + A (5.74)
log(1 + gt) = log(1 + g) + Atrend (5.75)
log(MSt) = %MS log(MSt−1) + MS (5.76)
where MPS, G, A, Atrend, MS, ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2i).
In the AR1 shock processes, standard deviations of i.i.d shocks are calibrated at 1% and
persistence parameters at 0.75.
5.3 Dynamic Simulations for the Model with a Laissez-
Faire Banking Sector
So far, we developed a macroeconomic model comprising two sources of ﬁnancial dis-
ruptions, one operating at the assets side of the banks' balance sheet, and the other
impacting on the liabilities side. To the extent that the inclusion of two types of credit
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frictions already involves a certain degree of novelty, in this section we investigate the
economic dynamics under this framework.
The aim is to provide qualitative insights into the eﬀects of two sources of ﬁnancial
frictions for the technology and monetary transmission mechanisms.
5.3.1 Negative Technology Shock
We begin by explaining the general dynamics of a negative technology shock. Figures
5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the impulse response functions for a series of economic and banking
variables.
Figure 5.2: Impulse response functions to a negative technology shock - a). Note: all
variables expressed in % deviation from steady state.
On impact, inﬂation rises and physical capital and investment drop. At the same time,
output rises, but very modestly. The increase in output may be driven by the large in-
crease in entrepreneurs' consumption, given the relaxation of the collateral constraint at
ﬁrst impact due to an unanticipated rise in asset prices. This counter-intuitive response
of output - it expands on impact following a negative productivity shock, but this is a
short-lived response - is also a ﬁnding in Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2011) for the model
with a collateral constraint type of ﬁnancial friction.
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Figure 5.3: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock - b).
The monetary policy maker counteracts the increase in prices (both goods and asset
prices) by raising policy rates. These policy rates are closely followed by increases in
loans' interest rates. The higher interest rates on credit and the further fall in physical
capital that follows lead to a tightening of the collateral constraint and a decline in
credit demand by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs' consumption starts declining at this
stage. At the banking sector, net worth increases signiﬁcantly, loans reduce and there is
deleveraging of the banks' balance sheets, inducing a rise in the bank spreads.
The contraction that started at the ﬁrms' level expands to the rest of the economy:
hours worked increase; output and consumption fall even further. The economy starts
recovering and converging to its steady steady when monetary policy rates are relaxed.
5.3.2 Positive Monetary Policy Shock
The impulse response functions from a tightening of the monetary policy interest rate
are represented in Figures 5.4 and 5.5:
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Figure 5.4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy tightening - a). Note: all variables
expressed in % from steady state.
After an increase in the policy rate, the transmission mechanism goes as follows. On im-
pact, the policy rate rises and inﬂation and asset prices decline (the latter considerably).
The interest rate on loans closely follows the policy rate behaviour, inducing a fall in
credit demand from entrepreneurs. Adding to this eﬀect, we observe the tightening of
the collateral constraint after a decrease in the value of the collateral, since both physical
capital and asset prices drop.
Figure 5.5: Impulse responses to a monetary policy tightening - b).
Banks' net worth increases, leverage falls and banks' balance sheet contracts, which
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is contrary to what occurs in the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model. In their set up,
a fall in asset prices has a negative direct impact on banks' net worth, because total
loans correspond to claims on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that equal the value of ﬁrms' capital.2
Thus, a drastic fall in asset prices implies a drastic fall in banks' net worth, restraining
substantially the amount of funds provided to the economy. This is the so called net
worth channel of the Gertler and Karadi (2011) framework and it explains why the
ampliﬁcation mechanism of a negative monetary policy shock is larger under this model.
In a two frictions framework of this type, the net worth channel is almost switched oﬀ,
since banks do not suﬀer signiﬁcant losses in their equity after a fall in asset prices. The
way we construct the assets' side of the banks' balance-sheet, i.e. by assuming a collateral
constraint that prevents banks from suﬀering from entrepreneurs' credit default, is the
reason why banks are better oﬀ even if the economy is hit by a sharp decrease in asset
prices.
The model dynamics continue as follows. To compensate for the decrease in loans (given
the high interest rates), entrepreneurs adjust consumption, which declines drastically.
A fall in households' consumption is also observed, but it is more modest than the one
aﬀecting entrepreneurs. Given the fall in consumption and investment, output contracts.
After the shock, policy interest rates start declining, bringing the economy back to its
steady state. However, while the nominal variables, such as inﬂation and interest rates,
converge to their steady state values after one to two years, some real variables, such as
physical capital and investment, take longer to converge.
In our framework, there is an interest rate undershooting issue under a monetary policy
shock. As an alternative to the Taylor rule we use, we consider a more aggressive
response of monetary policy towards inﬂation, but it does not change policy rates impulse
responses in a signiﬁcant way and the undershooting issue remains. Under Taylor Rules,
in which the response to the inﬂation gap is more aggressive, inﬂation rates fall by more
as expected, but also output, households' consumption and investment. In addition,
bank loans decrease at impact and increase afterwards by more under inﬂation targeting
rules leading to larger credit cycle swings.
2Recall that the value of physical capital is given by the number of units of physical capital acquired
multiplied by the price of a unit of capital, Qt.
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5.3.3 Impulse Responses Comparison
Now, we proceed to compare our two ﬁnancial frictions framework (thereafter 2 FF
Model) with three other models: i) a New Keynesian model without ﬁnancial frictions
(thereafter NK Model); ii) a New Keynesian model with ﬁnancial frictions in the spirit
of Gertler and Karadi (2011) (thereafter GK Model) ; and iii) a New Keynesian model
with ﬁnancial frictions in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005)
(thereafter KM Model).
Figures 5.6 illustrates the impulse responses diﬀerences between our framework and the
standard New Keynesian model for a monetary policy shock.
Figure 5.6: Model Comparison - 2 FF Model vs NK Model (IRF to a negative monetary
policy shock)
From the comparison of the 2FF Model with the NK model without any ﬁnancial frictions
(Figure 5.6), we conclude that the inclusion of ﬁnancial frictions in an otherwise standard
NK model considerably ampliﬁes the propagation mechanism of the monetary policy
shock. In particular, under a two ﬁnancial frictions model, the impact of an unexpected
increase in the policy rate leads to a larger fall in output, capital and investment.
The magnitude of the shock eﬀects on asset prices (represented by Tobin's Q) is signiﬁ-
cantly higher under our framework. It is also observed that the persistence of the shock
seems to be similar to a standard NK model.
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Figure 5.7 reports the dynamic diﬀerences across the other three models: 2 FF, GK and
KM models. The calibration was kept constant with the purpose of comparison.
The main conclusion is that the 2 FF Model impulse response functions closely follow
the KM Model, suggesting that results are mostly driven by the collateral constraint
part of the model, as already suggested above.
Nonetheless, in the 2 FF Model, the magnitude of the impact of the shock is less pro-
nounced, with the IRF being plotted in between the GK and the KM Models impulse
response functions for all the variables, except for investment and output.
The plotting of the impulse response functions for the three models suggests that con-
sidering diﬀerent sources of ﬁnancial frictions in a same setup may partially oﬀset each
other. This may be observed in the behaviour of bank loans, which drop is not as pro-
nounced in the 2 FF Model as in the other two (although it follows KM Model bank
loans impulse responses very closely).
This leads to a smaller fall in investment and it contributes to a faster recovery in
output (although the drop in output on impact is steeper than in the GK Model).
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2011) ﬁnd that a model featuring only a collateral constraint
produces reaction functions with the deepest impact occurring in the ﬁrst quarter of the
shock. Nevertheless, they note that this behaviour seems inconsistent with VAR evidence
on monetary transmission, where the reactions are usually hump-shaped. In addition,
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2011) conclude that, under a KM type of framework, shocks
exercise a strong response on the price of capital, as we observe in our two ﬁnancial
frictions model. Again, this feature may be inconsistent with empirical evidence and is
also reﬂected into excessive ﬂuctuations in the rate of return on capital.
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Figure 5.7: Model Comparison - 2 FF Model vs GK and KM Models (IRF to a monetary
policy tightening shock)
5.4 Preliminary insights on the interaction of macro-
prudential and monetary policies
In the previous sections, we simulated the dynamics of the model under a productivity
and a monetary policy shocks, assuming a constant loan-to-value ratio (i.e. in our model
m represents the loan-to-value ratio and is a parameter equal to 0.35). Since we are
ultimately interested in understanding the eﬀectiveness of time-varying LTV ratios as a
macroprudential tool (which are still to be introduced in the model), in this section we
seek to get some insights regarding the monetary transmission mechanism in the case of
a less stringent regulatory requirement for this ratio.
As aforementioned, we introduce a collateral constraint, in which the parameter m rep-
resents a loan-to-value ratio. This ratio can be thought of as a legal or regulatory
constraint on banks. Since we will introduce time-varying LTV ratios in a later stage of
this project, this exercise gives us a ﬂavour of how it can impact on the monetary shock
propagation. With this purpose, we depart from our baseline calibration and we re-run
the simulation procedure assuming the same parameters' values, except for m, which is
calibrated to capture a less stringent regulatory stance.
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Recall that the collateral constraint is given by
Rl,tLt ≤ mEt [Πt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt] (5.77)
Therefore, the LTV or m is then determined by the total amount of lending divided by
the expected value of the collateral at time t:
m =
Rl,tLt
Et [Πt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt] (5.78)
By assuming a low LTV ratio we thereby impose a tighter collateral constraint on the
entrepreneurs' side of the model. It means that entrepreneurs can borrow less given a
ﬁxed expected amount of physical capital. We consider two regimes for the LTV ratio: a
stricter regime (Regime 1), in which we assume a low value of 0.35 (our baseline scenario)
and an alternative and more ﬂexible regime (Regime 2), in which we assume a high value
of 0.89, as in Iacoviello (2005). The comparison of the dynamics of the model after a
monetary policy tightening under very distinct LTV ratios is presented in Figure 5.8:
Figure 5.8: Monetary Policy Shock under a low and a high LTV ratio.
A positive monetary policy shock in the context of a tighter (low) LTV ratio (Regime 1)
causes a smaller fall in output, driven by a less drastic fall in entrepreneurs' consump-
tion. In Regime 2, in turn, the transmission mechanism of a monetary policy shock is
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considerably ampliﬁed when a less strict loan-to-value ratio is required. Results suggest
that, ceteris paribus, the sensitivity of borrowing to changes in the value of the collat-
eral increases when the collateral constraint is relaxed. Calza et al. (2013) have similar
ﬁndings.
Therefore, the propagation dynamics of monetary policy under diﬀerent LTV ratios
suggest that a tighter LTV ratio dampens the credit cycle and decreases volatility in
the economy, outcomes that are in line with the macroprudential policy ultimate goals
of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability. In terms of monetary policy implications, the
ampliﬁcation eﬀects associated to less stringent regulatory requirements must be taken
into account by monetary policymakers when assessing the implications of monetary
policy changes.
In the context of a monetary union such as the euro area, this result is even more
important. While the monetary policy is common to all the Member States that belong
to the euro area, some macroprudential instruments are of the exclusive responsibility
of the national macroprudential authorities. This is precisely the case of the loan-to-
value ratios and other instruments that aim at mitigating the systemic risk that may
arise from asset price bubbles (such as loan-to-income and debt-service-to-income ratios).
Under this peculiar institutional and regulatory set-up, it is possible to observe divergent
national macroprudential policies targeting the real estate sector (more or less strict LTV
ratios), which may hamper the eﬀectiveness of monetary policymaker eﬀorts to stabilize
prices within the euro area.
5.5 Conclusions
The introduction of a macroprudential oversight of the ﬁnancial system raises very in-
teresting questions to researchers and economic policy makers. The institutional and
regulatory setup in the euro area are particularly challenging, since it combines central-
ized monetary and macroprudential policy powers at the ECB, but, at the same time,
discretion is allowed to national supervisory authorities in certain domains of macropru-
dential policy, such as in counterveiling real estate bubbles. Given that macroprudential
tools available to the ECB and those available to national authorities are imperfect
substitutes, how should the ECB as a monetary authority respond in the case national
authorities refrain from leaning against the bubble, e.g. because they do not fully in-
ternalize the associated ﬁnancial stability risks, which may partly spill over to other
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countries? And how should the ECB as a macroprudential authority react, acknowledg-
ing that its incomplete macroprudential policy toolkit may be not as eﬀective as the one
under the national authorities guard?
To the extent such risks complicate the ECB's task to maintain price stability, there
may be monetary policy rationale to respond to them. But, in this simpliﬁed example,
it would have to choose between policy-controlled interest rates or counter-cyclical cap-
ital buﬀers, both of which could only partly mitigate the risks. The question is which
tool would be best suited, in this second-best scenario, to counteract the price stability
implications of the bubble.
The DSGE framework with a banking sector constrained by two sources of ﬁnancial fric-
tions was developed in this chapter as a ﬁrst step to answer some of the current concerns
of euro area policy makers. Three main conclusions stand out from our simulations.
First, when merging two sources of credit frictions in an otherwise standard New Key-
nesian framework, the collateral constraint type of credit friction is dominant over the
incentive constraint proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011). Against this background,
the net worth channel of the banking sector from the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model
is not so relevant and, as a consequence, the model's large eﬀect on the economy also
vanishes under a technology and monetary type of shocks. This is a robust property of
our framework, since it holds for diﬀerent calibration scenarios and alternative monetary
policy rules.
Second, the inclusion of a collateral constraint, that can be seen as a prudent bank
behaviour, enhances banks' resilience to shocks. This ability is improved when a more
stringent LTV ratio is considered. These outcomes oﬀer some insight in terms of the ben-
eﬁts of introducing time-varying loan-to-value ratios as a macroprudential tool. Finally,
less stricter regulatory requirements for the loan-to-value ratio amplify the propagation
mechanism of monetary policy shocks.
As previously stated, the embeddedness in this two ﬁnancial frictions model of macropru-
dential tools, such as countercyclical capital requirements and time-varying loan-to-value
ratios, will be work for future research. Once this task is completed, we will be focusing
our analysis on the assessment of how eﬀective macroprudential policy is in counteracting
the eﬀects of shocks in the business cycle, assuming a perfect control of both instruments
and considering two scenarios: one including a monetary policy response and the other
abstracting from monetary policy.
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5.6 Appendix A - Equilibrium conditions
5.6.1 Households
The equilibrium of households sector is given by 7 equations:
Λt = Λ(Ct, ht) =
((Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1− ht)ρ)1−σc − 1
1− σc (5.79)
ΛC,t = (1− ρ)(Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1(1− ht)ρ(1−σc) (5.80)
Rext =
Rn,t−1
Πt
(5.81)
ΛC,t = βt(1 + Stochg)
(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1Et
[
Rext+1ΛC,t+1
]
(5.82)
Wt
Pt
=
%(Ct − χCt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−ρ)(1−σc)(1− ht)ρ(1−σc)−1
ΛC,t
(5.83)
βt = β (5.84)
ρt = ρ (5.85)
5.6.2 Goods Producers
Equilibrium of Goods Producers is given by 3 equations:
Y Wt = F (At, ht, Kt) = (Atht)
α(Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−α)/∆t (5.86)
Yt = (1− c)Y Wt (5.87)
PWt
Pt
Fh,t =
PWt
Pt
αY Wt
ht
=
Wt
Pt
(5.88)
5.6.3 Capital Producers
Equilibrium of capital producers is given by 7 equations:
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Kt = ((1− δ)Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt) + (1− φx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt))2)It)ψt+1 (5.89)
Xt =
It
It−1
(1 + Stochgt) (5.90)
DDt,t = β
ΛC,t
ΛC,t−1
(1 + Stochgt)
(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1 (5.91)
1 = Qt
(
1− φx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt))2 − 2Xtφx(Xt − (1 + Stochgt)
)
+ Z1,t+1(5.92)
Z1,t = Et−1
[
DDt,tQt2φx (Xt − (1 + Stochgt))X2t
]
(5.93)
Z2,t = (1− α)P
W
t
Pt
Y W
Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt)
+ (1− δ)Qt (5.94)
Rk,t = ψt(Z2,t/Qt−1) (5.95)
5.6.4 Entrepreneurs
Equilibrium for entrepreneurs is given by 12 equations:
DDEt,t+1 = βE
ΛEC,t+1
ΛEC,t
(1 + Stochgt+1)
−σE (5.96)
1 = Et
[
DDEt,t+1R
ex
l,t+1 +
ΘE,tRl,t
ΛEC,t
]
(5.97)
1 = Et
[
DDEt,t+1Rk,t+1 +
ΘE,tmΠt+1Qt+1(1− δ)
ΛEC,tQt
]
(5.98)
φE,t =
QtKt
QtKt − Lt (5.99)
Rl,tLt = mEt [Πt+1Qt+1(1− δ)Kt] (5.100)
CE,t +QtKt +R
ex
l,tLt−1/(1 + Stochgt) = Rk,tQt−1Kt−1/(1 + Stochgt) + TE,t + Lt (5.101)
ΛEt = (CE,t − χECE,t−1/(1 + Stochgt))(1−σE)
1
(1− σE)(5.102)
ΛEC,t = (CE,t − χECE,t−1/(1 + Stochgt))−σE (5.103)
Rexl,t =
Rl,t−1
Πt
(5.104)
βE,t = βE (5.105)
TEt = TE (5.106)
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5.6.5 Banking Sector
The equilibrium of the banking sector is given by 9 equations:
φB,t =
µn,t
ΘB,t − µL,t (5.107)
Lt = φB,tNt (5.108)
Nt = (σB + ξB,t)R
ex
l,tLt−1/(1 + Stochgt)− σBRext Dt−1/(1 + Stochgt) (5.109)
Dt = Lt −Nt (5.110)
µn,t = Et
[
DDt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
]
(5.111)
µL,t = Et
[
DDt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
l,t+1 −Rext+1)
]
(5.112)
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µn,t + φBt µL,t) (5.113)
ΘB,t = ΘB (5.114)
ξB,t = ξB (5.115)
5.6.6 Retail Sector
Retail sector is standard and comprises 6 equations:
Ht − ξβEt[Π˜ζ−1t+1Ht+1(1 + Stochgt+1)(1−ρ)(1−σc)] = YtΛC,t (5.116)
Jt − ξβEt[Π˜ζt+1Jt+1(1 + Stochgt+1)(1−ρ)(1−σc)] =
(
1/(1− (1
ζ
))
)
MCtYtΛC,tMSt(5.117)
Π˜t ≡ Πt
Πγt−1
(5.118)
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)1−ζ
(5.119)
MCt =
PWt
Pt
(5.120)
∆t = ξΠ˜
ζ
t∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)−ζ
(5.121)
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5.6.7 Closing the Model
The resource constraint and the government balanced budget close the model, plus the
Monetary Policy Rule:
Yt = Ct + CE,t +Gt + It (5.122)
G = httaxt
Wt
Pt
(5.123)
log(Rn,t/Rn) = αrlog(Rn,t−1/Rn) + (1− αR)(ΘΠlog(Πt/Π) + ΘY log(Yt/Y )) + epsMPS
(5.124)
5.6.8 Shocks
The shocks are 6: monetary policy, government spending, technology, trend, mark-up
and capital quality shocks, respectively:
log(MPS) = %MPSlog(MPSt−1) + epsMPS (5.125)
log(Gt)− log(G) = %G(logGt−1 − logG)− epsG (5.126)
log (At)− log (A) = %A(logAt−1 − logA)− epsA (5.127)
log(1 + Stochgt) = log(1 + g) + epsAtrend (5.128)
log(MSt) = %MS ∗ log(MSt−1) + epsMS (5.129)
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5.7 Appendix B - Steady State
5.7.1 Households
Λ =
((C − χC/(1 + g))(1−ρ)(1− h)ρ)1−σc − 1
1− σc
ΛC = ((1− ρ)(C − χC/(1 + g))(1−ρ)(1− h)ρ − 1)/(1− σC)
Rn = R
exΠ
Rex =
(1 + g)(1−ρ)(σc−1)+1
β
C = [W/P (1− ρ)(1− h)] / (ρ(1− χ/(1 + g))
β = β
ρ = ρ
5.7.2 Goods Producers
Y W = (Ah)α (K/(1 + g))(1−α)/∆
Y = (1− c)Y W
PW
P
αYW
h
= W/P
5.7.3 Capital Producers
X = 1 + g
I = (
δ + g
1 + g
)K
DD = β(1 + g)(1−ρ)(1−σc)−1
Q = 1
Z1 = 2DDQφx(X − 1− g)X2
Z2 = (1− α)P
W
P
Y W
K/(1 + g)
+ (1− δ)Q
Rk = Z2/Q
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5.7.4 Entrepreneurs
DDE = βE(1 + g)
−σE
ΘE = (1−DDERexl )
ΛEC
Rl
Rk =
1−ΘEmΠ(1− δ)/ΛEC
DDE
φE =
QK
QK − L
L = mΠQ(1− δ)K/Rl
CE = RkQK/(1 + g) + TE + L−QK −Rexl L/(1 + g)
ΛE = ((CE − χECE/(1 + g))(1−σE))/(1− σE)
ΛC,E = (CE − χECE/(1 + g))−σE
Rexl = Rl/Π
5.7.5 Banking Sector
φB =
µn
ΘB − µL
N = L/φB
N = ((σB + ξB)R
ex
l − σBRex)L/(1 + g)/ [1− σBRex/(1 + g)]
D = L−N
µn = Ω
µL = DDΩ (R
ex
l −Rex)
Ω = 1− σB + σBφBΘB
ΘB = ΘB
ξB = ξB
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5.7.6 Retail Sector
H =
Y ΛC
1− ξβΠ˜(ζ−1)(1 + g)(1−ρ)(1−σC)
J =
(1− 1/ζ)Y ΛCMC
1− βξΠ˜ζ(1 + g)(1−ρ)(1−σC)
MC =
(1− 1
ζ
)
[
1− ξβΠ˜ζ(1 + g)(1−ρ)(1−σc)
]
1− ξβΠ˜(ζ−1)(1 + g)(1−ρ)(1−σc)
(
1− ξΠ˜(ζ−1)
1− ξ
)1/(1−ζ)
Π˜ ≡ Π
Πγ
PW/P = MC
∆ =
(
1− ξ
1− ξΠ˜ζ
)(
1− ξΠ˜ζ−1
1− ξ
) ζ
ζ−1
At the steady state, MS = 1.
5.7.7 Closing the Model
Y = C + CE + I +G
tax = G/(h
W
P
)
At the steady state, we also make use of the following relationship:
G = gyY
where we assume gy = 0.2.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
The selection of the topics for the research conducted within the scope of this thesis
was motivated by the extensive and widespread reforms in the institutional settings
of monetary policy and banking regulation, implemented as a response to the large
economic breakdown caused by the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. The ﬁnancial crisis challenged
not only the way by which economic policy had been conducted in the past, but also
questioned the theoretical underpinnings of monetary policy and banking regulation.
As an example of the high policy interest of the research questions investigated in this the-
sis, the Bank of England (2015), in its discussion paper introducing One Bank Research
Agenda, has identiﬁed these themes as key research ﬁelds that need deeper knowledge
and understanding, or, has Bank of England puts it, require(s) frontier research. In
particular, the Bank of England (2015) research questions to which this thesis aims at
contributing are:
 How should monetary policy, macroprudential policy and microprudential policy
be co-ordinated? 
 Do we need to revisit the monetary policy framework in light of the ﬁnancial
crisis? 
 How should we design an appropriate macroprudential policy framework?
The survey ﬁnds that there is a common view that central banks should have an explicit
ﬁnancial stability mandate, by playing a role in macroprudential policy, but the micro-
prudential dimension of banking regulation and supervision should be assigned to an
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independent authority. This view is raised upon the stronger similarities between mon-
etary and macroprudential policies and, as such, the assignment of a ﬁnancial stability
mandate to central banks would maximise the synergies arising from the interaction
of the two policies (Smets, 2014). Nonetheless, the survey also highlights the need for
empirical and theoretical evidence, which is still scarce, suggesting that this view is not
yet informed by empirical and theoretical analysis, but mostly by personal opinions of
researchers and policymakers. Theoretical microeconomic approaches on this topic show
that the analysis of the banking supervisors' incentives should be carefully considered
in the design of optimal supervisory institutional setups. This literature would beneﬁt
from an extension to assess the implications of incorporating its interplay with monetary
policy. Macroeconomic models in which the interplay of monetary policy and banking
regulation is investigated are also scant and mainly focused on Basel I and Basel II cap-
ital regulation frameworks, although recent years have been very fruitful on producing
research on this ﬁeld.
The study presented in chapter 3 assesses the conﬂicting goals of price and banking
stability. Acknowledging that central banks in charge of banking regulation may be less
aggressive in their inﬂation mandate, in cases in which tight monetary policy conditions
could have a negative eﬀect on the stability of the banking system, it has been argued
that banking supervisory powers should be assigned to an independent authority to avoid
inﬂation bias. The paper investigates, from an empirical standpoint, whether central
banks' combined mandates lead to an inﬂation bias problem, using panel data for 25
industrialised countries from 1975 to 2012. Both static and dynamic panel data models
are employed. Findings show that, once we control for relevant policy and institutional
factors, there is no evidence of an inﬂationary bias arising from institutional frameworks
in which central banks have banking supervisory mandates. Our estimation results,
which are backed up by several robustness tests, suggest that there are other institutional
pillars of the monetary and ﬁnancial supervisory architecture, such as deposit insurance
schemes and inﬂation targeting mandates of central banks, that contribute in a signiﬁcant
manner to keeping inﬂation rates low. From a policy standpoint, empirically we do not
ﬁnd an inﬂation bias standing out from institutional arrangements in which central banks
combine monetary policy tasks with supervisory responsibilities. Still, without further
research on the relevance of other arguments against the combination of tasks, such as
reputation risks or organisational costs, we cannot argue that such an institutional setup
would be superior to one in which banking supervision is assigned to an independent
authority.
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The role of monetary policy in promoting ﬁnancial stability, its interaction with macro-
prudential regulation and how these policies can contribute to improve social welfare is
investigated in Chapter 4. We ﬁnd that a 'leaning against the ﬁnancial imbalances' mon-
etary policy rule would perform better in terms of maximizing welfare than a standard,
conventional monetary policy rule in this type of framework. However, rules responding
to credit spreads and asset prices would come at a cost of higher inﬂation volatility.
In the case of scenarios encompassing a macroprudential policy approach, our ﬁndings
from optimization exercises are interesting from a policy perspective. They not only
conﬁrm the countercyclical nature of macroprudential tools, but more importantly they
show that the deployment of macroprudential regulation together with standard mon-
etary policy improves welfare, regardless of the target selected in the analysis and, to
some extent, of the type of policy mandate under assessment (separate or uniﬁed). The
welfare maximization is achieved, though, under a partially uniﬁed mandate featuring a
macroprudential rule that reacts simultaneously to credit and credit spreads. Inﬂation
stabilization, on the other hand, is better accomplished in a separate mandate, compris-
ing a standard Taylor rule feeding back on inﬂation and output gaps, and a macropru-
dential rule responding to credit and spreads. Next steps of this project involves the
estimation of the model using Bayesian techniques.
The last chapter presents preliminary work on the investigation of the transmission
mechanisms of diﬀerent macroprudential policy instruments and their interactions with
monetary policy-controlled interest rates, under a New Keynesian model with two types
of ﬁnancial frictions. We extend a New Keynesian model with a banking sector incorpo-
rating an incentive constraint between households and banks to include a second friction,
which arises from a collateral constraint on the entrepreneurs' optimization problem.
This setup provides a ﬁrst step to analyze how monetary policy would diﬀer depending
on whether it has access to the full or only parts of the macroprudential toolkit - a
question that is particularly relevant in the emerging institutional landscape of the euro
area where the central bank will lack some important macroprudential instruments.
Three main preliminary ﬁndings stand out from our simulations. First, when merging
two sources of credit frictions in an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework, the
collateral constraint type of credit friction is dominant over the incentive constraint. Sec-
ond, the inclusion of a collateral constraint enhances banks' resilience to shocks. This
ability is improved when a more stringent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is considered. These
outcomes oﬀer some insight in terms of the beneﬁts of introducing time-varying LTV ra-
tios as a macroprudential tool. Finally, less stricter regulatory requirements for the
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loan-to-value ratio amplify the propagation mechanism of monetary policy shocks. Fu-
ture work on the model encompasses the embeddedness of macroprudential instruments,
such as countercyclical capital requirements and time-varying loan-to-value ratios.
The extension of the model to encompass tools that address speciﬁc types of macro-
prudential risks is needed to assess the challenges emerging from the new institutional
landscape in the euro area: upon inception of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),
the European Central Bank (ECB) is granted certain tools to address macroprudential
risks, but its toolkit remains incomplete: for example, the ECB is authorized to raise
countercyclical capital buﬀers on euro area banks, whereas loan-to-value ratios remain at
the discretion of national authorities in euro area countries. A real-estate bubble might
be best addressed by raising loan-to-value ratios, thus putting the onus of action on
national authorities, but they may not fully internalize the associated ﬁnancial stability
risks, and refrain from act against the bubble. Such risks may complicate the ECB's task
to maintain price stability and there may be monetary policy rationale to respond to
them. What would be then the best suited tool, in this second-best scenario, to counter-
act the price stability implications of the bubble, in such an institutional arrangement?
Our ﬁndings must be interpreted carefully, since DSGE models with typical solution
techniques based on log-linearization do not allow for the non-linear dynamics that usu-
ally characterize boom-bust episodes. As an example, bank default is an important
aspect of bust events which is diﬃcult to model is this type of frameworks. Recent re-
search work has been undertaken to overcome this limitation of DSGE models, such as
Clerc et al. (2015), in which bank, households and ﬁrms default are incorporated in a
otherwise standard real business cycle model. Still, despite the absence of nonlinearities
in these models, the importance for monetary policy to `lean against the wind' and for
considering macroprudential policy as an ancillary tool to deal with ﬁnancial imbalances
is entirely conﬁrmed by simply granting a non-negligible role to ﬁnancial intermediation
provided by the banking system.
Contributions of this thesis for macroeconomic policy making are several. Empirically, we
do not ﬁnd evidence for the `conﬂict of interest' thesis in developed countries, suggesting
that institutional arrangements assigning a central bank role in banking supervision are
insulated from a tendency to deviate from the inﬂation target. Moreover, results also
show that monetary policy rules reacting to price developments and ﬁnancial imbalances
are welfare optimizing, although they imply higher inﬂation volatility. The introduction
of macroprudential policy improves welfare, even in the case in which we consider a
separate institutional regime. Nonetheless, ﬁndings also suggest that macroprudential
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instruments may impact on the way monetary policy shocks propagate in the economy.
Research work in this ﬁeld is fundamental, not only to identify the situations in which
macroprudential policies may act as a complement to monetary policy, but mainly the
cases in which they may enter into conﬂict. As an example, research is needed on the
implications of a very accommodative monetary policy stance on the banking and in-
surance companies' business models, on the build-up of housing price bubbles and other
risks to ﬁnancial stability. The way each policy aﬀects the transmission mechanism of
the other policy should thereby be investigated more extensively. The understanding of
these interactions is key to the optimal design of institutional setups of monetary pol-
icy and macroprudential regulation, taking into consideration that there are currently
multiple institutional frameworks of macroprudential policy around the world. In Eu-
rope, for example, macroprudential policy institutional arrangements diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from country to country - the most common framework is characterised by the central
bank being the macroprudential authority (i.e. Portugal, United Kingdom, Finland or
Spain), but there are jurisdictions that have opted by assigning the macroprudential pol-
icy powers to committees, that can have diﬀerent compositions from country to country
(varying, for example, in the degree of intervention in the decision making process of
the Ministry of Finance). Adding a layer of complexity to the institutional landscape
in Europe, the European Central Bank has also macroprudential responsibilities, which
provides it with the capacity to top up measures taken by national authorities in some
cases. As such, there is a need to establish better cooperation mechanisms between
monetary and macroprudential authorities, at the national and European levels.
Other future research avenues related to these issues may assess the optimal level of bank
capital requirements and its decomposition into micro and macroprudential components.
The pace of implementation of stricter capital requirements, also considering its impact
on the monetary policy transmission channels, is also a very challenging topic that claims
for further investigation. Should supervisory authorities request ﬁnancial institutions to
comply with higher capital buﬀers gradually (for instance, allowing them to build the
capital ratio over a period of 3-4 years) or quickly (in one year, at most). What are
the implications of a faster or slower build up of capital buﬀers for credit, probability
of default and economic activity? This question leads to another relevant issue: How to
measure and quantify the costs and beneﬁts of such distinct approaches?
The eﬀectiveness of cyclical and structural macroprudential policy instruments is yet
to be proven; some macroprudential instruments are imperfect substitutes (for instance,
countercyclical capital requirements and the leverage ratio, both of them promote delever-
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aging) and may work better in some circumstances than others. The development of
frameworks accounting for endogenous bank default and systemic banking crisis would
be a very important step to assess the eﬀectiveness of macroprudential tools. The small
impact on welfare of introducing macroprudential policy in a framework that already
accounts for monetary policy could be related to the absence of such features in the
models.
The impact of the banking system structure on the transmission channel of monetary
policy also requires further empirical research. It is still not clear whether the propaga-
tion of monetary policy is smoother in more or less concentrated banking systems.
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